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Introduction 
Most of what has been written about Queensland politics over 
recent years has focused on the political style and policies of Sir 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen and his personal dominance of the 
Queensland political stage. One of the effects of this consuming 
interest of observers in the person rather than the party has been 
to deflect attention from the way the Nationals built and 
broadened their power base, eclipsed the Liberals in government 
and kept the Labor party in the political wilderness. Even less 
has been known about how the Nationals in government have 
operated, although there have been some inklings as a result of 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
This book is about how politics and government have been 
played, and continue to be played, in Queensland. In particular, 
it is about how the Nationals have operated as a government and 
how they have used political power. 
The Queensland National party staunchly professes its affec-
tion for the British monarchy, its commitment to democratic 
ideals, its attachment to the so-called Westminster system, and 
its determination forever to preserve and defend these tradi-
tions. Rhetoric aside, however, the Nationals over the years have 
shown they neither appreciated nor were concerned about the 
role of the various institutions in a parliamentary system of 
accountable government, the interrelationships among them, or 
the principle of the separation of powers. 
As a consequence, the distinctions between "party" and 
"government" have become badly blurred, if not lost, as have 
those between "parliament" and "government". The entire 
institutional fabric of Queensland has been manipulated — in 
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fact, utterly politicised — in the process of broadening the sup-
port of the National party and maintaining it in power. 
The blame for the situation in Queensland cannot be levelled 
entirely at the Nationals; over the years the other parties have 
contributed to it, as have the media. 
The ruling National party, post-Bjelke-Petersen and post-
Fitzgerald, has promised a more accountable government. The 
new style is unfamiliar and somewhat threatening to many in the 
party. It also remains to be seen whether very much has really 
changed. The National party organisation maintains as close a 
watch as ever over the parliamentary party in general, and the 
cabinet in particular. There is also no indication whatsoever that 
the post-Bjelke-Petersen National party will modify the most 
crucial element of its political foundation in Queensland, the 
zonal electoral system. Above all, it is the zonal system which 
has provided the Nationals with a longstanding buffer against 
political defeat and encouraged a view within the electorate of 
the party's electoral invulnerability. 
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In Their Own Right 
With the disintegration of the twenty-six year coalition in August 
1983, and the routing of the state Liberals at the subsequent 
general election, Joh Bjelke-Petersen and the Queensland 
Nationals realised their long-held political fantasy: the opportunity 
to govern Queensland in their own right. The achievement was 
a remarkable one. In just ten years the Nationals had managed to 
overcome the potentially fatal handicap of a dwindling electoral 
base and an image increasingly at odds with the state's changing 
economic and demographic profile. They discarded their tradition-
al "Country party" label in favour of a new name and, with the 
considerable support of the party's organisational wing, set about 
the process of addressing their attentions to a much wider set of 
issues, particularly matters of concern to urban voters in the south-
east of the state. The Nationals made gains in the coastal and 
hinterland areas outside Brisbane and, from 1977, it became 
apparent that their particular brand of strident anti-Labor politics 
was also loosening the grip of the Liberal party as the "natural" 
conservative party of the metropolitan and urban areas. 
Not surprisingly, the Liberals became increasingly anxious about 
the situation. The first sign was at their 1976 state convention, 
where the different perspectives of the parliamentary and organisa-
tional wings regarding the political direction and role of the 
Liberal party in Queensland became evident. Tensions increased 
as the Liberals witnessed a drift in their electoral support from 
31.1 per cent at the 1974 state election to 26.9 per cent at the 1980 
poll, and then deteriorate to an estimated 17 or 18 per cent in 
opinion poll support by the time the coalition self-destructed in 
August 1983. Over the same period support for their partners, the 
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Nationals, had risen to an almost corresponding extent, from 27.9 
per cent at the 1974 state poll to an estimated 34 per cent in the 
August 1983 Morgan survey and 38.9 per cent at the October 1983 
general election. 
This deterioration in Liberal support only aggravated the party's 
fundamental dilemma about its bridesmaid status in Queensland 
politics. On the one hand, the Liberals' role in the state's govern-
ing coalition had given the party legitimacy and standing and, 
significantly for the senior members of the parliamentary party, the 
considerable spoils of office. On the other, there had developed 
in the public mind a clear impression that the Nationals were far 
more adroit tactically than their coalition partners. The Liberal 
party organisation was thus increasingly frustrated by what it 
perceived as the inability or unwdllingness of its parliamentarians 
to influence the framing of government policy and thereby to 
secure identifiably "Liberal" measures, such as electoral or par-
liamentary reform. Joh Bjelke-Petersen's unwavering opposition 
to such reformist causes, which he periodically ridiculed as "hoo-
ha" or "trendy", did not make the Liberals' task any easier; nor did 
the party's inability to develop an organisational or electoral base 
beyond the south-eastern corner of the state, an inability at least 
partly enforced by the coalition arrangement under which each 
partner was discouraged from contesting the other's seats. 
While the Nationals' trouncing of the Liberals in 1983 was 
comprehensive, a feeling still lingered in Liberal ranks that the 
Nationals' ascendancy would be temporary and that traditional 
Liberals would return to the fold once they had sampled the style 
of a National party government now unfettered from the strictures 
of coalition. True, the Nationals' position was fragile to the extent 
that prior to the 1983 state poll they had only ever held one 
Brisbane seat, Wynnum, for a single term between 1974 and 1977. 
At the same time, the 1983 result provided them with a hitherto 
elusive metropolitan base, netting the party five seats on election 
night, and a further two following the post-election defections of 
two former Liberal ministers, Don Lane and Brian Austin. Even 
more impressive for the Nationals in 1983 was that, in contesting 
many Brisbane seats for the first time, they outpolled the Liberals 
in 15 of the 18 metropolitan seats which both parties contested. 
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Indeed, if the Nationals made a tactical error in their metropolitan 
campaign at that election it was their decision not to contest every 
Brisbane seat. Had they done so, the rout of the Liberals might 
have been complete. 
Throughout his premiership Bjelke-Petersen and his government 
sought to be perceived as forcefully promoting Queensland's 
economic development and its status as the last bastion of free 
enterprise, at the same time staunchly protecting and defending 
the state's moral and political values. He also refined to a new 
level of frenzy the hostility toward the Commonwealth government 
which, long before his premiership, had developed as an important 
element of Queensland's political culture. Sir Joh's assaults on the 
Labor party were as savage as they were relentless, while his 
careful cultivation of the equation that anything Labor was un-
Queensland, anti-Queensland, socialist, Canberra-based and, 
therefore, wrong, proved an extremely effective weapon in his 
oratorical arsenal against his traditional foes. 
Immediately the coalition arrangement was terminated the 
Nationals moved to destabilise and delegitimise the state's Liberals 
in precisely the same manner as the previous coalition government 
had done over the years with the ALP. Instead of proceeding 
directly to the polls after the coalition break-up the premier 
recommended to the governor, and was permitted to form, a 
temporary minority government to administer the affairs of the 
state for the sixty-day period leading up to the announced election 
date. This proved a shrewd ploy, allowing the premier valuable 
weeks in which to demonstrate his claim that the departure of the 
Liberals had simply forced some rearrangements and that 
government business was "as usual". In other words, the formation 
of the temporary minority government - including the appointment 
of a number of additional National party ministers to cover the 
portfolios vacated by the Liberals - allowed the National party 
valuable time to legitimise itself as a government and to convince 
the electorate that the Liberals had deserted their responsibilities 
and thus were now no more than political counterfeit. 
The Nationals' minority government status also conferred upon 
the party the considerable advantage of conducting the election 
campaign as the government, that is, from the political high-
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ground. That advantage was probably enhanced by the decision to 
launch their official election campaign before either the ALP or 
the Liberals. By leading off the campaign the Nationals were able 
to establish the issues on which the election would be fought. It 
also enabled the premier, now treasurer as well, to incorporate 
within the National party policy statement - and thus take credit 
for - a range of initiatives which were compiled by the previous 
Liberal treasurer and which in other circumstances would have 
been contained in a state budget. 
There were other aspects of the Nationals' policy speech in 1983 
which highlighted their intention to isolate, destabilise and 
delegitimise their former coalition partners. Perhaps most 
tellingly, the speech did not contain a single reference to the 
Liberal party or the Liberal party's contribution to coalition 
government since 1957. By ignoring the Liberals so pointedly, Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen made brutally clear his party's determination to 
exclude its former coalition partners totally, with the aim of 
squeezing them out in a polarised poHtical climate. This strategy 
of isolation was underlined later in the campaign when the 
Nationals repeatedly lumped together the Liberals and the ALP on 
the issues of parliamentary and electoral reform. The intention 
behind this was presumably to create the impression that on such 
matters there was nothing to distinguish the two and that people 
who supported such measures might as well go "all the way" and 
vote for the Labor party. 
The Nationals in their own right, 1983-1986 
Following the election and the subsequent desertion of two 
Liberals to give them government in their own right, the Nationals 
persevered with the stridently promotional, defensive and desper-
ately parochial style which had served the coalition government so 
well. In several important respects, however, the circumstances 
of government had now changed. Most importantly, the condition 
of the state's economy had weakened. Joh Bjelke-Petersen had 
built much of his reputation on the economic strength of Queens-
land and his government's ability to deliver the "economic goods". 
He had been extremely fortunate, however, in having able 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
In Their Own Right 5 
treasurers to assist him - Gordon Chalk, Bill Knox, and Llew 
Edwards - all Liberals. During the years of coalition Joh Bjelke-
Petersen had relied very considerably on these men for economic 
advice, as well as requiring them to absorb the heavy and detailed 
workload associated with the Treasury portfolio. With the 
coalition arrangement discarded, Bjelke-Petersen decided to 
allocate himself the dual roles of premier and treasurer, duties 
hitherto split as part of the coalition agreement. It was a decision 
he may soon have regretted, given his obvious discomfort with 
detailed economic debate. 
During 1984 and 1985, and coinciding with an international 
downturn in mineral prices, several government and academic 
reports were released questioning the state's general economic 
condition, particularly its narrow structural base; these reports 
also suggested that the Queensland economy was not performing 
as well as the economies in several Labor states. While neither Sir 
Joh nor most of his ministers acknowledged these criticisms in 
even the slightest way, the changed economic circumstances in the 
state presented some political problems for the government. 
Moreover, the refusal or inability of the premier to enter into 
serious debate on the economy did not inspire confidence either 
in his own performance as treasurer or his government's willing-
ness to address substantive economic concerns. On the contrary, 
Bjelke-Petersen's increasingly intemperate outbursts in response 
to any individual or group criticism of him or of his government's 
economic record gradually made the premier's advanced age and 
level of astuteness a political issue. 
For Joh Bjelke-Petersen, the Nationals' triumph in 1983 rep-
resented the pinnacle of his political career. Yet the circumstances 
of that election - the disintegration of the coalition and the 
implosion of the state Liberal party - generated some doubt about 
the permanence of the realignment that had occurred at the poll. 
Also, the Nationals' achievement in 1983 was secured by a premier 
then well into his seventies, but upon whom the fortunes of the 
government now predominantly depended. The electoral skills of 
the premier and his party machine were beyond dispute, but 
governance requires a different blend of competence, and the 
Nationals, now in sole occupancy of the Treasury benches, could 
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no longer rely on the prop provided by the Liberal party s 
partnership in government. During the cozdition the Nationals were 
far more street-smart than their Liberal partners, yet the Liberals 
over the years had provided a number of highly regarded cabinet 
ministers in complex portfolios. 
The departure of the Liberals also posed other problems. One 
of the most significant of these was that, for the first time ever, the 
National party had no scapegoats on whom it could dump its 
problems. During the years of coalition the Nationals had basked 
in their tenure of a number of high-profile, largesse-pumping 
portfolios, at the same time sidestepping political fallout by 
saddling Liberal ministers with pohtically troublesome portfolios, 
such as Labour Relations, and also with one-off responsibihties for 
problematic issues. Furthermore, with the Liberal buffer removed, 
National party parliamentarians representing vulnerable metropoli-
tan seats now bore the brunt of criticism when government 
decisions were unpopular with the Brisbane community. And 
although the number of National-held metropolitan electorates was 
modest, government by the Nationals in their own right depended 
on these seats being retained. 
Changes within the National party's own organisation also 
affected the circumstances of government. It is somewhat ironical 
that the critically supportive role provided by the National party 
organisation in assisting the party to broaden its electoral base in 
the south-east and, ultimately, to assist the Nationals to secure 
government in their own right, was not sustained thereafter. Not 
long after the 1983 election their longtime executive director, Mike 
Evans, resigned to move into private business. His successor, 
political director Col Walker, also departed his post fairly quickly, 
for medical reasons. These and later personnel movements were 
both uncharacteristic and destabilising for the party, and they most 
certainly related to the unusual amount of internal friction evident 
in National ranks after 1983. 
In general terms, the Nationals endured a reasonably rocky first 
term of office in their own right. True, the government scored a 
major and apparently popular victory over the state's power 
industry unions in early 1985. In other areas, however, the 
government's performance was shakier: the premier's indifferent 
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performance as treasurer has already been mentioned and the 
government also was plagued by a series of scandals, some 
internally damaging. During 1985 Sir Edward Lyons, a close 
friend of the premier, relinquished his posts as TAB chairman and 
National party trustee in the wake of a prolonged battle with Russ 
Hinze, the Local Government and Racing minister. That struggle, 
and Hinze's role in it, angered the premier and for a time called 
into question Hinze's own position in cabinet. The government 
was also beset by the political fallout which followed cabinet's 
authorisation of police raids on alleged abortion clinics in Brisbane 
and Townsville, an action which the public considered to be heavy-
handed. Severe embarrassment also surrounded criminal charges 
against Allen Callaghan for misappropriating funds. Callaghan was 
formerly press secretary to Sir Joh and, up until his enforced 
resignation, permanent head of the Department of Arts, National 
Parks, and Sport. Judith Callaghan, his wife, was secretary of the 
Queensland Day Committee and had her own problems with the 
law: in mid-1986 she was jailed for misappropriation of the 
committee's funds. 
An even more damaging scandal arose over the disclosure in 
early 1986 that the state government planned to revoke 390 
hectares of national park land on Lindeman Island. The govern-
ment's plan, it transpired, was to revert this area to freehold and 
sell it to East-West Airlines, of which the Queensland chairman 
was Sir Edward Lyons. The issue focused attention on the way the 
government conducted business and generated hostility throughout 
much of the state. The public were irritated by the government's 
move to revoke the national park area without public consultation 
or debate, and by the decision to sell the land to East-West 
without calling public tenders. There was disquiet as well that 
East-West's Queensland's operations were chaired by a confidant 
of the premier. Not surprisingly, the government was accused of 
cronyism. For their part, both Bjelke-Petersen and Lyons were 
seen as handling the issue with an arrogant disregard for com-
munity concerns; this was best exemplified by Sir Edward, who 
told opponents of the venture that they could "go to hell" {Daily 
Sun, 11 March 1986). 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
§ Working The System 
There were other signs that the government was becommg 
increasingly accident-prone, and the party organisation unusually 
clumsy. Sir Joh's government was embarrassed just prior to the 
1986 state election campaign by a surprisingly messy round of 
National party preselection battles, as well as by suggestions of an 
over-generous out-of-court settlement of a defamation action in 
the premier's favour from the Bond Corporation. Another 
controversy arose when the Primary Industries minister, Neil 
Turner, overruled an Agricultural Bank decision not to provide a 
loan for $145,000 to Michael Behan, a north Queensland grazier. 
Behan was a former National party Senate candidate and at the 
time a senior official in the party. The premier's churhsh referen-
ce to criticism of the loan as a "lousy $145,000" did nothing to 
dampen public outrage. Indeed, the significance of the premier's 
gaffe was that, unlike many of his other remau-ks, that throwaway 
line may have generated misgivings not only in the south-east 
corner of the state but also in the National party's electoral 
heartland west of the Great Divide and in the coastal farming 
districts. 
Repeating the success, 1986 
Although the 1986 election campaign was not waged in circumstan-
ces as dramatic as the 1983 poll, its outcome was viewed as at least 
as potentially enduring. The Nationals had won government 
without the aid of the Liberals in the special circumstances of 1983 
and had snared the hitherto elusive metropolitan base in the 
process. Those achievements were on trial in 1986, as was the 
somewhat patchy record of the Nationals' first term in office. 
Above all else, however, the 1986 poll provided the opportunity to 
confirm the realignment amongst the state's non-Labor voters 
which had occurred in 1983. 
The Nationals won again in 1986; indeed they did so relatively 
comfortably. This was despite an uncharacteristically poor 
campaign effort on their part - poor, at least, until the last three 
or four days before voting. Over the preceding decade Queens-
landers had become accustomed to the slick, professional election 
campaigns which party president Sir Robert Sparkes and executive 
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director Mike Evans masterminded. Little of that professionalism 
was apparent in 1986. The difficulties commenced at the very 
outset, when the impact of their policy launch on the pubHc was 
overshadowed by embarrassing news coverage the same day of the 
failure of the Nationals' Sherwood candidate, former Brisbane 
town clerk Tony Philbrick, to lodge his nomination by the noon 
deadline. The party suffered more embarrassment within a few 
days when it had to withdraw, for further editing, one of its TV 
commercials which contained unauthorised footage of Queensland 
and Australian Rugby League captain, Wally Lewis. 
At a more substantial level the Nationals had to contend during 
the campaign with allegations of cronyism within the state govern-
ment made by one of the party's own trustees. Sir Roderick 
Proctor. These allegations, aired on ABC TV, immediately gave 
legitimacy to the ALP and Liberal campaigns, both of which were 
heavily emphasising the issues of corruption and cronyism in the 
wake of the Lindeman Island affair and the Allen and Judith 
Callaghan scandals. The Hames of the corruption issue were 
fanned during the campaign when it was confirmed that Sir Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen had indeed received $400,000 from Alan Bond in 
compensation for an allegedly defamatory statement broadcast on 
2 February 1983 by the QTQ Channel 9 current affairs programme 
Today Tonight. Bond had paid the amount to Sir Joh shortly after 
assuming ownership of the television channel. 
With this array of troubles the Nationals were finding it difficult, 
almost impossible, to control the campaign agenda. And even 
when the focus did turn to one of their favourite traditional issues 
- the support and defence of Queensland's economic record - they 
found themselves unable to score points as easily or as effectively 
as in the past. The Nationals' own market research was also 
confirming that Sir Joh's personal stocks were softening; even his 
attempts to "federalise" the campaign (that is, blame the federal 
government for Queensland's ills) failed when the Hawke govern-
ment ignored or sidestepped most of Bjelke-Petersen's taunts. 
Despite their problems the Nationals did regroup in the last few 
days of the campaign, and in the event marginally improved their 
overall primary tally from 38.9 per cent in 1983 to 39.6. They did 
so because they spent considerably more on their campaign than 
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their opponents, and because in the end they apparently convinced 
undecided voters that the return of the Nationals was preferable 
to the instability of a "hung" parliament, that is, one in which no 
party commands a majority. Throughout the campaign Bjelke-
Petersen had bitterly traded blows with the Liberals over the issue 
of electoral reform and continually discounted any possibility of a 
return to coalition. As a campaign ploy, he had actually threat-
ened to call a fresh election if the first outcome was unsatisfactory. 
Political observers may have been astounded by such a statement, 
yet its underlying assumption - that voters preferred stability - was 
probably very sound. 
Ejcplaining the Nationals' buoyancy 
One of the more intriguing aspects of Queensland politics over the 
Bjelke-Petersen years, and one of more than passing interest to Sir 
Joh's successors, has been the extent to which the National party's 
support base, certainly in the period before the Fitzgerald Inquiry, 
remained loyal in the face of an almost constant barrage of 
embarrassments and controversy. Of course it is the case that in 
particular issues the stocks of both party and party leader dipped 
momentarily. Yet the electorate's personal approval of the 
premier in August 1986 (the last Morgan survey before the 
announcement of the election date) was exactly the same as it was 
in the Morgan poll immediately before the 1983 election - 50 per 
cent. Support for the National party over that period was 
correspondingly buoyant, as the election results showed. 
There are various explanations for this quite remarkable 
buoyancy, a number of which turn on Bjelke-Petersen's position 
and performance. Throughout his premiership Sir Joh created an 
image for himself as the formidable protector and defender of 
Queensland and, in the process, acquired almost cult status for 
himself with a significant proportion of the electorate. The 
identification of Joh Bjelke-Petersen with Queensland was honed, 
literally, to an artform during the 1983 state campaign, when the 
National party distributed, and featured in their advertising, a large 
wall-poster sketch of a besuited Bjelke-Petersen accompanied by 
the simple captions "Joh" and "Queensland". After 1983 the 
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Nationals extended this further, bluntly appealing in the govern-
ment's classified advertising to Queenslanders' innate sense of 
superiority and individualism: "Queensland. A Stronger state. A 
better life"; "The Queensland government. Providing more jobs"; 
"Queensland. Getting on with Business"; "Queensland. State of 
the Future"; "Queensland. Australia's Growth State"; not to 
mention the Main Roads Department's contribution to this 
campaign, "Paving the way for Queensland". And when the 
Nationals were on the defensive in the lead-up to the 1986 poll, 
they managed to work these various themes together in their 
election slogan "Nationals. There's never been a greater need". 
Even though the Nationals' performance in government since 
1983 had been shaky, they were able to tap that large political 
reservoir created over the years by their successful articulation and 
mortgaging of what political scientist Brian Head describes in a 
different context as the ideology of "Queenslandism". This has 
enabled the state government not only to legitimise its position 
against rival political parties but also to argue that any criticism of 
its behaviour - whether internal (within the state) or external 
(from Canberra or elsewhere) - is anti-Queensland, un-Queens-
land, and thus wrong. In that sense, Bjelke-Petersen's continued 
reference in the 1983 campaign to the state ALP leader, Keith 
Wright, as "Mr Wrong" was hardly accidental. 
This strategy of Sir Joh and the Nationals of equating their own 
position on any issue vigorously and automatically with that of 
Queensland, and their vicious defence of that position against any 
and all others, worked brilliantly to their advantage over the years. 
It did so first in the 1974 state election when the ALP's parlia-
mentary numbers were reduced to the strength of a cricket team 
after a campaign dominated by pungent exchanges between the 
premier and the prime minister, Gough Whitlam, and Bjelke-
Petersen's cultivation of images of Canberra threatening the 
interests and sovereignty of Queensland. In the 1983 election the 
strategy was equally successful, although this time the threat to the 
state was an internal one: the Liberals were depicted by the 
Nationals as having deserted the government, thus abrogating their 
responsibilities to Queensland. 
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The formula which the Nationals have so ably adopted is not 
novel in the context of twentieth century Queensland politics. Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen's agrarian rhetoric, his championing of state's 
rights, his anti-Communism, his intimidation of the media, and 
his faith in unlimited development were no more strident than the 
views and actions of predecessors such as Forgan Smith, A1.P 
premier from 1932 to 1942. Nor were Bjelke-Petersen's assaults 
on Canberra any more feverish than those of another Labor 
premier, Ned Hanlon, later in the 1940s; the same two premier-
ships also shared another more dubious distinction, the apphcation 
of zonal gerrymanders. Attacks on elements of the trade union 
movement and tough industrial legislation were hallmarks of 
Bjelke-Petersen's premiership, yet such actions are hardly distin-
guishable in style from the determination of earlier governments, 
such as those of McCormack, Hanlon, and Gair (all Labor), and 
Nicklin (Country party-led coalition) to suppress militant unions. 
The Bjelke-Petersen government was also not the first in 
Queensland to be touched by allegations of personal corruption, 
though no premier's administration has been so smothered by such 
allegations as Sir Joh's, albeit that many of these were not aired 
until after his retirement from politics. In this respect, too, there 
have been precedents: the premierships of two early Labor leaders, 
E.G. Theodore and William McCormack, were badly tarnished, 
after both had left office, by the Mungana affair. This scandal 
emerged during the Great Depression when it was discovered that 
Theodore (by then federal treasurer) and McCormack held 
interests in a company which sold mining leases to the government 
at a considerable profit. The public outcry prompted a royal 
commission and, later, a civil prosecution. 
There has developed in Queensland over the years a consensus 
about what is good for the state. Economic development, 
particularly in the rural areas, has been regarded as the key to 
long-term success, ensuring prosperity and also the survival of the 
rural way of life which has been seen to be so spiritually important 
to Queensland's character. In terms of this folklore any limitation 
placed upon the state's developmentalist aspirations was un-
welcome. A political environment has thus emerged which tends 
to be much more receptive to notions of strong leadership and 
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strong, stable and purposeful government (that is, "delivering the 
goods" for Queensland) than it is to niceties relating to the 
conduct of government. 
Labor's split in 1957 caused a realignment of Queensland 
politics, with the Country party's base of support allowing it to 
succeed to much of the ALP's turf outside the metropohtan area. 
At the same time, the Country party-led coalition retained and 
further tailored the zone-based electoral structure introduced in 
1949 by the Hanlon Labor government. The effect was to ensure 
that the Liberal party's ambitions were continually thwarted. 
Indeed, the Liberals, at successive state elections up to and 
including 1974, continued to outpoll the Country (later National) 
party, yet the effect of that zonal arrangement, coupled with the 
long-time agreement of the coalition parties not to contest each 
other's seats, ensured the Liberal party's continued junior status in 
the coalition government. 
Over the decade to 1986, then, the National party managed not 
only to retain its traditional rural constituency, but also to extend 
its base of support to metropolitan Brisbane. Significantly, too, the 
regime-building potential of Sir Joh's particular brand of Right 
populism allowed his party to make significant inroads into 
working-class areas hitherto loyal to the ALP. Indeed, one of 
Bjelke-Petersen's skills was his ability to equate his position, and 
his party's, with Queensland's interests in such a way as to cultivate 
support from people who were prepared to vote for the party 
despite its ideology and behaviour, and against their own economic 
self-interest. Meantime, the electorate was encouraged to regard 
the role adopted by the Opposition as having nothing constructive 
to contribute, given that any criticism it offered was interpreted as 
an impediment to the process of government and thus, by defin-
ition, unhelpful and un-Queensland. 
Sir Joh's painful exit 
Instead of basking in the glory of his government being returned 
once again in its own right at the 1986 general election, and 
perhaps preparing himself for a graceful retirement from the 
political stage, Sir Joh took the improbable step of announcing his 
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intention to seek the prime ministership. Despite his age he was 
obviously still ambitious and probably concluded that he had 
achieved all there was to be gained from Queensland politics. He 
could now offer his brand of leadership to the nation, adding the 
scalp of Bob Hawke's federal Labor government to his political 
belt and at the same time rescuing the federal conservative parties 
from their leadership crisis. 
A number of Bjelke-Petersen's ministerial colleagues, however, 
harboured grave misgivings about his Canberra plans. At a 
country cabinet meeting on 16 February 1987 held, ironically, at 
Kingaroy, a number of them pleaded with him to remain in 
Queensland. They were concerned not only about the federal 
offensive failing but also about the survival prospects of the 
Queensland Nationals without him. Sir Joh, however, was deter-
mined to proceed. 
The "Joh for PM" campaign was launched over the Christmas-
New Year recess, a traditionally quiet political period chosen 
presumably to maximise media coverage. It attracted widespread 
public curiosity. There were reports that privately commissioned 
market research supposedly indicated public support for the 
campaign, while one of Sir Joh's principal backers, Sanctuary Cove 
developer Mike Gore, indicated that strong bankrolling of the 
campaign was available from the business community, perhaps to 
the extent of $15 million. Within a relatively short time, however, 
the "Joh for PM" drive stalled, for a number of reasons: lack of 
public support; inability to mobilise a nationally based campaign 
infrastructure; and, in more general terms, failure on the part of 
Bjelke-Petersen and his supporters to understand Australian 
federal politics and the Australian electorate. 
The failure of the "Joh for PM" strategy was deeply humiliating 
for the Queensland premier, who had built much of his personal 
reputation on his ability to outmanoeuvre his opponents. In this 
instance, however, he had failed not only to secure the keys to the 
Lodge, but also even to contest a federal seat. And far from 
wrecking a federal Labor government, Sir Joh's antics actively 
assisted his political opponents by destabilising the conservative 
parties. The prime minister, Bob Hawke, capitalised on this 
disarray within the non-Labor ranks by calling a double dissolution 
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election for 11 July 1987. At that poll the ALP government was 
returned with an increased majority, albeit with a reduced vote. 
Bjelke-Petersen was blamed by many on the conservative side of 
politics for creating much of the turmoil within the non-Labor 
parties which led to their third successive federal election defeat. 
Worse for the Queensland premier, however, the election results 
indicated that Labor had done well in terms of both seats and 
votes in Queensland. In other words. Sir Joh was perceived as 
having mounted a campaign which not only had destabilised the 
non-Labor parties federally, as well as itself failed, but also had 
backfired in his own backyard. 
Sir Joh's Canberra plans also distracted his energies from his 
obligations as premier and state treasurer over a number of 
months. During this period the Nationals' state government in 
Queensland was perceived as not addressing the severe economic 
difficulties confronting the state. Friction was also created within 
the Bjelke-Petersen cabinet by the premier's apparent anointing of 
Bill Gunn as the next premier. Gunn, while obviously grateful for 
Sir Joh's endorsement, was nevertheless sensitive to the public 
perception of himself as a Bjelke-Petersen clone. During this 
period as acting premier he took a number of steps to distance 
himself from his leader, the most significant being his role in 
establishing the Fitzgerald Inquiry and supporting its work. 
Another was his decision to nominate Sir Robert Sparkes for 
another term as party president, despite Bjelke-Petersen's 
opposition to Sir Robert. The effect of these events, coupled with 
opinion poll evidence signalling a decline in support for Sir Joh, 
was a much closer questioning of the premier's performance and 
pohtical judgment. Needless to say, Bjelke-Petersen did not 
appreciate such questioning: he felt he had led the Queensland 
National party to its greatest achievements and he should be left 
free by his party to determine his own future, in particular, the 
nature and timing of his departure from state politics. The 
concern of many Nationals, however, was that Sir Joh's political 
vocabulary simply did not include the word retirement. 
Bjelke-Petersen's difficulties worsened. At the National party's 
State Council meeting at Rockhampton in October 1987 the 
premier bitterly contested a motion, which State Council subse-
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quently endorsed, that ministers be required to step down from 
their portfolios a reasonable time before their retirement. The 
premier indicated his disillusionment with the party. The events 
which took place at the meeting confirmed to Bjelke-Petersen that 
his party now perceived him as an electoral liability. He and Sir 
Robert Sparkes were also urged to cease hostilities. Within a 
matter of days after the meeting, however. Sir Joh renewed his 
criticism of the party president and, in a misguided ploy to keep 
the premiership secure, threatened to call a snap election and to 
take the party down with him if it moved on him. 
These actions only served to underline party and public concern 
about his performance and judgment. On 8 October Sir Joh, now 
aware that his party had tired of his antics, blunted any immediate 
threat to his position by announcing (almost twelve months in 
advance) his preferred retirement date of 8 August 1988, his 
twentieth anniversary as premier. The announcement was greeted 
with scepticism by some National party members who believed that 
the premier was playing for time; they were convinced that he 
would not be able to contain for long his anger toward the party 
president and other Nationals with whom he differed personally or 
on policy priorities. Even at this stage, however, most state 
Nationals still hoped that Sir Joh would be allowed to see out his 
preferred term, in view of his contribution to the party over many 
years. 
With Sir Joh's departure from state politics now apparently 
assured, the National party, at its annual state conference at 
Tovwisville in November 1987, set about the task of preparing for 
the post-Bjelke-Petersen era. In policy terms this translated into 
endorsement of the position of Sir Robert Sparkes, and rejection 
of Sir Joh, on a number of issues. These included the introduction 
of condom vending machines, some hberalisation of the party's 
stance on prostitution, the provision of sex education during school 
hours, and the establishment of a foreign land register. Bjelke-
Petersen was also rebuffed by the conference on his insistence that 
Japanese developer Yohachiro Iwasaki be given trusteeship of land 
proposed as national park near Iwasaki's holiday resort at 
Yeppoon on the central Queensland coast. Even worse for Sir 
Joh's position. Sir Robert Sparkes was re-elected party president, 
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with some 80 per cent of the votes cast (Sir Robert Sparkes 528 
votes, Professor Hiram Caton 89, Les Whykes 47). This was a 
serious defeat for the premier, who had lobbied strongly against 
the incumbent president. Even Sir Joh's loyal deputy. Bill Gunn, 
expressed the view that the premier was "out of tune" and that he 
should "go fishing, have a rest and do a fair bit of thinking" 
(Courier-Mail, 9 November 1987). 
The Townsville conference left Sir Joh deeply embittered, and 
his public comments in the days following indicated that the par-
ty's crisis might require resolution in advance of his stated retir-
ement date. In the event, it was Bjelke-Petersen himself who 
single-handedly effected his own demise. On Monday 23 and 
Tuesday 24 November 1987 Sir Joh paid three separate visits to 
the Queensland governor. Sir Walter Campbell, formerly chief 
justice of the Supreme Court. Sir Joh's purpose was to discuss the 
quite remarkable contents of two separate letters he had written 
to Sir Walter on those days. In the first, dated 23 November 1987, 
Bjelke-Petersen requested the resignation of his entire ministry 
and sought a new commission for himself to form a new ad-
ministration. He attempted to justify the request by arguing that, 
in light of the report of the Public Sector Review Committee 
(which, incidentally, had been submitted to the government five 
months beforehand), there was suddenly "an urgent need to make 
major changes to the structure of my administration, including a 
reduction in the number of Ministerial portfolios". On the very 
next day, however, and obviously in light of discussions with the 
governor. Sir Joh amended his view, now indicating that he 
considered it "to be appropriate to retain the existing number of 
eighteen (18) Ministers". 
In the second letter he also requested that the commissions of 
three ministers, who had refused his request to resign, should be 
withdrawn. Sir Joh explained his request, to which the governor 
agreed, in the terms that "these persons are not prepared to 
conform to the policies I have laid dovra for my administration". 
Although Sir Joh's written request was for three ministers to be 
fired, he in fact had originally sought the removal of five, a matter 
confirmed in Sir Walter's letter to Sir Joh of 25 November. This 
letter, and the two letters from the premier to the governor, are 
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reproduced on the following pages. Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen had 
summoned individually each of the five ministers targeted for 
dismissal, and requested their resignations. Peter McKechnie was 
reportedly told by the premier he was being sacked for showing 
insufficient loyalty. Geoff Muntz was apparently given no reason. 
Brian Austin's removal was sought because he had been seen 
speaking with Sir Robert Sparkes at the party's state conference. 
Mike Ahern was targeted for alleged leaking and moral irrespon-
sibility. Bill Gunn, Sir Joh's deputy, was being sacked for nominat-
ing Sir Robert Sparkes for another term as party president. 
After all five refused to resign Sir Joh relented, now insisting on 
the resignations of only three: Ahern, Austin and McKechnie. The 
premier then arranged for two new ministers to be sworn in: 
Kevin Lingard, hitherto the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, 
and Gordon Simpson, MLA for Cooroora. Three other back-
benchers had been offered portfolios by Sir Joh - Brian Little-
proud, Max Menzell and Russell Cooper - but all refused because 
of the circumstances surrounding the offers. It was surprising that 
Lingard and Simpson accepted appointment as Sir Joh was clear-
ly within days of losing office. ABC radio journalist Doug Weller, 
who attended the swearing-in of the two new ministers, captured 
the situation well when, in the presence of the governor, he called 
to one of them, "Mr Lingard, do you regard this as a career 
move?" 
It transpired that the governor was not persuaded by the 
premier's strategy during these critical days. This was hardly 
surprising. The collapse of Sir Joh's support within the parliamen-
tary National party was plainly evident. The governor was 
separately informed to this effect by Bill Gunn, Mike Ahern and 
Brian Austin. Sir Walter Campbell thus interpreted events as a 
political crisis rather than a constitutional one, and encouraged a 
party room resolution. In the letter to Sir Joh of 25 November, 
the governor made clear that he had no doubts about the fragility 
of the premier's position. He resisted both Sir Joh's original 
advice for the resignation of the full ministry, as well as the stated 
grounds for that proposed action. Sir Walter then directly 
counselled Sir Joh that "should you resign as Premier, it may be 
that I may not re-commission you as Premier unless I was of the 
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view that you were able to form a new Ministry and that you 
would be able to obtain the confidence and support of the 
Parliament." Because of the governor's interpretation of the crisis, 
Sir Joh's audacious bid to retain power was thwarted. The 
premier's remaining backbench support collapsed and Mike Ahern 
and Bill Gunn both announced their candidacy for the party 
leadership, which was to be /letermined at a meeting of the caucus 
scheduled for Thursday, 26 November. 
Even as this meeting approached. Sir Joh clung to office. He 
threatened to recall parliament, he reportedly attempted to secure 
a deal with the state ALP, he questioned the standing of the 
proposed parliamentary party meeting (see Appendix A), and he 
indicated a preparedness to call a snap general election. All these 
actions were ploys designed to unsettle his party adversaries and 
allow him to regroup. Yet it was these same actions, as well as his 
attempted dismissal of five ministers and of the successful sacking 
of three of them, which increased the concern in the National 
party about Sir Joh's political judgment. Even worse for the 
premier, his actions were being perceived by many senior people 
within his own party's hierarchy as those of a desperate and 
vengeful man who was convinced he was greater than his party and 
who was prepared ultimately to place his own self-preservation 
ahead of the Nationals' long-term interests. Repeatedly Sir Joh 
asserted that his party would be finished without him. 
The 26 November 1987 caucus meeting was attended by forty-
eight of the forty-nine National members of parliament: Sir Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen was the absentee. In a last desperate bid to 
salvage his position he called together his seventeen ministers just 
an hour before the parliamentary party meeting and urged them 
not to vote on any leadership motions. The call went unheeded, 
however, and at the caucus meeting the leadership spill motion 
was carried by thirty-nine votes to eight, with one abstention. 
Three candidates - Mike Ahern, Bill Gunn and Russ Hinze - then 
contested the leadership secret ballot. Ahern won on the first 
ballot with thirty votes; Gunn received sixteen votes and Hinze just 
two votes. Gunn was then re-elected unopposed as deputy leader. 
Immediately after the meeting Ahern telephoned the governor 
to advise him of the result. He also arranged to forward to 
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23rd November, 1987. 
Your Excellency, 
you will recall that in December 1986 my Government 
established the Public Sector Review Committee to examine the 
administrative machinery of the Queensland Government. 
One of the specific objectives of the Review on 
which the Committee was asked to report was the elimination 
of the duplication or overlap of functions or activities 
amongst Departments and Statutory Authorities. 
The Committee submitted its Report last July and 
since that date my Government has been implementing a large 
number of the recommendations contained in the Report. 
I have now given very careful consideration to 
the Ministerial control of the various Departments of the 
Public Service and I have concluded that there is an 
urgent need to make major changes to the structure of my 
administration, including a reduction in the number of 
ministerial portfolios. 
I believe that this re-organisation necessitates the 
resignation of my entire Ministry. 
I therefore propose tendering to Your Excellency, on 
a date to be mutually agreed upon, the resignation of myself, 
and thereby placing at Your Excellency's disposal the offices 
of all of the members of my Ministry. At the same time, I 
seek a further Commission from Your Excellency to form a new 
administration. 
If Your Excellency sees fit to concur with these 
proposals, on receipt of Your Excellency's advice, I will set 
the necessary sequence of action in train. 
Yours sincerely. 
PREMIER. 
His Excellency the Honourable Sir 
Walter Campbell, Q . C , 
Governor of Queensland, 
Government House, 
BRISBANE. 4000 
Above and right. Correspondence from Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen to Governor Sir 
Walter Campbell at the time of the National party's leadership crisis in late 1987. 
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24th November, 1987. 
Your Excellency, 
Further to our discussion this morning concerning 
my intention to restructure the Ministerial portfolios, 
I desire to inform you that, in accordance with advice 
offered by you, I have placed my proposals before my 
Ministerial colleagues assembled in a full meeting of 
Cabinet. 
As you know from my discussion with you, I have 
re-examined my original proposal to reduce the number of 
portfolios and I now consider it to be appropriate to 
retain the existing number of eighteen (18) Ministers. 
You are also aware that I have asked three of my 
Ministers to submit their resignations, as I consider that 
these persons are not prepared to conform to the policies 
I have laid down for my administration. 
The three Ministers declined to submit their 
resignations when asked by oe earlier today and have again 
declined to submit their resignations sought of them at 
the Cabinet meeting this afternoon. 
I therefore tender my formal advice to Your 
Excellency that the Commissions held by the Minister for 
Health and Environment, the Minister for Mines and Energy 
and Minister for the Arts, and the Minister for Industry 
and Technology be withdrawn. 
I should be grateful for an early indication of 
Your Excellency's preparedness to act upon my advice in 
order that I can initiate the necessary action to 
restructure my administration. 
Yours sincerely. 
His Excellency the Honourable Sir 
Walter Campbell, Q.C, 
Governor of Queensland, 
Government House, 
BRISBANE. 4001 
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BRISBANE 
25th November, 1987 
Dear Premier, 
I refer to your letters to me dated respectively 23rd 
November, 1987 and 24th November, 1987, and also to your 
discussion with me at Government House on 23rd November and to 
two further discussions on 24th November, 1987. 
First, in reply to your letter of 24th November, I 
advised you that day that I did not consider your suggestion to 
resign as Premier and to seek a further commission to form a 
new administration was the appropriate course for the 
achievement of a restructuring of the Ministerial portfolios. 
I advised you that, should you resign as Premier, it may be 
that I may not re-commission you as Premier unless I was of the 
view that you were able to form a new Ministry and that you 
would be able to obtain the confidence and support of the 
Parliament. 
I also advised you at that time that, in my opinion, 
it would be wise for you to discuss with all your Ministers 
your proposed restructuring of the Ministry. You told me that 
you had clear and firm proposals to this end although you did 
not place them before me. You told me that you had not 
discussed this restructuring with your Ministers, although the 
Cabinet had met that morning. You also told me at that time 
that your intention was that five present Ministers would not 
be included in the new Ministry. I suggested to you that you 
should request each Minister whom you did not wish to continue 
as a Minister to resign his commission. You told me that you 
had not done this. 
When you called on me again the following morning you 
informed me that you had, that morning, requested the five 
Ministers - whose names for the first time were then mentioned 
by you to me - to resign and that each had refused to do so. 
During that discussion you told me that your intention at that 
time was to ask for the resignation of only three Ministers and 
not five. However, you said you had not explained the nature 
of the restructuring to the Ministers as a whole. Following 
upon that discussion you left me saying that you would call a 
meeting of the full Cabinet and Inform thera fully of the nature 
of the restructuring. 
The Honourable Sir Joh. Bjelke-Petersen, 
K.C.M.G., M.L.A., 
Premier and Treasurer of Queensland, 
BRISBANE QLD 4000 /2.. 
Letter from the governor of Queensland to the premier in response to proposals 
Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen made during the leadership crisis. 
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You informed me, in the letter of 24th November, 
1987, and also in the second discussion with me held late on 
that day, that you had placed your proposals concerning the 
nature of the restructuring of the Ministerial portfolios 
before a full meeting of the Cabinet, and that you had, at that 
Cabinet Meeting, asked for the resignation of three Ministers 
and that the three Ministers concerned had declined once again 
to submit their resignations to you. 
Your advice to me is that the commissions presently 
held by these three Ministers be withdrawn. These Ministers 
are: -
1. The Minister for Health and Environment; 
2. The Minister for Mines and Energy and Minister 
for The Arts; and 
3. The Minister for Industry and Technology. 
Acting in accordance with your advice I told you that 
I would be prepared, in the circumstances, to terminate the 
commissions held by these three Ministers. 
I told you that, as a result of your proposed 
restructuring of the Ministry, I would be prepared to hold a 
swearing-in of all relevant Ministers, including the three new 
Ministers and Members of the Executive Council as well as those 
present Ministers who will, in your restructured Ministry, 
assume altered Ministerial responsibilities. In accordance 
with your request I told you that I would be prepared to hold 
that ceremony at Government House today. 
The time we agreed upon for the holding of the 
ceremony was 10.30 a.m., but it was brought to my attention 
this morning that Government House had been infonned earlier 
this morning that the paperwork necessitated a later time. 
You again called on me at 10.00 a.m. today and told 
me that you were still in the process of discussing the 
Ministerial restructuring with your Ministers. You Indicated 
to me then that there may now be only two new Ministers to be 
included in the rearranged Ministry, and also that possibly 
only a further six or seven existing Ministers would now be 
subject to portfolio changes. You agreed to deliver to me full 
details of the restructured Ministry prior to the swearing-in 
ceremony so that I would have the opportunity to peruse that 
document before the ceremony. You then said that you would 
discuss the time for the holding of the ceremony with me after 
this was done. 
Yours sincerely. 
Governor ' 
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Government House a document in which forty-eight members of 
the caucus confirmed their support for his leadership (see 
Appendix B). Then began the attempts over several days to 
convince Sir Joh to resign. 
With his parliamentary party support now destroyed, and with his 
removal from office now only a matter of time, Bjelke-Petersen 
finally succumbed. In a prepared statement to a prime-time 
televised press conference on 1 December 1987 he aimounced his 
resignation as premier and as member for Barambah, effective 
immediately. In doing so he also indicated his deep disaffection 
with his party. 
The National party of today is not the party that I took to the 
election last year. The policies of the National Party are no 
longer those on which I went to the people. Therefore I have 
no wish to lead this Government any longer. It was my 
intention to take this matter to the floor of State Parhament. 
However, I now have no further interest in leading the 
National Party any further. (Transcript of press statement 
as reproduced in the Courier-Mail, 2 December 1987) 
Ahem's Challenges 
The forced and agonised departure from state politics of Sir Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen was an unhappy event for the Nationals, yet there 
was a sense of relief for most of the party that the ordeal was 
over. Opinion polls showed voter approval of the new premier. 
Ahern promised a "vision of excellence" for Queensland, a view of 
the state's future which combined continued traditional emphasis 
on economic development with a new style of leadership strongly 
characterised by its accountability. The new premier also pledged 
a more consultative approach to decision-making and an adminis-
ation that would keep in touch with community attitudes; presum-
ably this was an indirect reference to Sir Joh's unwillingness to 
respond to changing attitudes (including National party attitudes) 
on issues such as sex education or foreign ownership of land. 
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The Ahern "honeymoon" was short-hved. Sir Joh, still wanting 
to wield power, made it plain that he would neither accept Mike 
Ahern as premier nor forgive party president Sir Robert Sparkes 
for his involvement in the events which forced his departure. 
Worse still for the Nationals, Bjelke-Petersen waged a bitter 
campaign of disaffection very publicly and, in doing so, promoted 
the theme of party disunity. Several of the ministerial colleagues 
of Sir Joh who had been dropped from cabinet by the new premier 
- Russ Hinze, Lin Powell, Don Lane and Yvonne Chapman - were 
also vocal in their criticism of Mike Ahern, thus pubhcly exposing 
party disunity. Less visibly, though just as importantly. Sir Joh's 
rancour had an unsettling effect at the branch level. Although the 
majority of Nationals appeared to endorse the leadership change, 
a minority of party branches - including a significant number in the 
coastal farming belt and the western areas - appeared to sym-
pathise with Bjelke-Petersen. From the outset, then, the internal 
party hostilities with which Ahern had to contend were quite 
unprecedented for the Queensland National party. They were also 
extraordinarily dangerous for the Nationals, given that they had 
long flaunted their reputation as the only party in Queensland able 
to offer stable and cohesive leadership. 
Apart from this internal haemorrhaging, the National party had 
to contend with the grim revelations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry. For 
many years Sir Joh and the Nationals had paraded themselves as 
a government which, as well as stridently promoting Queensland's 
economic advancement, actively protected and defended the 
northern state's political and moral virtue. Within a year of 
Bjelke-Petersen's retirement, however, the reputation of his 
administration was in tatters. The Bjelke-Petersen era was in 
disgrace as a period when both personal and institutional corrup-
tion had been allowed to flourish unchecked. 
The inquiry presented Mike Ahern with a major opportunity to 
distinguish his new administration from that of his predecessor. 
Unlike many members of the National party, who may have 
harboured serious worries about Tony Fitzgerald's penetrating 
lines of investigation, Ahern and Bill Gunn unequivocally sup-
ported it. Their intention was to represent the Ahern ministry as 
a completely new government watching events unfold with the 
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concern only of an interested bystander. To some commentators 
this approach was puzzling, as most members of the Ahern 
ministry had also been members of the Bjelke-Petersen cabinet 
and so should have been acutely embarrassed by the spectacular 
revelations. Certainly Labor's new parliamentary leader Wayne 
Goss, and his state campaign director, Wayne Swan, exploited the 
situation in those terms. Toward the end of 1988, in one of the 
parhament's non-sitting weeks, they launched a television and radio 
campaign targeted directly at the new premier's political under-
belly. The television advertisement depicted a blindfolded and 
gagged Mike Ahern with his ears plugged. The message was clear: 
Ahern had been a member of state parhament for twenty years 
and a minister for the previous eight; as such, he was in no 
position to dissociate himself from events within that period. 
Ahem's strong public support for the Fitzgerald Inquiry was 
understandable, however, if viewed as an attempt to rebuild 
political momentum in Queensland out of the disintegration of the 
Bjelke-Petersen regime and thereby recapture the initiative for the 
National party. He was very much a new premier, enjoying the 
support of the parliamentary and organisational wings, but more 
slender grassroots support and limited public credibility. Ahern 
viewed the inquiry as a necessary amputation of entrenched 
corruption in the state in the interests of the long-term survival of 
the government. 
But Mike Ahern also had to contend with some more immediate 
problems stemming from the Fitzgerald Inquiry. The seemingly 
endless revelations of corruption seriously undermined the capacity 
of the National party to govern in its accustomed manner. It was 
impossible to maintain party unity in the face of the allegations. 
The inquiry had started out as a limited investigation into alleged 
police misconduct but had emerged as a wide-ranging investigation 
into the way things have been done in Queensland for a very long 
time. Not surprisingly, this touched off a number of pressure 
points inside the National party machine. Individuals or groups 
who had been part of the decision-making structure and who had 
been beneficiaries of corrupt arrangements were obviously 
threatened. Some of these people were unlikely to stand idly by 
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while a public investigation established by their own party scru-
tinised their behaviour. 
The National party's self-confidence was rattled, too, by very 
large adverse swings in one federal and two state by-elections 
during 1988, although it was less certain whether the results of 
those contests were directly attributable to voter disapproval of the 
new premier or to the allegations of systematic abuse of public 
office. Sir Joh, however, was convinced that the National party's 
problems largely derived from the leadership of Sir Robert 
Sparkes and Mike Ahern. Bjelke-Petersen's public intervention 
served only to aggravate instability in the National party during this 
period. Fortunately for Sparkes and Ahern, however, the former 
premier's own public standing continued to slump as the inquiry 
investigations continued. 
Ahem's government was threatened at an even deeper level. A 
Commonwealth referendum seeking to apply the one vote-one 
value principle to all lower house electoral systems in Australia 
had dire implications for Queensland's longstanding zonal electoral 
system. The Nationals were appalled, arguing that the measure 
represented another unwanted and unwarranted intrusion by the 
Commonwealth into the affairs of Queensland and other states. 
If the one vote-one value proposition succeeded in the referendum, 
the electoral building blocks of the National party's power base 
in Queensland would be destroyed. 
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Crucial to the National party's poUtical foundation in Queensland 
is the state's zonal electoral system. Ironically, this system was 
introduced by the Hanlon Labor government in 1949. It segre-
gates voters into several geographical zones, at the same time 
placing significantly different weighting on the value of votes cast 
in those zones. As the accompanying map illustrates, four such 
zones presently exist, with predetermined numbers of electorates 
allocated to each zone. The South-Eastern zone contains the 
largest number of seats, with 51 of the state's 89 electorates. Two 
more zones cover the coastal belt extending northward to Cairns. 
One of these, the Provincial Cities zone (with 13 seats), is geo-
graphically discontinuous, embracing the major urban centres 
dotted along the coastline; the other, the Country zone (with 17 
seats), meanders down the eastern seaboard taking in the coastal 
farmlands behind the regional centres. The remaining zone, the 
Western and Far Northern, comprises 8 seats which, together, 
cover the state's large geographical expanse westward of the Great 
Dividing Range. 
The number of voters per seat varies considerably across the 
zones, according to the quotas which have been prescribed under 
the Electoral Districts Act (for a definition of quota, see under 
Table 1, p.37). These variations indicate the degree of "weightage" 
attached to votes cast in different parts of the state. Using 1986 
official government figures, the average number of voters in a 
South-Eastern zone seat was 19,357, in the Provincial Cities 18,149, 
in the Country zone 13,131 and in the Western and Far Northern 
zone 9186. That is to say, the value of a vote cast in the urban 
south-east of the state may be less than half that of a ballot cast 
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m the western area. And because of the historically irregular 
frequency of redistributions in Queensland, that variation has 
sometimes been very much greater. Immediately prior to the 
1985-86 redistribution, for example, the near-Brisbane electorate 
of Fassifern contained more than 32,000 voters, while the western 
seat of Warrego contained fewer than 8000 electors. 
Supporters of the zonal arrangements usually argue that in a 
decentralised state such as Queensland the vast rural areas warrant 
special attention and therefore greater pohtical representation. Sir 
Robert Sparkes regards this approach as providing equality of 
representation. By that he means representation of interest groups 
and geographical expanses, but not equality of representation for 
all people regardless of where they live. In practice, however, 
Queensland's zonal system has been crafted, and periodically 
modified, by a succession of governments whose overriding interest 
has been not the compensation of rural disadvantage but electoral 
self-preservation and the maximisation of partisan advantage. 
When in 1949 the then premier, Ned Hanlon, discarded the 
Queensland ALP's longstanding commitment to one vote-one 
value in favour of the zonal system, he attempted to justify the 
measure by citing problems faced by the rural areas and the need 
to ensure that city-based interests did not become all-pervasive. 
The true reason, however, was political expediency. The popula-
tion in the country areas, where the ALP at that time enjoyed 
strong political support (especially in the mining areas), was 
diminishing. In the face of this eroding electoral base the 
government reasoned that to preserve itself in office it needed to 
increase the value of country votes and, thus, the number of Labor 
seats in state parliament. The experiment worked impressively, 
enabling the government to retain office in 1950 by a margin of 
nine seats, 42 to 33, despite being outpolled in primary votes by 
their political opponents (46.9 per cent to 49.2 per cent). 
Following the Labor government's self-destruction and subse-
quent poll defeat in 1957, the incoming Country party-led coalition 
government moved swiftly to modify the zonal arrangement to its 
own advantage. Three zones were now created, replacing the 
existing four, including for the first time a Provincial Cities zone 
which was incorporated to contain Labor support in the non-
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Zoning to Stay in Power 31 
metropolitan areas. At the same time, the strong rural weightage 
enshrined in the 1949 legislation was retained in the 1958 model. 
The Country party's ascendancy over its Liberal party pjutners 
was underlined at the election in 1960 when the Country party won 
many non-urban seats held by the ALP prior to its split. The 
Liberal party's vote, on the other hand, was corralled in the 
Brisbane metropolitan area. 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen, as premier, presided over three redistribu-
tions, those in 1971 and 1977 under coalition arrangements, and 
that of 1985-86 under National party government. All of them 
changed the number and spread of seats within zones and 
modified slightly the zones themselves. But the dominant feature 
of each redistribution was the unashamed vote weightage built into 
the legislation governing it. This was despite the trenchant 
criticism of the original 1949 Hanlon proposals by Joh Bjelke-
Petersen, then an Opposition backbencher: 
In this legislation the people are given the right of voting, admit-
tedly, but the odds are so greatly against them that to achieve the 
results they desire is impossible because the predetermined zones 
and the numbers set out will mean nothing but that the majority 
will be ruled by the minority. (Speech by Joh Bjelke-Petersen to 
Legislative Assembly, 29 March 1949) 
Over the last twenty years several other states and the 
Commonwealth have moved toward more equitable electoral 
arrangements, and have sought to protect, by statute, such arrange-
ments from partisan interference. In Queensland, however, there 
has been absolutely no reflection of those trends. On the contrary 
Bjelke-Petersen, his ministers and various National party officials 
frequently attacked and ridiculed concepts of electoral justice and 
the one vote-one value principle, or took solace by reminding 
interviewers that it was the ALP which introduced the zonal 
system in Queensland. In March 1977 Russ Hinze, one of the 
most senior members of the Queensland cabinet at the time, went 
somewhat further in indicating what he regarded as a desirable 
step for the Queensland government to take in this area, particu-
larly having regard to trends elsewhere: 
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I told the Premier, If you want the boundaries rigged, let me do 
it, and we'll stay in power forever. If you don't do it, people will 
say you are stupid. In South Australia Steele Hall redistributed 
himself out of office. I don't think you'll be able to blame Joh 
or me for doing anything like that. (Quoted in Deane Wells, 
The Deep North, Melbourne: Outback Press, 1979, p.87) 
Russ Hinze's offer to his premier was a generous one, though 
judging by his own much later statements to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, 
he already was convinced that the boundaries were rigged. 
Responding under cross-examination to a question from Matt 
Foley, representing the ALP, Hinze stated: "I've carried the 
National Party, unlike some of the seats in Queensland that are 
rigged to the extent that the boundaries - that all you have to do 
is get the National Party tag and you can win forever and a day" 
(extract from Fitzgerald Inquiry transcript, 24 November 1988). 
Later during the same cross-examination Russ Hinze even 
declared himself a convert to the cause of one vote-one value. 
Reinfordng the advantage 
The redistribution finalised in January 1986 was by far the most 
critical to the Nationals in terms of its potential effect. Certainly 
the earlier redistributions of 1971 and 1977 were important to the 
Country (later National) party in electorally protecting itself from 
a declining rural demographic base and containing any potential 
surge by Labor. Those redistributions also assisted the party to 
maintain seniority over its Liberal coalition partners in the 
Legislative Assembly. The stakes in the 1986 redistribution, 
however, were much higher. Hinging on it were the National 
party's prospects of maintaining control of the Treasury benches. 
Only in 1983 had the Nationals realised their pohtical dream of 
forming the government without relying on the Liberal party, even 
though their majority was not won on election results but secured 
as a consequence of the defections to the party, just two days after 
the poll, of Liberal ministers Don Lane and Brian Austin. 
The National party recognised very early that the 1983 coalition 
crisis, coupled with the outcome of the subsequent state election, 
could secure a fundamental and perhaps enduring realignment of 
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Queensland's politics in the party's favour. The 1986 redistribution 
would determine the electoral framework for the first state 
election following the Nationals' assumption of government in their 
own right. The zones and boundaries to be drawn up were 
enormously important, therefore, both in maximising the party's 
prospects of retaining the majority in its own right, and in 
maintaining its ascendancy over the Liberals in Brisbane and the 
south-east corner of the state. Until 1983 the Nationals had only 
once held a metropolitan seat, that of Wynnum between 1974 and 
1977, but in the 1983 election, as already mentioned, they out-
polled the Liberals in 15 out of the 18 metropohtan seats both 
parties contested. 
A crucial feature of the 1985 Electoral Districts Act, which 
provided the statutory framework for the subsequent redistri-
bution, was an increase in the number of state electorates from 82 
to 89. While the government defended this by reference to 
population increase, the move was condemned in the parliament 
by both the Liberal and Labor parties. Liberal leader Sir William 
Knox, for example, ridiculed the move by pointing out that if the 
size of the Queensland parliament had been increased over the 
years in response to population growth, its number of seats would 
have risen from 62 in 1931 to more than two hundred by 1986. 
It is unclear whether the proposal put to cabinet for an increase 
in seats was outlined by the attorney-general, Neville Harper, or 
by the Transport minister, Don Lane; certainly it was not put by 
the premier. But it was Lane who carried most of the argument. 
Lane, who before joining the Nationals had had experience with 
redistributions as a Liberal, was one of the few members of 
cabinet with a strategic knowledge of how to go about the task. 
The argument which Lane put to cabinet was that an increase in 
the size of the House was necessitated by rapid population 
expansion along the Gold and Sunshine Coasts, and in their 
respective hinterlands, as well as in the growth corridors to the 
north and south of the metropolitan area. Equally, Lane correctly 
assumed that cabinet would not agree to any decrease in represen-
tation for inland areas which were, at best, demographically stable. 
In cabinet's view any decrease would have struck against the 
National party in its own heartland and threatened to pit the 
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party's rural MLAs against one another for re-endorsement in a 
reduced complement of seats. 
As Lane explained the strategy to the cabinet, the political 
objective in the first instance was to have a small enough quota in 
the south-eastern corner so that non-Labor seats m the city could 
be preserved and extra seats on the north and south coasts could 
be created to the National party's advantage. He pointed out that 
a smaller quota for South-Eastern zone seats would not contrast 
as starkly with that for seats in the adjacent Country zone where 
the quota is small to meet statutory requirements. 
The real purpose of the 1985 seat increase proposal, then, was 
to protect the number of seats in the Western and Far Northern 
zone (where, of course, the Nationals are very strong), while at the 
same time taking political advantage of the population increases 
which had occurred in both the South-Eastern and Country zones. 
By coupling the 1985-86 distribution with an increase in the 
number of seats, the National party benefited both ways. Although 
the percentage of voters hving in the Western and Far Northern 
zone had reduced as a percentage of the total number of voters 
state-wide, the increase of seats in the parliament allowed the 
government to maintain the number of electorates in that zone. 
Indeed, the government, under the guise of preserving the quality 
of representation available to the people of that area, proceeded 
a step further by actually increasing both the number and propor-
tion of electorates in that zone. In the South-Eastern zone, on the 
other hand, the National party could point to the changing 
demographic relativities between Brisbane and the near-coastal 
region to justify the abolition of several seats in the metropolitan 
area; for the same reason it justified the creation of new seats in 
the expanding coastal and adjacent hinterland areas where, not 
coincidentally, the National party had cultivated its political 
support. The altered balance of seats between Brisbane and non-
Brisbane was justifiable, in demographic terms, if the South-
Eastern zone is viewed in isolation. But it was not justifiable if the 
purpose of a redistribution is to reflect changing demographic 
relativities across the state, not just those in selected areas. 
The Electoral Districts Act of 1985 is quite explicit in its loading 
of the electoral dice. It not only maintains and reinforces the 
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zonal weightage which has been incorporated in all Queensland 
state redistributions since 1949, but also accentuates the degree of 
electoral advantage to the Nationals which is derived from that 
system. This is apparent from Table 1, which highlights the 
electoral quotas that have been set in successive redistributions 
for seats in the different zones. 
While vote weightage in Queensland is most pronounced in the 
Western and Far Northern zone, it is the existence of the Country 
zone which is the most blatant feature of the state's electoral 
system. That zone artificially cordons off the provincial city areas 
from their surrounding hinterlands. The effect is to contain the 
electoral impact of urban voters (who traditionally have favoured 
the ALP in provincial city areas) and maximise that of nearby non-
urban voters (where the Nationals have been strong). This is 
notwithstanding the natural communities of interest which may 
exist between the two groups: non-urban voters who hve close to 
a major centre but are electorally segregated from it commonly 
feel more affinity with the people of that centre than with other 
voters who live hundreds of kilometres away but who happen to 
belong to the same non-urban zone. Translated into party terms, 
at the 1983 election the ALP won 10 of the 13 Provincial City 
seats, the Nationals the other 3; the Nationals for their part were 
equally dominant in the Country zone, winning 13 of the 15 seats, 
the other 2 being held by the ALP and an Independent. At the 
same time, the value of votes cast in the two zones varies mark-
edly: the average quota for a Provincial City seat, under the 1985-
86 arrangements, is 18,149, while in the nearby Country zone it is 
13,131. 
The existence of the Country zone also appears illogical along-
side the very factors which the Electoral Districts Act indicates 
must be given due consideration by the redistribution commiss-
ioners when allocating boundaries within zones. These include 
such matters as distance from the seat of government, ease of rep-
resentation and community of interest. For example, ex-premier 
Bjelke-Petersen's seat of Barambah, with a voting population in 
1986 of less than 13,000, is in the Country zone though only two to 
three hours by car from Brisbane; other electorates located fifteen 
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hundred or more kilometres from Brisbane have voting popula-
tions of close to 20,000. 
Indeed, in the zonal drawings the Queensland government has 
even managed, ironically, to discriminate among its own sup-
porters. A good example is in far north Queensland, where 
Mulgrave and Barron River are two National party-held seats. 
They are not only adjacent to one another, but share a variety of 
economic and socicJ characteristics. The ease of political repre-
sentation is similar and their geographical sizes are roughly equiv-
alent (Barron River is slightly larger). Yet Mulgrave is located 
in the Country zone, and in 1986 had 13,640 electors; Barron 
River, on the other hand, was placed in the Provincial Cities zone, 
and contained 17,069 electors. 
Similar problems exist in the southern part of the state. 
Warwick and Fassifern are adjoining National party-held seats 
located between Brisbane and the New South Wales border. Both 
have a town and country mix. Yet Fassifern, which is significantly 
larger in geographical size, is in the South-Eastern zone, while 
Warwick is in the Country zone. Fassifern had a 1986 voting 
population of 21,067, and Warwick 12,314 electors at the equiv-
alent time. Yet another illogical zonal separation involves the 
adjoining National-held seats of Barambah and Somerset. Both 
are town and farm seats fairly close to Brisbane and, until Sir Joh's 
departure, were represented by the premier and deputy premier, 
respectively. They are roughly the same in area and economic 
character. There is even an added community of interest in that 
the major road access from Brisbane to Kingaroy (the major town 
in Barambah) is via the Brisbane Valley Highway which passes 
through the Somerset electorate. Yet in 1986 Somerset (in the 
South-Eastern zone) had 20,438 enrolled voters compared to 
12,931 in Barambah (Country zone). 
The weightage contained in the zonal arrangement was rein-
forced further in the 1985-86 redistribution (see Appendix C for 
detail). The Country zone, with 14.8 per cent of the state's voters, 
was allocated 19.1 per cent of the seats, up from 14.3 per cent of 
the voters for 18.3 per cent of the seats at the 1977 redistribution. 
The Western and Far Northern zone fared even better, capturing 
9 per cent of the seats with just 4.5 per cent of the state's voters. 
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TABLE 1 Queensland state electoral redistributions, 1949 to 1985 
37 
Year 
1949 
Zones 
Metropolitan 
South-Eastern 
Mackay) 
Northern 
Western 
(south of 
Quotas 
for seats 
in each zone' 
10,716 
9,536 
7,852 
4,783 
Number of 
seats 
per zone 
24 
28 
13 
10 
75 
1958 Metropolitan 
Provincial Cities 
Country 
11,002 
12,189 
8,324 
28 
12 
38 
78 
1971 South-Eastern 13,212 
Provincial Cities 13,170 
Country 10,054 
Western & Far Northern 7,784 
47 
13 
15 
7 
82 
1977 South-Eastern 16,368 
Provincial Cities 15,952 
Country 11,515 
Western & Far Northern 8,586 
47 
13 
15 
7 
82 
1985 South-Eastern 19,357 
Provincial Cities 18,149 
Country 13,131 
Western & Far Northern 9,186 
51 
13 
17 
8 
89 
• A quota of electors for each zone is detcnnined by dividing the total number of electors living in that 
zone t^ the number of electoral districts prescribed in the act for that zone. In effect, the quota for a zone 
represents the average number of electors in each electorate of that zone. Because of the arithmetical 
impossibility of arriving at seats with precisely the same voting populations, the electoral commissioners are 
able to determine scat tKiundaries within a prescribed margin (or tolerance) of the quota. 
T\ic Electoral Districts Act in fact provides for separate quotas for the different groups of Provincial Cities 
seats; for example, the quota for the three Townsville area seals is shghtty different from the quota for the 
Bundaberg area seats. For the purpose of this table an average quota has been arrived at for the Provincial 
Cities zone as a whole. 
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In 1977, on the other hand, it had been allocated 8.5 per cent of 
the seats on the basis of 5 per cent of the voters. By contrast, the 
South-East's proportion of seats was not increased in 1985-86, 
despite its augmented share of the state's voters. Yet the South-
East did better than the Provincial Cities zone which, unhke the 
Western and Far North, suffered a proportional loss of seats for 
a slightly reduced share of voting population. 
The full political impact of the state's system of vote weightage 
becomes apparent when these statistics are compared with the 
zonal break-down of each political party's tally of seats won at any 
of the recent state elections. This clearly indicates the ALP's 
strength in Brisbane and the provincial cities, and the Nationals' 
dominance in the Western and Far Northern and Country zones. 
Over recent years the Nationals have also extended their influence 
in the south-east outside Brisbane, while in the rather unusual 
circumstances of 1983 they also made their first significant inroads 
into the metropolitan area, gains they consolidated at the 1986 
poll. For its part, the Liberal party's base in Queensland has 
traditionally been in Brisbane and the south-east and, to a much 
lesser extent, in the provincial cities. However, the Liberals face 
real difficulties in retaining that limited base, much less extending 
it in the north and west of the state. The results of the 1986 state 
election illustrating this situation are set out in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 Queensland state election 1986: first preference votes and seats 
won, state-wide and by zone 
Zone National 
% of 
votes 
South- 34.1 
Eastern 
Provincial 42.3 
Cities 
Country 57.4 
Western 53.5 
and Far 
North 
Total 39.6 
Seats 
won 
23 
5 
15 
6 
49 
Liberal 
% of 
votes 
22.3 
6.1 
5.2 
5.0 
16.5 
Seats 
won 
9 
0 
0 
1 
10 
ALP 
%of 
votes 
41.3 
48.8 
35.0 
40.9 
41.4 
Seats 
won 
19 
8 
2 
1 
30 
Other 
%of 
votes 
2.3 
2.8 
2.4 
0.6 
2.5 
Seats 
won 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Tola) 
seats 
51 
13 
17 
8 
89 
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Leaving nothing to chance 
The electoral redistribution process in Queensland is also notable 
in the extent to which it is dominated by the partisan interests of 
the government of the day. The redistribution commissioners are 
appointed by Govemor-in-Council on the recommendation of the 
cabinet. Their final boundary recommendations are, moreover, 
submitted to the premier and become law without any reference 
whatsoever to either the cabinet or the parliament. 
The Electoral Districts Act governing the redistribution specifies 
the total number of seats to be apportioned state-wide, the 
boundaries of each of the zones, and the number of seats to be 
allocated to each zone. While such arrangements provide the 
government with watertight insurance that the redistribution 
commissioners will make recommendations in accord with the 
relevant act, the commissioners have no ability to correct errors 
or absurdities which may be present in the legislation, and for 
which they themselves may attract criticism. Shortly after the 1985 
Electoral Districts Act was passed, it returned to parliament for 
amendment. The entire redistribution exercise consequently was 
delayed by at least two months, because of a flaw in the legislative 
description of the South-Eastern zone boundary. 
On another issue the redistribution commissioners themselves 
incurred direct (though mistaken) criticism following the release 
of the provisional boundaries in November 1985. The Wujal Wujal 
Aboriginal reserve had been incorporated into the Western and 
Far Northern zone seat of Cook, held by the ALP, even though 
Wujal Wujal itself is wholly located within Barron River, a 
Provincial City zone seat marginally held by the National party. 
The commissioners were required by the statute to comply with 
this bizarre piece of electoral cartography, which was inspired 
more by an interest in protecting the Nationals' Martin Tenni in 
Barron River (Wujal Wujal had voted solidly for the ALP 
candidate at the previous state election) than it was by any 
"community of interest" argument relating to the effective par-
hamentary representation of far northern Aboriginal communities 
by placing them all in the one electorate. 
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There are other aspects about the conduct of Queensland 
redistributions which do not protect either the commissioners or 
the public. For example, although public submissions on bound-
aries are invited, those documents are secret imless publicly 
released by their sponsors. Individuals or political parties do not 
necessarily have access to the submissions of others, and so no 
assessment can be made of the extent to which the commissioners 
may have followed the submissions of any one group. As far back 
as 1971 Joh Bjelke-Petersen was on record as opposing the public 
release of submissions on this ground. He claimed that if the 
commissioners' proposals resembled too closely the submission of 
one party, they would be accused of bias. Moreover, the rules do 
not allow the commissioners to hold public hearings or to provide 
reasons for their boundary decisions. 
This process of secrecy and limited circulation assists the 
Nationals, who regard redistributions as pohtical instruments to 
secure the government's survival. The Queensland National party's 
approach to electoral law has been consistently to leave as little as 
possible to chance. Given such attitudes, and the high political 
stakes involved, it is hardly surprising that the party devoted 
enormous resources, and the closest possible attention, to all 
phases of the 1985-86 redistribution exercise. 
This work did not start with the appointment of the electoral 
commissioners. Most of the substantial effort in setting the 
ground-rules (that is, determining the zonal boundaries and 
allocating seat numbers overall and for each zone) had to be 
completed for incorporation in the legislation. The commissioners, 
once appointed, would then be obliged to follow those prescrip-
tions in the more limited exercise of drawing individual seat 
boundaries within each zone. 
There was also plenty of time in which to prepare for the 1985-
86 redistribution. It was common knowledge, even in 1983, that a 
redistribution would be held before the 1986 state poll. By mid 
1984 more than one third of the state's 82 seats were either above 
or below the allowable tolerance, thus easily meeting the legislative 
requirement enabling redistribution. The possibility of a snap 
redistribution, if only a partial one confined to the South-Eastern 
zone, had in fact been raised within National party circles in 1983. 
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(Western & Far Northern zone 
Wujal Wujal 
BARRON RIVER 
(Provincial Cities zone) 
A classic boundary gerrymander — the case of Wujal Wujal 
This was about the time former party president John Ahern 
alerted the party's Management Committee to the need for 
additional seats in the rapidly growing Gold and Sunshine Coasts, 
and in the growth corridors hnking them to Brisbane. But while 
the party was aware of the possible electoral advantages to be 
gained (specifically, in a partial redistribution confined to the 
South-Eastern zone Brisbane would lose seats to the surrounding 
areas), the Nationals also realised that such an exercise could 
spark a damaging backlash in the crucial pre-election period. The 
notion was dropped before it could be seriously entertained. 
During 1984 the National party organisation began establishing 
the ground-rules for the redistribution. It created a Redistribution 
Committee, a subcommittee of the party's powerful state Manage-
ment Committee, to undertake this work. Members of the party, 
especially parliamentary members as well as zone and branch 
representatives, were invited to make suggestions to it. Various 
proposals were considered by the Redistribution Committee, 
including one to retain the South-Eastern zone but to split the 
remainder of the state along a north-south line roughly following 
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the Great Dividing Range. The suggestion would have entailed 
some risk to the party's power base, however, and given the 
Nationals' knife-edge parUamentary majority (43 seats out of 82), 
it was quickly rejected by the committee. All agreed that the 
existing four-zone system had served the party well and should be 
retained. 
It was only after the Redistribution Committee had settled its 
position on some of these broader matters that the proposal to 
increase the overall size of the parliament was taken to cabinet. 
Little wonder, too, that the cabinet viewed this matter as a. fait 
accompli. All ministers would have been aware of the activities of 
the Redistribution Committee and equally aware of the way in 
which its composition and work integrated both parliamentary and 
organisational perspectives. The working membership of that 
committee comprised former party president John Ahern, David 
Russell QC, Peter Lacey, and two cabinet ministers from the north 
- Vince Lester and Bob Katter Jnr. Others closely associated with 
or aware of the committee's work included party operative Jennifer 
Russell, Sir Robert Sparkes, Don Lane, Brian Austin, new MLA 
Mark Stoneman, and Wendy Armstrong. Armstrong, a member 
of the Premier's Department research staff, also served as an 
important liaison between the parliamentary and organisational 
wings of the party. 
John Ahern, who lives at Conondale in the Sunshine Coast 
hinterland and is the father of premier Mike Ahern, played an 
important role in determining the number of additional seats to be 
created in the South-Eastern zone, as well as suggesting other 
possible zone boundary changes. Armstrong, who in the past had 
worked at party headquarters, is reported to have played an 
important role in revising zone boundaries across the state. Mark 
Stoneman, for his part, was reportedly instrumental in bringing 
about zone modifications which affected a number of seats 
between Townsville and the Whitsunday region, including his own 
seat of Burdekin. Jennifer Russell's role at headquarters was to 
sift through the boundary suggestions submitted by individual 
parliamentary members and others, and to discuss their ideas with 
them. She then contributed those suggestions, as she saw approp-
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riate, to the strategic discussions held by the party hierarchy as it 
formulated its approach to the boundary-drawing. 
When this phase of the Redistribution Committee's work was 
completed, a revised Electoral Districts Bill incorporating the 
recommendations of the party's Redistribution Committee was 
prepared. It was introduced into the House in early 1985, and 
passed shortly thereafter. As mentioned earlier, an error forced 
the government to seek some amendments several months later; 
the problem delayed the work of the redistribution commissioners, 
who had commenced their task shortly after the passage of the 
original bill. 
Choosing the commissioners 
The choice of the electoral redistribution commissioners was a 
tricky matter and, like earlier coalition administrations, the 
government exercised great care in making its selections. The 
commissioners themselves have a very limited role. They deter-
mine electoral boundaries within each of the zones but the ground-
rules upon which they operate predetermine the essential character 
of the electoral structure. 
Among their other problems, the commissioners during the 1985-
86 redistribution had to rely on an inadequate data base. In fact, 
it was grossly inferior to the data base the Nationals used to 
prepare their submissions. For example, the redistribution 
commission's base maps, supplied by the State Electoral Office, 
were badly out of date in their detail of new housing estate 
developments in outer suburban Brisbane and in the near coastal 
areas. The electoral rolls were in equally poor shape, a product in 
part of the longstanding inability of the Queensland and Common-
wealth governments to reach agreement on joint electoral rolls. 
By contrast, the National party's data provided it with a much 
more sophisticated basis upon which to formulate detailed 
boundary recommendations. It prepared its submissions with the 
assistance of the Justice Department's computerised data base and, 
in some areas, by extremely detailed booth-specific voting data. In 
some cases where the data base was patchy, such as new housing 
estates, "on the ground" assessments were made of the likely 
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numbers of electors residing in new developments. 
It is unclear, however, whether the data obtained from the 
Justice Department was additional to that which was available to 
all MLAs. Each MLA is entitled to obtain for his or her elec-
torate a floppy disk providing detailed roll information for that 
seat. MLAs are also able to request that information for adjoining 
seats provided they are in the same electoral zone. A program is 
available with these disks to enable the data to be manipulated. 
For example, street-specific information can be isolated. The State 
Electoral Office also publishes the results of each election, which 
includes polling-booth-specific data. 
The extent to which redistribution commissioners over the years 
have seen themselves as fearlessly impartial agents or, alternatively, 
as operatives of the incumbent regime is difficult to assess. It is 
also not easy to judge their work in these terms, given that 
submissions are secret (unless their sponsors choose otherwise), 
proceedings are conducted in private, and no reasons for boundary 
decisions are provided. 
In the selection of commissioners there has been a preference by 
successive governments for continuity in terms of the types of 
individuals appointed, as well as the actual people chosen. For 
example, the last three redistribution commissions each comprised 
two career public servants and one outsider; and the late Sir 
Douglas Eraser, a distinguished pubhc servant, participated in four 
successive redistributions, three of them as chairman. Even more 
remarkably, though a tribute to the man's standing. Sir Douglas 
managed to be appointed by both Labor (1949) and Country party-
led administrations (1958, 1971, and 1977). Four of the five 
redistribution commissions appointed since the zonal system was 
instituted have included the principal electoral officer or, in the 
case of 1985, the departmental under secretary to whom that 
person reported. On one occasion (1958) the surveyor-general was 
appointed, while only in 1949 was a Supreme Court judge involved 
(as chairman). Appendix D provides details of the composition 
of each of the redistribution commissions since 1949. 
The person chosen to head the 1985 redistribution commission 
was John Andrews, an engineer, economist and town planner who 
enjoyed great career success in the Queensland public service. He 
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first came to public notice in 1978 when, as deputy commissioner 
for Main Roads, he was appointed by the state government as 
temporary city administrator of the Gold Coast City Council in the 
wake of the council's dismissal by Local Government minister Russ 
Hinze. Andrews held that difficult post until the scheduled 
municipal elections in March 1979, and was widely regarded as 
having performed well in it. His efforts were rewarded when, 
sdmost immediately, he was appointed by the state government as 
chairman of the Public Service Board, one of the very top pubUc 
service jobs. Surprisingly though, he relinquished the post after 
only five months, in fact on the day of his sixtieth birthday. But he 
still enjoyed the government's confidence and two years later was 
appointed to the plum post of Queensland agent-general in 
London. While in that office he was approached about becoming 
chairmjm of the state's redistribution commission. He expressed 
interest in the job and, before returning to Australia in September 
1984, spent some time looking at British, Canadian and American 
electoral systems. The redistribution job was also not the last task 
requested of Andrews by the government. When the redistribution 
was completed he became chairman of the Queensland Sugar 
Board. 
The second member of the 1985-86 redistribution commission 
was another career public servant. Col Pearson. Pearson was 
under secretary of the Department of Justice and, as such, the 
permanent head to whom the State Electoral Office reported. 
As already mentioned, each of the redistribution commissions 
since 1958 has contained, in addition to two career public officials, 
one member from outside the public service. In 1971 and 1977 
this was Archibald (later Sir Archibald) Archer, a retired grazier 
and company director, and a person with appropriate geographical 
connections (he had a good knowledge of the west) and sound 
family links with the Country party. The outsider appointed to the 
1985-86 redistribution commission was another Queensland knight 
with close conservative party connections. Sir Thomas Covacevich. 
Covacevich was a business man and senior partner in the Cairns 
legal firm Macdonnells. 
Not surprisingly, Covacevich's past association with both Sir Joh 
and the National party drew critical comment from the Opposition 
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and segments of the media on his fitness to serve as electoral 
commissioner. In 1976 Covacevich had donated $100,000 for a 
university centre in Cairns, and the premier had announced it at 
a country cabinet reception there at the time. Covacevich was 
later knighted for his contribution to the welfare of the people of 
north Queensland. His appointment as electoral commissioner 
drew especially blunt criticism from Opposition leader Neville 
Warburton. He told the state parliament on 28 August 1985 that 
in 1979 Su- Thomas had sought funds for the National party's 
Bjelke-Petersen Foundation and thus was "under no circimistances 
a fit and appropriate person to be carrying out redistributions". 
According to Quentin Dempster in the Sunday Mail of 23 October 
1988, at no time did Sir Thomas respond to or pubhcly deny the 
Opposition leader's claims. 
Compiling and handling the submissions 
The first task of the redistribution commission (formally known as 
the Electoral Districts Commission) was to call for public submis-
sions. The Liberal party prepared a document outlining a range 
of suggestions, as did a number of other groups and individuals. 
The ALP, however, lodged no submission other than a single-page 
letter from its state secretary, Peter Beattie, reiterating the party's 
strong objections to the zonal system. 
The ALP's failure to lodge a proper submission played into the 
hands of the Nationals. While understandably sceptical about the 
framework governing the redistribution, the ALP's decision not to 
make boundary suggestions meant that the commissioners would 
not have any proposal before them from the Nationals' traditional 
opponents. Labor's tactical mistake was also unnecessary, as 
David Hamill had spent several weeks preparing such a document. 
In fact, the decision of the ALP was probably determined more by 
factional distrust than by any interest in the party adopting the 
high ground on the issue of the zonal system. 
In contrast, the Nationals paid the closest attention to the 
preparation of their boundary proposals. They displayed the same 
rigorous approach and attention to very fine points in their 
dealings with the Electoral Districts Commission as they had in 
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earlier estabhshing the statutory base and ground-rules under 
which the commissioners would be obliged to operate. Not 
contenting themselves with one document, they furnished the 
commission with separate proposals for each zone. Nothing was 
left to chance. Each document went into intricate detail about the 
boundary proposals being submitted. Each was forwarded separ-
ately upon completion, the last only reaching the commission on 
the closing date for submissions. 
The National party's submissions to the Electoral Districts 
Commission were constructed only after all members of the 
parhamentary party had been invited by party headquarters to 
lodge their suggestions for boundaries. Most took advantage of 
this opportunity, some by forwarding area maps indicating 
boundary preferences and colour-coded guidance regarding the 
known pockets of support for each of the parties in the relevant 
areas. Other members simply went up to the party's Spring Hill 
headquarters at Bjelke-Petersen House and discussed their ideas 
with Jennifer Russell, who played a key role in this phase of 
proceedings. 
The Nationals have a strong base in both the Western and Far 
Northern and Country zones. The party thus had no difficulty in 
drawing upon expert local advice to assist in the formulation of 
preferred boundaries in those regions. There was also little 
pressure on individual MLAs holding seats in those areas since the 
zonal structure governing the redistribution not only guaranteed, 
but also increased, the seat numbers in both zones. The Nationals 
were similarly strong in the Gold and Sunshine Coast areas, and 
it is thus not surprising that the party's submission for the South-
Eastern zone outside Brisbane relied heavily on the advice of local 
MLAs and branch and party officials, including John Ahern and 
state senior vice-president Charlie (later Sir Charles) Holm. The 
material submitted from these various sources was also supple-
mented by computer analysis incorporating updated demographic 
data, which was vital to the drafting of boundary proposals in these 
expanding areas. 
Although the revised zonal structure meant that, in strict 
arithmetical terms, the Nationals could almost retain office in their 
own right without any metropolitan seats, the party was under-
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standably desperate not to forfeit the significant foothold it had 
gained in Brisbane in 1983. Given that the Nationals' metropolitan 
base was still only in its infancy, and bearing in mind that the 
party's parliamentary representation in Brisbane was half com-
prised of ex-Liberal MLAs, much of the detailed boundary work 
for metropolitan seats was handled by ex-Liberals, in particular 
Don Lane and Brian Austin and, to a lesser extent. Bob Moore. 
Moore joined the Nationals in early 1983 after he was disendorsed 
as the Liberal candidate for the seat of Windsor, which he had 
represented since 1969. 
The detailed work of Don Lane and Brian Austin was very 
significant in determining the party's preferred Brisbane boun-
daries, although other sitting National members from metropohtan 
seats were also consulted. While it was logical for campaigners 
with a good local knowledge, like Austin and Lane, to carry out 
much of this work, there was a risk to the party in allowing the two 
men carte blanche. Both held tricky seats, and both could expect 
difficulties because of the timing and circumstances of their 
defections in 1983. Austin as a Liberal had held his seat of Wavell 
that year only by a narrow margin in a two-way contest with ALP 
candidate Chris Begley. Lane had survived a tight three-corner 
struggle in Merthyr. The dilemma now facing the Nationals in 
redrawing the Brisbane boundaries was that while there was an 
obligation to assist Lane and Austin, the party could not afford to 
protect them at the cost of its ambitions of consolidating a broad 
metropolitan base. 
Demographic changes within the South-Eastern zone since the 
1977 redistribution meant that, in net terms, Brisbane would lose 
two seats. On the other hand, the non-Brisbane area within the 
south-east would gain six seats, a net increase of four seats for the 
zone (bringing its seat tally from 47 to 51). 
The reduction in Brisbane seats, coupled with demographic shifts 
within the metropolitan area, made it necessary to abolish at least 
one of Brisbane's inner western or northern seats. Initial planning 
within National party ranks was to eliminate the seat of Windsor 
won from the non-Labor parties by ALP candidate Pat Comben in 
1983. A number of boundary realignments involving northern and 
western suburbs were then crafted on this basis. An alternative 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Zoning to Stay in Power 49 
suggestion was to abolish the seat of Nundah, held for the Liberal 
party by Sir William Knox. This idea was discarded, however, 
when the Nationals realised that the plan would threaten the 
adjoining seats of Merthyr and Wavell, held by Lane and Austin, 
respectively. Party headquarters, probably in concert with Lane and 
Austin, then experienced a change of heart regarding the strategy 
for dealing with the boundary problems on Brisbane's northside. 
This switch was presumably prompted by the realisation that no 
juggling of Brisbane's northern and western suburbs could readily 
save both Brian Austin and Don Lane. The Nationals wanted to 
protect both men: they were two of the government's senior 
ministers, and both were regarded as competent. The party also 
owed them a debt for their change of party colours in 1983. It was 
agreed that one of their seats, probably Wavell, should be 
abohshed and a suitable seat for its incumbent found elsewhere. 
Bob Moore, who had assisted in drawing the Brisbane boun-
daries, played a key role in drafting proposals for the three 
Townsville seats and for the coastal belt stretching from Townsville 
to Cairns. Again local members were consulted, though Labor's 
strong provincial city base meant that the local databank available 
to the Nationals was not as complete as in those other parts of the 
state where their base was strong. One of the major arguments 
within the National party over boundaries in the north Queensland 
coastal beU centred upon what MLAs termed the "manageability" 
of individual electorates. Some National parliamentarians pro-
posed revised boundaries which they felt would produce more 
manageable electorates in terms of the ease of representation. 
This argument was relevant, for example, in discussions about 
Barron River and a new seat of Tablelands, originally touted 
within the party as the new seat of Mareeba. Not surprisingly, 
however, party headquarters intervened to insist that seat safety 
prevailed as a criterion over seat manageability. 
Given the rugged style of politics of Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen and 
the Nationals, it is curious that during this period when sub-
missions were being prepared there was unofficial communication 
between certain National party officials and certain parliamentary 
members of the ALP Opposition. Whether contact also extended 
to Liberal members is not known. The dialogue appears to have 
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been inspired in one or two cases by the genuine interest of some 
National MLAs in gauging the reaction of certain Opposition 
parliamentarians to particular proposals. In other instances the 
motives for making contact were more obscure, though one 
possible explanation was the mischievous interest of some Nation-
als in ALP factional politics. There was also the mutual interest 
of the Nationals and the ALP in getting rid of the Liberal party al-
together. The bonds of parliamentary mateship and perhaps even 
those of Freemasonry also should not be discounted as possible 
contributing factors motivating such discussion. 
The outcome 
As chairman of the redistribution commission John Andrews was 
extremely sensitive to suggestions that his role was Hmited. But as 
this analysis has already shown, his hands were largely tied by the 
rules governing the process. But it was Andrews's own statements 
at a media briefing which embarrassed the state government and 
further elevated the zonal electoral system as a major public issue. 
He had convened the meeting in his office on 4 November 1985 
for the purpose of releasing the commission's prehminary findings. 
Responding to a reporter who had questioned what appeared on 
the electoral map as a small blue island in north Queensland, 
Andrews said: 
That's the Aboriginal reserve of Wujal Wujal that got quite a 
special mention in the Act. The reasons for it don't concern me 
as an electoral commissioner. All I know is that I don't count 
the numbers in this [Provincial Cities] zone. I count them in that 
[Western and Far Northern] zone. 
Later in the same media briefing Andrews clashed with Gary 
Hardgrave, then a reporter with the Channel 7 current affairs show 
State Affair. 
Hardgrave: There's going to be criticism from this time on that 
the gerrymander still exists. 
Andrews: Yeah, but look. As far as I'm concerned I follow the 
Act. The criticism can rage on as much as it likes but it doesn't 
alter one iota the commission I have. My commission is under 
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the Act and as far as the law is concerned, I'm stopping with it. 
We'll finish it there. 
It is hardly surprising that, given the rules governing the process, 
there is suspicion that the boundaries recommended by the 
commissioners are identical to the proposals lodged by the 
National party. While such a view overstates the case, the 
boundary recommendations have nearly always conformed to the 
general thinking of the Nationals, even if not their detailed 
prescriptions. Such an impression has also been confirmed by 
several individuals closely associated with the redistribution 
process, one of whom explained to the writer that to assume the 
system was "supposed to be fair" was to miss the point: the only 
game in town was to remain in office indefinitely. 
Electoral commissioners in Queensland are in an impossible 
position. The legislation under which they operate limits their 
options, while they themselves are not permitted to explain their 
boundary decisions. Their cartographic activity, limited by the 
pre-determined zonal boundaries and by National party influences, 
often attracts strong criticism. The provisional boundaries released 
by the commissioners in November 1985 included, for example, a 
controversial proposal involving the western seats of Warrego and 
Balonne. This proposal from the Nationals involved the removal 
of the Labor town of Cunnamulla from the marginal National 
party seat of Warrego to the adjoining and much safer National-
held seat of Balonne. Quickly dubbed by the media the Cunna-
mulla Nipple, which cartographically the boundary around Cun-
namulla resembled, the effect of the proposed change was to make 
Warrego a much safer seat for the government. But the proposal 
was condemned by many locals on the grounds that it isolated 
Cunnamulla from its environs. As a result of the public outcry the 
commissioners, in their final recommendations several months 
later, amended the boundaries in the region in a way which largely 
overcame these concerns. In doing so, Cunnamulla stayed in 
Warrego and the seat remained a marginal one for the Nationals. 
Similar criticism greeted the commissioners' provisional boundary 
recommendations involving the Sunshine Coast electorate of 
Landsborough. The redrawn Landsborough boundary snaked 
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around some beachfront real estate at Caloundra, in a shape which 
was likened to a parson's nose. Significantly, this unusual boun-
dary incorporated within the Landsborough electorate the home of 
sitting National party member and future premier, Mike Ahern. 
The commissioners, once again reacting to objections, slightly 
broadened the shape of the parson's nose in their final maps. 
Despite these relatively minor irritations and embarrassments, 
the Nationals had reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the 
redistribution. A detailed computer analysis of the 1985 redistrib-
ution revealed that, should Queensland voters reproduce their 1983 
voting behaviour in 1986, the National party could expect to 
capture at least 50 seats (on the basis of the 38.9 per cent vote for 
them in 1983) in the newly enlarged 89-member parliament. (The 
calculations were made by entering the results recorded in all 1689 
booths spread among the 82 electorates at the 1983 Queensland 
state election. All those booths were precisely located on maps 
and then, when the provisional redistribution was announced in 
November 1985, they were reallocated amongst the 89 newly-
arranged seats. A similar exercise was conducted when the final 
or determined boundaries were released in late January 1986.) As 
it happened, the Nationals won the 1986 state election by collecting 
49 seats with 39.6 per cent of the primary vote. 
Reinforcing the electoral advantage 
Although explained on the basis of preserving rural representation. 
Premier Hanlon's real motive for introducing the zonal system in 
1949 was to protect his government's hide. Yet his action was to 
prove doubly ironic, not only because the zonal arrangement, 
following Labor's split, was able to be reformulated to keep them 
out of power, but also because Hanlon himself came from 
Brisbane. His predecessors who had maintained Labor's commit-
ment to one vote-one value, on the other hand, had all represented 
rural seats. 
It suited the Country (later National) party to maintain the zone-
based structure, and the party reinforced the advantage by creating 
a zone comprised of coastal farmland districts. This initiative was 
inconsistent with the National party's own "community of interest" 
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arguments in favour of vote weightage, but this was irrelevant to 
them. The real intention behind the arrangement was to ensure 
that support for the Labor and Liberal parties was geographically 
compartmentalised, and thus politically contained. The National 
party could then be sure that in any general election it would have 
a kick-start advantage over its opponents. 
Charleville 
WARREGO 
BALONNE 
The Cunnamulla Nipple 
The Parson's Nose 
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Loaded though the electoral dice has been m Queensland, it 
should not be concluded that Labor has been unfairly denied 
government. On only one occasion since 1958 has the ALP's 
primary vote exceeded the combined tally of the Liberals and 
Nationals. This was in 1972. The Nationals have been much more 
fortunate. They won seniority status within the state's coahtion on 
as few as 20 per cent of the votes, and office in then own right on 
just 38.9 per cent. Appendix E details the results of all state 
elections since the introduction of the zonal system in 1949. 
The National party has steadfastly resisted any suggestion that 
it has rorted the electoral system. But the case of Wujal Wujal 
alone is a glaring example of a boundary gerrymander which has 
been legislatively imposed. 
The extent of the National party's involvement in Queensland's 
electoral arrangements has been clearly shown in the conduct of 
the 1985-86 redistribution. Public confidence in the integrity of the 
state's electoral arrangements was also severely undermined by 
evidence before the Fitzgerald Inquiry in 1988. Russ Hinze told 
the inquiry of "rigged" electoral boundaries; corrupt ex-police 
officer Jack Herbert gave evidence of improper practices regarding 
the management of electoral rolls; and several ex-ministers made 
statements about how state cabinet seemed to be aware of the 
alleged voting behaviour of a Supreme Court judge. Just as 
remarkably, Queensland's suspended police commissioner. Sir 
Terence Lewis, attempted to explain to the inquiry how it was 
necessary for him, in the exercise of his police duties, to raise 
electoral matters (including redistributions) in discussions with the 
premier, other ministers and National party identity Sir Edward 
Lyons. The relevance of such matters to the police commissioner's 
sphere of responsibility has yet to be established satisfactorily. 
The maintenance of Queensland's zonal electoral structure is 
crucial to the National party's future. Little wonder that the state 
government was prepared to invest significant public funds in a 
goverment advertising campaign to convince Queenslanders not to 
support the 1988 constitutional referendum proposal dealing with 
fair elections. And while the National party government sought to 
portray that proposal as one in which a gun was being held to the 
heads of Queenslanders, the reality was that the proposal threat-
ened the survival of the Nationals' regime. 
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For many years Queensland's electoral structure has provided the 
state government with a buffer against the possibility of political 
defeat. This situation has been understood by those working 
within or close to the political system and, in the process, a view 
has been engendered of the relative invulnerability of the position 
of the ruHng party (or parties). The effect, in practice, was to 
reinforce longstanding values about what are supposedly the 
important elements in Queensland politics. It also underlined the 
already longheld disregard for the fate of those institutions, such 
as the parliament, public service, the police force, and the judicary, 
whose role it is to ensure that government operates with a 
measure of efficiency, accountability and regard for the public 
interest. The parliament has failed to bring the government to 
account; the public service has been politicised; and the police 
force has been used not so much to uphold the law, but as an 
active arm of government. Even the state's judiciary has shown 
itself vulnerable to political interference. These institutional 
structures have been regarded by successive governments as 
impediments to progress and development, so it is perhaps not 
surprising that governments have sometimes sought to neutralise 
their effect. 
A lame parliament 
Party and government dominance of parliament is a common 
feature of Westminster-derived systems, and one which has led to 
widespread questioning of parliament's capacity to ensure that the 
government remains accountable to it. This ability to secure 
accountability is the very essence of responsible government and 
one of the central functions of a modern parliament. Over the 
years, however, parhament's influence has been eroded by the 
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steadily increasing authority of cabinet, the imposition of tight 
party discipline, and cabinet's reliance upon the expertise of 
permanent public officials working in an increasingly complex 
administrative environment. 
Whereas in the past generation there have been a number of 
significant attempts elsewhere in Australia to rejuvenate the 
authority and independence of the parhament, the Bjelke-Petersen 
government was impervious to any suggestion that the role of 
Queensland's legislature might deserve reconsideration. In a sense 
this was not surprising, gjven that Queensland's pchtical leaders, 
as a rule, had never felt obliged to acknowledge, much less follow, 
trends emerging elsewhere in the country. It is worthwhile 
recalling, for example, that in 1983 the Queensland Nationals were 
prepared to push the relationship with their Liberal coalition 
partners to the political brink in preference to making the least 
concession on what was a modest proposal for parliamentary 
reform, namely, estabhshing a parhamentary public accounts 
committee. 
On no account could it be reasonably argued that the Bjelke-
Petersen government's lack of interest in parliamentary reform was 
based upon the assurance that the Queensland parliament 
possessed the authority to bring an incumbent government to 
account for its activities. Rather, the reverse was the case. There 
were, and remain, numerous aspects of the parliament's proced-
ures and practices where the role of the Opposition and backbench 
to scrutinise individual ministers, the cabinet collectively, and the 
government's administration, is not safeguarded. To a large extent 
such scrutiny probably has not even been acknowledged as 
legitimate activity. 
The blame for this situation cannot be levelled entirely at the 
Bjelke-Petersen period. The authority of the parliamentary 
institution in Queensland had withered long before his premier-
ship. Certainly it is the case that parliament in this state once 
enjoyed, like its English parent, a "golden age", in the sense that, 
during the first fifty years following Separation, political life was 
centred on the parliamentary arena. That was before the political 
parties were fully established, however, and at a time when 
ministries fluctuated with changing political and parliamentary 
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loyalties. It was also a period when the scope of government 
activities was sufficiently limited that ministers were relatively well 
placed to control their departments at a detailed level. Yet there 
is no evidence to suggest that parliament in Queensland at that 
time was a more relevant institution because of any substantive 
understanding of or commitment by the state's politicians to the 
Westminster principles of responsible government. 
The erosion of parliament's authority in Queensland has been 
hastened over the years by several indigenous factors, among them 
the abolition of the state's Legislative Council in 1922. The record 
of Australian state upper houses, as chambers of legislative and 
administrative review, is not creditable; for the most part, they 
have failed to assume their "review" responsibilities, except in those 
almost predictable circumstances where an upper house has been 
dominated by a political grouping other than that controlling the 
lower chamber. In such terms Queensland may well have done 
the right thing in abolishing its second chamber. 
Yet the absence itself of the Legislative Council has had a 
discernible influence upon the character of government in 
Queensland. Sole responsibility for the construction and scrutiny 
of legislation has rested with the Legislative Assembly. This 
imphes a need for the Assembly to have developed the resources, 
talent, capacities and functions which are shared, at least notional-
ly, under a bicameral (two-House) system in the other Australian 
states. This additional burden on the Legislative Assembly has 
never been acknowledged. Also, the absence of the second 
chcunber, combined with the entrenching of the party system since 
the early twentieth century, has worked against the development 
in Queensland of any notion of political compromise, in particular, 
any sense that there were limitations to the authority of parliament 
or government. 
Queensland's raw political style also has influenced very sig-
nificantly the shaping of parliament's role, and especially the 
relationships between the executive and the legislature. For most 
of this century Queensland politics have been dominated by long 
periods of stable and unbroken rule, and by a series of strong, 
often authoritarian, political leaders. A tradition has developed 
whereby Queensland's pohtical life has been, and remains, 
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dominated by party leadership and the cult of personaUty. As a 
result, the parliament has not developed as a focus of pohtical 
authority except in those unusual circumstances where a complete 
party break-down has occurred, such as at the time of the ALP's 
split in 1957. 
The Queensland parhament was therefore a downgraded 
institution long before Joh Bjelke-Petersen arrived at political 
centre-stage. In turn, Bjelke-Petersen's own early experiences as 
a politician had an enduring impact on his perspectives of political 
leadership and the roles of parhament and cabinet. He sampled 
ten years of tough political life as an Opposition backbencher 
before Labor's collapse in 1957 - ten years which illustrated to him 
the enormous difficulties of overcoming a government tightly in 
control of its parliamentary party room; he also perceived the 
advantages for a government which worked closely with its pubhc 
service and minimally through the parhament. Above all, Bjelke-
Petersen's pre-1958 experience showed him the benefits to a 
government of curtailing as far as possible the parliamentary 
opportunities for pohtical attack by the Opposition. 
Bjelke-Petersen's first two years' experience as premier were 
also significant in shaping his later behaviour. The difficulties he 
encountered then impressed on him the overriding importance of 
cultivating and maintaining absolute personal and party loyalty 
and solidarity within his own parliamentary party and ministry. 
As explained below, his determination to ensure loyalty led to 
some rather novel interpretations of the Westminster-derived 
model of government, and also to a variety of practices which sit 
uncomfortably alongside more conventional understandings of the 
notion of ministerial responsibility. 
Queensland cannot claim a monopoly on such reformulations or 
misrepresentations of Westminster-derived principles, yet it is 
distinguishable for the extent to which wayward interpretations 
have been actively incorporated within the parliamentary and 
government apparatus. A good example has been the long-term 
blurring of the roles of parliament and government. Prior to Mike 
Ahern's premiership the Nationals in government had also 
demonstrated a total lack of concern for the fate of the parliamen-
tary institution. For example, the Queensland parliament's own 
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Standing Orders Committee, the body responsible for the parlia-
ment's procedures, did not meet between 1950 and 1980. This 
gives an indication of the extent to which concern about the 
adequacy of parliamentary procedures simply did not register on 
the political barometer. It suggests that the parliamentarians 
themselves either did not perceive that the role of the legislature 
was a changing one, or were uninterested in it. It was not until a 
scandal in the late 1970s over the alleged misuse by parliamen-
tarians of air-travel vouchers, coupled with increasingly vocal 
criticisms of parliament's performance by a retiring Speaker, that 
the Liberal and Labor parties raised the performance of the 
parhament as a political issue. 
This failure to update standing orders led to some interesting 
anachronisms. One example is that, to this day, no change has 
been made to the provision for a parliamentary quorum, that is, 
the number of members necessary to be present for debate in the 
House. In the late 1940s state parhament comprised sixty-two 
MLAs, with the quorum set at sixteen members, plus the Speaker. 
This figure has remained unchanged ever since, despite the four 
increases in the size of the parliament which have occurred since 
that time. The present quorum represents only about 18 per cent 
of the House's full complement of eighty-nine: so serious is this 
situation that the ministry alone, even with one or two of its 
members absent, has sufficient numbers to constitute a quorum. 
The difficulties associated with outdated standing orders have 
not been assisted at various times by the rulings of the Speaker, 
nor with the interpretation of the role of that office by some of its 
incumbents. As tends to occur in other parliaments, the 
effectiveness of Question Time is restricted by the Speaker's 
limited authority to ensure some relationship between the 
questions asked and the answers provided. Changes to Question 
Time introduced in 1983 following a report from the Standing 
Orders Committee the previous year provided the Speaker with 
the discretion to curtail unduly long ministerial answers, and to 
insist that those answers be relevant. This discretion has rarely 
been exercised. As in many parliaments. Question Time continues 
to be consumed by extremely routine exchanges, lengthy answers 
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to "Dorothy Dixers", and the reading of answers which become, m 
effect, ministerial statements. 
Questions without notice - a device intended to obtain on the 
spot accountability from ministers - have been permitted under 
sessional order since August 1970 and via standing orders since 
April 1983. Sometimes, however, mmisters decline to answer such 
questions, insisting instead that they be placed on notice before 
they are answered. Such questions therefore cease to be questions 
without notice. In this further way ministers are able to under-
mine Question Time by reading prepared answers which may be 
lengthy and therefore time-consuming. 
These practices serve collectively to curtail severely the effective-
ness of the important institutional role which Question Time 
should fulfil in securing a measure of government accountability. 
The 1983 standing order adjustments to Question Time, if 
enforced by the Speaker, might assist that process, and many 
routine matters could be handled by written, rather than verbal, 
questions and answers. Unfortunately for the parliamentary 
process itself, most recent Speakers have either been unwilhng or 
unable to exercise discretion, except in those cases where it has 
assisted the government's partisan position. 
The ministerial statement is another vehicle whereby ministers 
are traditionally held accountable in parhament, though the 
effectiveness of this process is influenced in Queensland, as 
elsewhere, by the usual party political factors. Until 1983 parl-
iamentary procedures did not allow a right of reply to ministerial 
statements by either the Opposition or the backbench. The rather 
unfortunate effect of this practice was demonstrated in April 1980 
when Premier Bjelke-Petersen, in making a ministerial statement 
on the subject of the then Commonwealth Royal Commission into 
Drugs, heavily criticised Ed Casey, the leader of the Opposition. 
Casey, however, had no formal right of reply to the premier's 
allegations. The new standing order. No. 108A, potentially add-
resses this problem by allowing a minister concluding a statement 
to trigger procedurally an opportunity for the Opposition leader or 
nominee to respond on an equal-time basis. Yet that right of reply 
is still discretionary, and in most cases ministers do not make 
available the opportunity for an Opposition response. Even when 
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it is provided, the Speaker has the authority to insist that such a 
reply be scheduled at a later point in the sittings if, in the 
Speaker's view, an immediate response would interrupt the 
business of the House. 
The position of leader of the Opposition is, institutionally, an 
unportant one in a parliamentary system. Yet in Queensland it 
has virtually no parliamentary privileges accorded to it, which 
suggests some reluctance or inability on the part of government to 
recognise the legitimacy of the role of pohtical opposition. The 
staff resources provided by parhament to the leader of the 
Opposition are confined to a private secretary, a press secretary, 
four clerk-typists and a chauffeur (who in practice doubles as a 
general assistant). The deputy leader of the Opposition has the 
services of a research officer. 
The government, by contrast, is supported in parliament by 
eighteen individual ministerial staff teams, as well as by the 
considerable resources of the state's public service. In 1979 the 
Opposition leader and his staff secured improved accommodation 
facilities in the parliamentary complex, but for a period prior to 
this they had been required by a directive from the government to 
occupy office premises about a kilometre and a half away from 
Parliament House. The office and meeting facilities available to 
the Opposition remain meagre compared to those at the disposal 
of the government. Interestingly, too, the 1979 decision to upgrade 
the Opposition's resources was taken by the Liberal parliamentary 
leader (as acting premier), in consultation with the parliamentary 
chairman of committees, at a time when Joh Bjelke-Petersen was 
out of the state on business. It is reported that, when notified of 
the matter, the premier was extremely angry at this concession to 
his political opponents. There was nothing he could do about it, 
however, given that the decision already had been formally 
authorised for implementation by the Speaker, Jim Houghton, as 
his final act prior to his retirement from parliament. 
The creation of permanent parliamentary committees of a policy 
or investigatory nature is generally regarded as likely to assist the 
rejuvenation of parliament's authority by holding governments to 
account. Developments of this nature at the federal level are well 
known, and a number also have occurred in other states. In 
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Queensland, on the other hand, there are still no permanent 
parliamentary committees of a pohcy character. Before 1988 the 
explanation was simple: Joh Bjelke-Petersen did not hke commit-
tees. To him they got in the way of the busmess of government. 
Above all, committees with a capacity to scrutinise the pohcies or 
adminstration of the government were portrayed as representing 
an unnecessary threat to Queensljmd's pohtical stabUity. That so-
called stabUity, however, was nothing more than an institutional-
ised assumption that there should be no limitations on the govern-
ment's powers. The prospect of a pubhc accounts committee was 
evidently especially "unnecessary" and threatening - the issue 
caused the collapse of the state's coalition in 1983. Indeed, not 
even the later jailing of Allen and Judith Callaghan for misusing 
pubhc funds weakened Sir Joh's opposition to the idea. And it was 
not until Mike Ahern assumed the premiership that the govern-
ment - by this time also reehng from revelations made before the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry - moved to establish one. 
The long-time absence of a pubhc accounts committee assisted 
the cultivation of an environment in which virtuaUy no thought was 
given to the principle of ministers, parliamentarians or officials 
differentiating public duty from private interest. This has led, in 
turn, to a situation well-documented in evidence before the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry, in which the public purse has come to be 
regarded as a facility for the government and its friends. Little 
wonder there was no interest in establishing checks on behaviour 
through parliamentary public accounts or public works committees. 
Of the parliamentary committees which do exist, there is httle 
recognition of their potentially onerous workloads. The Sub-
ordinate Legislation Committee is a good example. Like other 
parliamentary committees it has representation from both sides of 
the House. Its functions are to oversee the review of all regula-
tions, rules, by-laws, ordinances, orders-in-council, and proclama-
tions which are tabled in parliament. In any year there may be 
hundreds of these. Yet the Subordinate Legislation Committee 
under present arrangements shares, with the Privileges Committee, 
the support services of just two clerks (and a clerk-typist). Not 
surprisingly, those individuals tend to spend their time collating 
documentation and incorporating alterations rather than perform-
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ing the more active review and scrutiny tasks which otherwise 
might be expected of a parliamentary committee's support staff. 
There are also no parliamentary committees in Queensland that 
deal with estimates of departmental and other expenditure. These 
estimates are considered by the House as a whole. Because of the 
magnitude of this task and the limited time available for that 
scrutiny within the parliamentary calendar, the practice has 
developed whereby only between five and eight of the eighteen 
ministries have their estimates examined by parliament in any one 
year. Even fewer, perhaps two or three, tend to be dealt with in 
an election year. While the general expectation is that estimates 
debates will be rotated among the various portfohos, it is 
interesting to note that it is not the parliament, but the cabinet, 
which decides which ministries will be examined by the legislature 
in any one year. Even when portfolios are selected for scrutiny, 
larger or more important ministries may include a number of 
departments or sub-departments, so the consideration of all the 
portfolios's estimates is compressed into the allotted time. 
Furthermore, certain portfohos have tended to be debated more 
frequently than others. The estimates of the treasurer's own 
portfolio are never discussed, and the premier's portfolio was not 
debated during Sir Joh's last eight years in office. Yet the Works 
and Housing portfolio was dealt with on three occasions over the 
same period. 
There were several explanations for this, including Sir Joh's 
uneasiness over such scrutiny, and the considerable pork-barrelling 
opportunities available to governments in matters concerning 
Works and Housing, or Mines and Energy (the latter portfolio has 
tended to be debated every second year over the last decade). In 
other words, the accountability process to parliament was not 
recognised as such, but was seen only in terms of associated 
pohtical risks or opportunities. 
None the less, the procedures for considering legislation in the 
Queensland parliament have undergone a modest improvement 
over recent years. For example, there are wider opportunities for 
adjournment and urgency debates and, at long last, procedures 
have been modified to dispense with debate at the First Reading 
stage of legislation. Up until 1979 the practice had been to debate 
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at the First Reading stage the principles of bills which at that point 
were not printed, and thus to which members of parliament (apart 
from cabinet members) were unlikely to be privy. 
A major weakness of present procedures for considering 
legislation relates to the means of examining detailed provisions 
within legislation. Committee-stage proceedings, as presently 
conducted, are really no different from Second or Third Reading 
debates. The House sits in the committee stage as a committee of 
the whole (that is, all MLAs may be present), and in most cases 
the so-called "committee stage" debate tends to be generalised 
rather than specific. 
During the days of coalition government there were several well-
publicised instances of parhament's failure adequately to consider 
or explore the details and consequences of legislation, for example, 
the Justices Act Amendment Act of 1979, and the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1979. Both were important pieces of legislation 
in the government's handhng of pohtical events at the time. There 
were, however, only relatively few occasions during the coalition 
period from 1957 to 1983 when the cabinet lost control of 
parliamentary debate on a matter of its own legislative initiative. 
One instance occurred in 1979, when some forty amendments, 
mostly sponsored by the Liberal backbench, were made to the 
Firearms and Offensive Weapons Bill. There were even fewer 
occasions when the actions of cabinet were subject to censure 
motions in parliament from the government's own backbench, 
although one such motion was pursued in the wake of the 
unexpected night-time demolition of the Belle Vue Hotel opposite 
Parliament House. The Belle Vue had been the subject of a 
wrangle between those groups which wanted, for heritage reasons, 
to save it and the state government, which had development plans 
for the site. 
Without its coalition partners after 1983, however, the National 
party government encountered considerable difficulty in the 
parliament. The government's preferred style of "strong" and 
"determined" leadership did not always adapt well to the parlia-
mentary arena, and there were numerous instances, mostly during 
Bjelke-Petersen's time, when the government's almost hortatory 
approach to the drafting of legislation, such as that dealing with 
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industrial relations, came unstuck. It was not uncommon for 
important legislation which had originally been steamrolled 
through the House in unseemly haste, to be returned for amend-
ment shortly afterwards; the reason was often sloppy drafting or 
because the government had refused either to accept amendments 
or to allow a reasonable time for legislative gestation. The 
Electoral Districts Act of 1985 is a case in point. 
The state government periodically defended the parliament's 
performance by claiming, quite correctly, that over the years the 
Queensland parhament had averaged at least as many sitting days 
per year as any of its Lower House counterparts at the state level 
in Austraha (see Appendix F). But this defence missed the point, 
as sitting days alone provide little indication of the quality or 
relevance of parhamentary proceedings. A much more valid 
observation relates to the length of parliamentary recesses, those 
periods in which there is no scrutiny by the legislature of the 
executive's activities. The Queensland parliament sat for only four 
days between 30 March and 22 November in 1983, yet it was 
during that period that the state's coalition government crumbled. 
The problem with long periods of parliamentary recess is essential-
ly that in these periods ministers are not readily accountable for 
their actions, except to their party colleagues. There is also no 
guarantee that, when parliament resumes, issues dealt with by the 
government during the parliamentary recess will be subject to the 
House's scrutiny or even be reported there. 
It is possible for parliament to be recalled in extraordinary 
session, but this happens at the behest of the government request-
ing the Speaker. The conditions necessary for the extraordinary 
recaU of parliament are dictated, as elsewhere, by the party 
pohtical considerations of the day. The Queensland government 
was much more favourably disposed to consider recalling parlia-
ment over the perceived need for essential services legislation or 
the related anti-power union measures than it was over the con-
troversial decision to locate the state's next power station at 
Tarong or the 1986 arts funding crisis which led to the criminal 
convictions of the Callaghans. In the first case the government 
probably considered its own position at one wdth apparent public 
hostiUty toward the strike-prone electricity industry. With Tarong, 
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on the other hand, the strategy was to by-pass the Legislative 
Assembly, or at least to deny parliament most (if not all) of its 
opportunity to comment upon the issue until after the decision 
was sealed. As for the arts funding crisis, the clear strategy of the 
government was to keep it out of the parliament by asserting that 
the matters were being handled by the courts, and were thus sub 
judice. This respectful approach to the courts may have been 
appropriate, but it was also very convenient. It was, moreover, an 
approach somewhat at odds with the government's more carefree 
attitude to the rights of individuals, or to matters under investiga-
tion, when its political opponents were involved. For example, on 
6 March 1984 the then Transport minister, Don Lane, used the 
opportunity provided by a question without notice on an unrelated 
matter (the Interstate Commission) in order to name High Court 
judge and former federal Labor attorney-general Lionel Murphy 
as the judge involved in the so-called yige tapes. This was despite 
the fact that, at the time, the authenticity of the tapes had not 
been established. 
AccountabiUty to whom? Confusing the roles of government and 
parliament 
The appallingly lame condition of the Queensland parhament in 
terms of its ability to secure accountability is not entirely surpris-
ing, given that the state's politics have long been dominated by 
notions of strong personal and party leadership. Moreover, 
throughout this century the parliament has been regarded as 
having no role other than that of legitimating government activity. 
One of the effects of this has been to institutionalise a number of 
fundamental misunderstandings about the roles and functions of 
parliament and about concepts such as ministerial responsibility. 
Procedures for the consideration of government legislation, as 
discussed below, provide a good example. 
Party factors obviously have a role to play, as they do elsewhere, 
yet the parliament's role in considering legislation is so delayed 
and so diminished in Queensland that an assumption seems to 
have arisen that the obstacles to legislative passage will derive only 
from the government side of the House. This not only denies the 
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legitimate role traditionally accorded the Opposition, but also 
suggests that the party room has become the de facto parliament. 
During his premiership Joh Bjelke-Petersen's own notions about 
the government's accountability actively contributed to the 
prevailing confusion and misunderstanding in Queensland regard-
ing the respective roles of parliament and government. His strong 
religious views seemed to flavour his behaviour in this regard, as 
reflected by his comments in an interview with the Bulletin on 8 
October 1977: "Surely if you're elected to govern you should know 
what's correct or right without having to ask somebody's advice." 
He also once put the view to parliament that governments have a 
responsibility to protect people from themselves (Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, vol. 210, 1954-55, p.l724). 
When considered in conjunction with his Lutheran fundamen-
talist views, statements such as these indicated that Joh Bjelke-
Petersen preferred to consider himself accountable not to the 
people, or even the parliament, but to a higher and externally-
imposed authority - God, the Bible, and his own strong sense of 
morality. Yet to rely on the apparent integrity of one person in 
government is risky in the extreme. Political systems need 
structures of accountability, not the word of a demigod. And as 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry has revealed, no matter how much political 
leaders have claimed to be moral, the absence of public scrutiny 
in Queensland allowed a seething bed of corruption to operate 
unchecked. 
In their behaviour certain of Joh Bjelke-Petersen's ministers also 
displayed equally idiosyncratic confusions regarding the respective 
roles accorded parliament and government. One minister, also the 
proud father of a GPS student, hosted a tour of the Queensland 
parliament by his child's class. While visiting the Legislative 
Assembly, one student mentioned this confusion of the roles of 
parliament and government by pointing out the inscription which 
appeared on the Mace. (The Mace is the symbol of royal 
authority and of the authority of a lower house of parliament in a 
Westminster-derived system. The Mace in question had been 
presented to the Queensland parhament several years before this 
incident.) The student asked the minister why the Mace was 
inscribed "Presented to the Government of Queensland" rather 
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than "Presented to the Parhament of Queensland". The minister's 
reply was breathtaking: "What's the bloody difference anyway?" 
Bjelke-Petersen's successor, Mike Ahern, had a longstanding 
interest as a parliamentarian in addressing issues of accountability, 
a commitment made more urgent once he was in office by the 
extent of institutional break-down revealed before the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry. Ahern must be credited with pushing for the establish-
ment of a parhamentary public accounts committee, despite 
significant "old guard" resistance within his party. Yet even he was 
unprepared, in spite of the lessons of Fitzgerald, to acknowledge 
fully parhament's role in securing ministerial accountability. In 
late 1988 he issued a set of revised guidelines for ministerial 
conduct and accountability, in the wake of the evidence to the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry given by former Transport minister Don Lane. 
For Queensland, which prior to Ahem's premiership had no such 
rules, this initiative was pathfinding. To some extent, however, 
Ahern squandered the opportunity by insisting that, in terms of the 
guidelines, ministers were to be accountable to him and not the 
parliament. Although this requirement to report to the premier 
was consistent with procedures introduced in some other states, 
Ahern might have gone further by immediately requiring ministers 
to report details of their business and other interests to parliament. 
From the outset he had indicated that a feature of his premiership 
would be the strong emphasis placed on public accountability and 
on restoring the community's faith in the state's political institu-
tions. Here was an obvious opportunity to underline that commit-
ment, particularly given Lane's admission that he had been a tax 
cheat and had corruptly handled his ministerial expenses. 
The institutionalised misconceptions in Queensland about the 
roles of government and parliament have contributed significantly 
to the malaise of the parliament's position. Significant ambiguity 
even surrounds the status of several officials who either are 
deemed permanent parliamentary officers or who report directly 
to the parliament. The Queensland Parliamentary Handbook lists 
the parliamentary counsel as a permanent parliamentary officer. 
At the same time, the Queensland Government Directory shows 
the position under the Premier's Department, despite the fact that 
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the parliamentary counsel is required to assist the Opposition as 
well as the government in the preparation of legislation. 
Until the mid 1980s the position of auditor-general was equally 
ambiguous in terms of its locus. The auditor-general presents his 
or her reports directly to parliament, and under the Financial 
Administration and Audit Act may only be removed from office 
by the state governor upon the consent of parliament. However, 
until 1984-85 the position of auditor-general was placed under the 
umbrella of the Premier's Department, and not that of the 
parliament, in the Queensland Government Directory. 
While the post of Speaker was a powerful one in nineteenth-
century Queensland politics, the status of the position has declined 
in the twentieth century as party influences upon parhamentary 
hfe have become stronger. As in many other parliaments, election 
to the Speakership in Queensland has not often led to later 
elevation to ministerial rank. But the job has always been 
considered a "prize" for the governing party to bestow on one of 
its members. The Speakership has never developed any strong 
tradition of parliamentary neutrality in Queensland, though this is 
by no means unusual in the Australian experience. During the 
Labor party's years in government in Queensland, for example, the 
Speaker usually attended parliamentary caucus meetings. There 
were even instances during the Labor years when Speakers were 
known to pass notes to the ministry suggesting ways in which the 
standing orders might be best utilised in order to blunt the 
Opposition's attack. 
The weakening of the Speaker's post was hastened in at least two 
ways during Joh Bjelke-Petersen's term as premier. In the first 
place Bjelke-Petersen himself recognised the partisan yet fragile 
nature of the Speakership and the necessity for its occupant to 
retain the confidence both of the government and the House in 
order to be renominated for the position and thus usually re-
elected to it. On one occasion in 1972, early in the Bjelke-
Petersen premiership, the Country party backbench actually 
rejected their leader's choice of speaker, instead supporting Bill 
Lonergan, who was elected. Ironically the premier's choice, Jim 
Houghton, who secured the post in 1974, later became a strong 
advocate for the rejuvenation of parliament's role, and was 
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extremely critical of the government's attitude toward the legisla-
ture. In more recent years, however. Speakers usually have made 
little effort to disguise their partisanship or else have yielded to 
their circumstances by altering rulings in the face of Sn Joh's 
openly displayed hostility. 
The Speaker's office was also weakened by the political executive 
seizing absolute advantage of lapses in the parliament's own 
managerial behaviour. In 1978, for example, the Queensland 
auditor-general, Jim Peel, submitted a report to parliament which 
identified twenty-three serving and former MLAs as having 
misused public funds by converting air-travel vouchers for domestic 
flights to entitlements for international flights, using travel 
vouchers for family members, and claiming expenses which had not 
been incurred. Until that time the administration of these matters 
had been the province of the Speaker, acting within cabinet 
guidelines. Bjelke-Petersen chose to use the Peel findings as 
justification for transferring the administration of a number of 
matters from the Speaker (and the parliament) to the Premier's 
Department. Jim Houghton, the Speaker at that time, attempted 
unsuccessfully to resist. He made repeated public criticisms of the 
Queensland parliament's performance. 
Houghton's concerns about the fate of the parhamentary 
institution were not apparently shared by his successor, Selwyn 
Muller. Shortly after his election as Speaker Muller was reported 
as saying that it was the Speaker's responsibility to apply the 
wishes of the government he represented (Courier-Mail, 8 August 
1979). Mullcr's rulings also attracted scrutiny, perhaps most 
notably the ruling he made on 11 September 1979 that the 
Opposition could not ask questions in Question Time about the 
controversial Essential Services Bill, then before the House. The 
ruling was based, apparently, on the argument that questions could 
be asked on the bill when it moved to the Second Reading. None 
the less, the Speaker's interpretation sat somewhat uneasily 
alongside the then standing order No. 68, and against the Speak-
er's own allowance of a question on the same bill in the previous 
week. 
Muller's apparent lack of understanding of standing orders was 
also to prove a major difficulty for the government on 4 August 
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1983, the day when the self-destruction of the state's coahtion was 
initiated by disagreement within the government parties over a 
Liberal backbench motion in favour of bringing forward discussion 
on the possible establishment of a pubhc accounts committee. If 
the Speaker had understood a point of order raised by Liberal 
leader Dr Llew Edwards about the necessity for a division on the 
fateful motion moved by a Liberal backbencher, the sacking of 
Terry White, a senior Liberal minister, may have been averted. In 
supporting that motion White had enraged both Bjelke-Petersen 
and Edwards; they claimed he had broken cabinet solidarity. For 
his part, White argued that his action in supporting that motion 
was not inconsistent with cabinet policy. 
Just a few days later, on 9 August, the Speaker's actions again 
proved to be significant. On that occasion the Speaker assumed 
the chair at 11 a.m. The premier immediately attempted to 
address the chair, but as he did so the Opposition leader, Mr 
Keith Wright, rose on a matter of privilege. (Parliamentary 
privilege refers to the special rights granted to parliament and its 
members designed to ensure the independence of both and to 
enable parliamentary business to be carried out without external 
pressure or fear of prosecution.) Under standing orders a matter 
of privilege normally takes precedence over all other business. 
Yet the Speaker refused to hear Wright's privilege call, instead 
allowing the premier to recommend the indefinite adjournment of 
the parliament's sitting, a proposition which attracted both 
National and Liberal support. For the government the Speaker's 
ruling was politically expedient; it prevented the possibility of the 
Opposition taking parliamentary advantage of disarray on the 
government side. 
A politicised public service 
Under Westminster conventions, the role of the public service is 
to provide the government of the day with advice which is 
professional, impartial and fearless. Indeed, security of tenure has 
long been associated with public employment as a positive 
encouragement of such behaviour. The assumption is that a 
distinction can and should be drawn between making policy and 
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implementing it, and that the public service's role is confined to 
the latter activity. Above all, the loyalty of the pubhc service 
should be to the government of the day, yet the qualities instilled 
in public servants, and encouraged by then conditions of employ-
ment, supposedly ensure an ability to adapt flexibly and readily to 
changes of minister, policy, priority and government. 
Public services everywhere have had difficulty in applying these 
conventions to the circumstances of modern government. A 
century ago, when many of these traditions were developed, the 
activity of government was both limited in scope and predominant-
ly clerical in character. Since that time the party system has 
become entrenched, while the activities of government have 
broadened in both scope and complexity. The distinctions between 
making and administering pohcy have consequently become 
blurred, in the process threatening and sometimes confounding 
traditional notions of ministerial responsibihty and pubhc service 
neutrality. 
There was an almost total lack of interest by government in 
Queensland in such matters, at least imtil the late 1980s. Over the 
years a variety of practices had become established which, taken 
together, badly impeded the ability of the Queensland public 
service to be professional or impartial, much less fearless. This 
situation did not appear to unsettle Joh Bjelke-Petersen. Asked 
on one occasion in the late 1970s why Queensland had not 
followed several other states and the Commonwealth by ha\ang a 
broad-ranging public service inquiry, the premier cunningly parried 
the question by responding: "But I make enquiries of the public 
service every day of the week." 
Even if Bjelke-Petersen recognised the challenges facing 
governments in modernising their machinery, he cared little for 
such matters. Issues of administrative or parliamentary reform 
were "hoo-ha" to him. Besides, as an Opposition backbencher he 
had observed the considerable advantages accruing to a govern-
ment able to work cosily with its public service. Sir Joh often 
excused or justified his political behaviour by referring, not 
surprisingly, to practices which had been perpetrated by his 
opponents thirty or forty years before. For example, he probably 
remembered the decision of Billy Moore, the Health and Home 
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Affairs minister in the Gair Labor government, to appoint his own 
private secretary to the position of departmental under secretary. 
This represented a stunning leap in public service classification 
terms, a leap which was greeted with outrage at the time. Or 
perhaps Joh Bjelke-Petersen remembered a little further back to 
other examples where other Labor premiers attended generously 
to the public service careers of their relatives. 
Whatever Bjelke-Petersen's recollections of past practices, the 
public service remained professionally unattended during his long 
premiership. Until the 1980s employees were recruited mainly at 
the "base grade clerk" level and were almost entirely Queensland 
school-leavers; in recent years this recruitment of school-leavers 
has been supplemented with increasingly significant intakes of new 
graduates from Queensland's universities and colleges. However, 
above the high school and graduate points of entry recruitment 
from outside the public service and recruitment from outside 
Queensland, is still discouraged. While appeals against outside 
appointments are not permitted, such appointments are neverthe-
less able to be successfully upended by rights of objection which 
are available to inside candidates; any such objections must be 
considered before a recommendation for an outside appointment 
is finalised. Furthermore, until 1985 prospective appointees from 
other states or the Commonwealth were unable to have leave and 
related entitlements recognised on transfer to Queensland. Little 
wonder that the Queensland public service has remained such a 
closed shop. Even today, virtually no one is appointed to per-
manent head level from outside the public service, much less from 
outside Queensland. 
There are two main routes to permanent head and other senior 
levels of appointment. The first, the traditional public service 
path, is the "slow track" means of floating slowly to the top on the 
basis of a lifetime of devoted service. Until recently, length of 
service was the primary criterion for promotion. The other, a 
more accelerated route available typically to young males who have 
been targeted as talented people by the minister or the minister's 
mandarins, is by means of attachment to a minister as a private 
secretary or press secretary. At least forty-five individuals who 
currently hold or who over the last generation have held the 
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position of permanent head or another very senior appointment, 
have had stints as ministerial staffers during their careers. 
Those who have had the best chance of all for high promotion 
appear to be those who have worked for the premier of the day. 
Graham Swan (later under secretary. Employment and Industrial 
Affairs), Col Curtis (under secretary. Premier's Department) and 
Col Douglas (chairman of the Public Service Board) were all once 
staffers for Sir Frank Nicklin. And seven of the personal staff of 
Sir Joh when either a minister or premier, later secured very 
senior pubhc service posts: D.K. Houston (under secretary. 
Works); Allen Callaghem (under secretary. Arts, National Parks 
and Sport); Stan Wilcox (under secretary, Arts, National Parks and 
Sport following Callaghan's jailing for misusing government funds); 
Russ Roberts (member, Pubhc Service Board, and other posts); 
Ken Crooke (director. Government News and Information 
Services); Gary Gilbert (director of Sport); and John Walsh 
(deputy director. Office of Public Service Personnel Management). 
Career success for former ministerial staffers has not been 
confined to those attached only to National party ministers. 
Among those who once worked with Liberal ministers and later 
secured senior appointments are Ian Staib, Peter Hall, John Leech, 
Len Smyth, Fred Albietz, Bernie Yorke, Cedric Johnson, John 
Bellert, Kev Leyshon, and Allan Pettigrew. Others have managed 
to walk the political tightrope, a task expected of career officials 
but historically one not necessarily appreciated by politicians on 
either side in Queensland. The late Sir David Muir enjoyed a 
distinguished career during the coalition years as chairman of the 
Public Service Board, Queensland's ombudsman, agent-general in 
London, and first director of the state's Department of Industrial 
Development; he was once also on the personal staff of Labor 
premier William Forgan Smith. 
While career advancement is often accelerated for ministerial 
staffers, in a number of instances, several of them in recent years, 
the pace has been breathtaking, even allowing for the talent of the 
appointees. Allen Callaghan, Stan Wilcox, Ken Crooke, and Russ 
Roberts, all former staffers to Sir Joh, departed the premier's 
office to assume, directly or soon after, highly paid, senior posts. 
The career path of Russ Roberts has been one of the most 
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spectacular. In just eight years he moved from private secretary 
to the premier, to secretary of Cabinet, thence to commissioner of 
the Public Service Board. While commissioner he was appointed 
to the Savage Committee of public sector review which, ironically, 
led to the abolition of the Public Service Board. Roberts was then 
appointed director of the newly created Office of Public Service 
Personnel Management, the effective successor to that board. 
There have been others who have enjoyed a meteoric rise. 
Kevin Edwards, formerly attached to National party minister Vince 
Lester, moved in the space of four years from ministerial private 
secretary to Industrial Registrar and thence to a permanent 
appointment as an industrial commissioner, on the equivalent of 
a District Court judge's salary of $88,000 (in 1988 terms). Brian 
Ferris, on the other hand, moved from a position as Ivan Gibbs's 
ministerial private secretary, which he held for some five years (he 
had previously been a clerk in the Mines Department), directly to 
that of commissioner for Housing, with a salary of $80,000 (in 1988 
terms). 
Sometimes the rewards extended to ministerial staffers for 
outstanding and loyal service have been enjoyed immediately. As 
a group, ministerial staff have received salary classification hikes 
over recent years, while most of their departmental colleagues 
have been salary-bound by public service wage freezes or, at best, 
salary restrictions. Beyond that, some ministerial staffers have 
been singled out for especially generous treatment, in the process 
receiving salary advancements bearing little relation to salary 
decisions made by the government for other posts. In June 1987, 
for example. Sir Joh pushed through cabinet large or otherwise 
exceptional pay increases for three of his key staff: his pilot. Beryl 
Young, who received an increase of $27,000 (from $48,0(X) to 
$75,000); his press secretary. Ken Crooke, who advanced $9000 
to $58,000; and his departmental research officer, Wendy Arm-
strong, who moved up $2000 to $45,220. 
Regardless of which promotional track an individual follows, 
cabinet applies intense personal and political scrutiny on all who 
aspire to appointment or promotion at senior levels. In fact, it 
vets all public service appointments as far down as the middle 
executive classification grade 1-15 and, for police force posts, down 
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to the level of senior sergeant. While the government may justify 
its interest in terms of ensuring an efficient and responsible (and 
recently, honest) public service, its concern for such matters has 
never extended to an insistence that all senior posts be advertised. 
The Public Seivice Management and Employment Act 1988 does 
set out requirements for advertising senior posts, but a less-
heralded clause in that legislation allows govemor-in-council (in 
effect, state cabinet) to waive the requirement if it chooses. 
That same 1988 legislation also provides for the introduction of 
contract employment for those occupying the top 3 or 4 per cent 
of public service posts. Such contract arrsmgements are now not 
uncommon in Australian states, but the move toward contracts in 
Queensland is widely interpreted within the pubhc service not so 
much as a means to develop an efficient and flexible system of 
public management, but as a further and very blunt attempt at 
politicisation. 
Other practices have developed within the Queensland public 
service which reward personal loyalty, punish perceived disloyalty, 
instil an atmosphere of fear, and generally help to weaken the 
career structure of the public service. Pubhc service positions may 
be arranged for defeated or retired government politicians, for 
friends and family of ministers, for friends of senior pubhc 
servants, or for National party associates. One particularly 
unsubtle instance of this occurred in 1987 when the Premier's 
Department created a number of contract public service posts to 
assist the "Joh for PM" campaign. On the other hand, some public 
servants have been treated as little more than enemies of the state 
because, as private citizens, they have opposed the government on 
issues unrelated to their work, or because their professional 
honesty has embarrassed the government, or because they have 
contested seats at state elections on behalf of the government's 
political opponents. The careers and personal lives of these 
individuals have often been destroyed in consequence of their 
actions. John Sinclair, who led the fight to protect Eraser Island 
from sandmining, is the most prominent example of such victimisa-
tion. Ironically, he was once a member of the National (then 
Country) party! An adult education officer in the state Depart-
ment of Education, he sued Joh Bjelke-Petersen for defamation. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Institutional "Dry Rot" 77 
Sinclair won the case, but Bjelke-Petersen appealed and the 
decision was overturned by the Full Court. Quite apart from 
having to pay the extensive legal costs arising from the matter, 
Sinclair endured a very difficult time in his pubhc service position. 
Threats were made to abolish his post and he was issued with 
several transfers in the space of a few years. His career and family 
hfe in tatters, he moved to Sydney. 
Revelations before the Fitzgerald Inquiry of the rorting of 
ministerial expenses pointed to the break-down of accountabihty 
which had occurred in Queensland. But this break-down was not 
perpetrated by the state's pohticians alone. After all, the very 
rorts they had developed, such as fudging ministerial or parliamen-
tary expenses and blurring personal and business costs, were 
known about by many senior public servants who themselves 
participated in the administration of these practices. In particular, 
it was they who administered the notorious voucher system and 
who verified the items of expenditure being claimed as "necessary 
expenditures". 
The collusion of politicians and some senior public servants in 
the "working" of this voucher system deserves special mention. 
Officially, there are three stages (prescribed by the Treasurer's 
Instructions) covering the process of expending government funds 
on goods or services. The first is the departmental requisition 
form (Treasurer's Instruction No. 92) which sets out particulars of 
the goods, services or works to be provided, and the estimated 
price thereof, the fund and budget heading to which the relevant 
-expenditure is to be charged, and the signature of the officer 
authorising the expenditure. The second stage involves the 
completion of a departmental order form (covered by Treasurer's 
Instruction No. 93) which is completed by an ordering officer who 
receives requisition forms from throughout the department. That 
person, who has specialised knowledge of stores and purchasing 
procedures, as well as of the items which are available, completes 
an official order form on the basis of the details contained on each 
individual requisition; this order form is then addressed to a 
particular supply source chosen on the basis of competitive price, 
availability of goods and services requested, the standard of 
product supplied, and so on. The final stage (covered by Treas-
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urer's Instruction No. 97) requires a government expenditure 
voucher for every payment of public moneys for the supply of 
goods, the rendering of a service (including a periodic service), the 
construction of works, and so on. The voucher and all its accom-
panying details - including the signatures of various authorised 
accounting officers and the invoice for the services provided - is 
the basis for preparing the cheque to pay the suppher. In that 
sense the term voucher is inaccurate: the forms which are used 
are really multi-purpose expenditure claim forms utilised for 
everything from obtaining reimbursement of personal travelling 
expenses to purchasing machinery or to paying contractors for 
constructing a building. 
Rorting the voucher system, which occurs across many 
departments, but which is probably at its worse in the trust 
accounts of certain departments, is achieved by a number of 
means. These include: 
• ordering a piece of equipment or some consultancy services for, 
say, $60,000, but arranging for the supplier to invoice this amount 
in two or three smaller lots, thus avoiding having to seek 
ministerial approval (a public service permanent head or 
delegated officer has such authority up to $50,000; amounts 
between $50,000 and $100,000 require mmisterial approval while 
those over $100,000 require that of cabinet or, more correctly. 
Executive Council); 
• not obtaining quotes for certain work or services, and giving that 
work to suppliers who are on the "favoured" list; 
• completing requisition forms and order forms only after the 
invoice has been received, that is, at the same time the expendi-
ture voucher is being completed. This is effected by backdating 
requisitions (which are often not numbered) and by completing 
orders from a book or books of order forms kept aside especially 
for this purpose. Because audits take place at known times, 
internal procedures can be most irregular over much of the 
financial year; 
• debiting ministerial expenses against departmental expenditure 
headings such as travelling expenses, postage, freight and 
incidentals. This practice is known, not surprisingly, as "hiding"; 
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• arranging payment in cases where there may be a lack of 
evidence that the work involved in the consultancy or the 
contract has been completed; 
• failing to secure prior authorisation for expenditure on individual 
items. 
The administration of the so-called voucher system is now 
undergoing major change, with the introduction of a U.S.-based 
system developed by Management Science of America (MSA). 
Yet there is no indication that the MSA system wiU be able to 
cope with these longstanding problems any more efficiently than 
the preceding arrangements. 
Public servants may seek to defend their participation in 
activities such as those listed above by pointing to the political 
pressures on them or to their institutional obhgations of loyalty 
and confidentiahty. On the other hand, over the years some of 
these senior public servants have themselves had access to credit 
cards, luxury motor vehicles, and a range of other perquisites of 
office. In effect, there has been a conspiracy of silence among 
some senior pubhc servants and ministers in the face of any 
outside investigations of these practices. Some permanent heads 
have also gone to unusual lengths to maintain this silence, 
developing elaborately secretive procedures to ensure that not even 
their departmental officers (other than whoever processes the 
paperwork) have the opportunity to peruse these "sensitive" 
expenses. 
Internal investigations have been equally discouraged. Snap 
audits are very unusual and individual auditors have been known 
to be reprimanded for arriving at a department unannounced. The 
auditors also are provided with a prescribed list of tasks which, 
while being historically familiar, will not necessarily probe all 
vouchers for large amounts or areas of likely abuse. Individual 
auditors may be intimidated, too, by the consequences of being 
over-zealous. Valid or otherwise though it may be, a perception 
exists amongst many auditors that an adverse report on a 
department may backfire against the officer who has "blown the 
whistle". 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
80 Working The System 
The cumulative effect of all these practices is that, for a very long 
time, public servants in Queensland have been given a clear sense 
of what the state government expects of them. They, too, have 
had their expectations of the government in terms of its attitude 
to their interests, which include the maintenance of a public 
service closed shop. One former Liberal minister was fond of 
remarking, "If you look after the public service, it wih look after 
you". 
Street-smart public servants have also been aware that the 
protection afforded to the government by the state's electoral 
arrangements has meant, in effect, that the ruling party 
represented "the only game in town". There was no prospect of 
a change of government and changes in administrative practice 
were not encouraged because they could threaten the longstanding 
cosiness of arrangements between the government and its admin-
istrative advisers. In other words, the public service as an 
institution came to share the "values" of its political masters. It 
thus became politicised, not so much in a directly partisan sense 
but by way of sharing the benefits of office and the threats posed 
by government defeat at the polls. 
This is not to say that individual pubhc servants have always been 
unwilling or unable to maintain their professionalism and indepen-
dence, to hold their ground against political interference, or to 
secure top posts solely on the basis of merit. Some ministers also 
have been keen to reward merit and have been sensitive to the 
position of their professional administrative advisers. Nevertheless, 
the public service as a whole has not sampled changes of policy or 
practice; nor has it expected such changes. It has fitted itself to 
the government's political needs and become, in effect, a partisan 
institution of policy-making. Some people have been cowered by 
the system while the consciences of others have been bought off 
by the system's rewards. And those who have maintained their 
ground in the face of pressure have often done so at substantial 
risk to their careers. 
There have also been other less visible though equally destructive 
factors working against the operation of a healthy career service. 
Although rarely spoken of openly, the bonds of Freemasonry are 
still apparent, as are Catholic networks. In the public service the 
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Masonic influence, which is known as the goat-rider or knuckle-
thumper factor, is said to have been influential in the now-
dismembered Public Service Board, and still remains relevant 
within certain elements of the police force. The Catholic influence 
has been marshalled under the umbrella of the "Knights of the 
Southern Cross" group and has been especially prevalent in the 
Justice Department and the Lands Department, as weU as in the 
pohce force, where it is dubbed the "green Mafia". Illogical though 
it may seem, there has also developed a network of influence, 
agam centred in the police force, which involves Freemasons who 
are also Catholics. Although nowadays impossible to measure, and 
all too easy to exaggerate, such sectarian influences historically 
have been strong. Their impact, now diminishing, has also been 
divisive on institutions in general, imd the public service in 
particular. 
The pohce as an arm of government 
Politicisation has extended to the police force. Throughout his 
premiership Joh Bjelke-Petersen, himself once Police minister, 
used the Queensland police force as an active political agent to 
enforce government policy. This is precisely what the system of 
checks and balances in a parliamentary democracy should guard 
against. At best, the police force in Queensland has been 
regarded by the state government as just another public service 
department, responsible through its minister to the parliament. 
But the police force should not be so equated, because in addition 
it has a responsibility to uphold the law, to exercise original 
powers granted by common law. The concept of original powers, 
which forms the basis for the theory of police independence, sets 
out the obligation upon police to enforce the law of the land. It 
is the possession of such original powers which allows a police 
force (and its members) to ignore, theoretically at least, an 
unlawful direction from a minister. 
Not since the departure of former police commissioner Ray 
Whitrod has the force sought to protect its broader responsibility 
to uphold the law independently of ministers. And sometimes 
there is a conflict between the two. Evidence by suspended police 
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commissioner Sir Terence Lewis to the Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed, 
for example, that successive Police ministers supported the 
"containment" of prostitution, even though it is an illegal activity in 
Queensland. Sir Terence had followed the ministerial advice, 
obviously preferring to acknowledge the realities of pohtical power 
than to insist on a strict observance of the law (albeit in this 
instance an impossible one to enforce). 
This interpretation by Lewis of his position as police commis-
sioner was one explanation for his great political success in the 
office. His predecessor, Ray Whitrod, had not been able to 
reconcile his position with such ease; nor did he seek to do so. 
Whitrod publicly clashed with Joh Bjelke-Petersen over allegations 
of police brutality in a street march incident, and again over the 
reported behaviour of police who raided and "torched" a commune 
at Cedar Bay in north Queensland. In both cases Ray Whitrod 
was concerned about possible police misconduct, actions which 
might have been in breach of either the Queensland Police Act, 
the Queensland Police Rules, or both. He wanted an inquiry into 
both incidents to ensure that police had not broken the law. Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen saw it very differently. In his very early days as 
premier, when his own parliamentary support was soft, he had 
brought hundreds of police to Brisbane in 1971 to enable the 
government to adopt a tough stand against demonstrators at a 
Rugby Union match involving the touring South African team, the 
Springboks. This action helped to earn him a reputation as a 
strong leader, a useful quality in the state of Queensland, and he 
quickly recognised the benefits of cultivating it further. 
After Whitrod's departure in 1976 those in charge of the police 
force were all too willing to play the game: they were prepared to 
do the premier's political bidding in return for the special relation-
ship they would enjoy with him. As Colleen Lewis has shown in 
an unpublished thesis (Griffith University, 1988), this worked in a 
number of ways. In the first place there had developed a com-
munication pipeline between the police force and the premier. 
This was particularly helpful if the Police minister was not 
perceived as "sympathetic" to the force, as in the case of Max 
Hodges, the minister at the time Whitrod was commissioner. In 
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Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, premier of Queensland from 1968 to 1987. 
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The association of Joh Bjelke-Petersen with Queensland was unambiguous in this 
National Party poster. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Russell Hinze, long-serving minister for Local Government, Main Roads and Rac-
ing, said that "[in] some of the seats of Queensland . . . all you have to do is get the 
National party tag and you can win forever and a day". (Courtesy Queensland 
Newspapers) 
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National party trustee and Bjelke-Petersen confidant Sir Edward Lyons was 
chairman of the TAB. He is pictured here at the tote at the Members' Enclosure at 
Eagle Farm Racecourse, Brisbane. (Inset photo, courtesy Queensland Newspapers) 
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National party organisation 
duo — state president Sir 
Robert Sparkes (above), 
and executive director Mike 
Evans. (Courtesy Queens-
land Newspapers) 
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In 1981-82 Bjelke-Petersen rode roughshod over Liberal attorney-general Sam 
Doumany in the selection of the new chief justice for Queensland. (Courtesy Alan 
Moir and Courier-Mail) 
Sir Robert Sparkes, National party state president, was principal tactician for the 
party in its dealings with the Liberal coalition partners on the ticklish question of the 
zonal electoral system. The Liberal party was concerned about the continued effect 
of the electoral arrangements on its own fortunes but preferred the comfort of coali-
tion and the accoutrements of office to the harsh realities of political wilderness. 
(Courtesy Alan Moir and Courier-Mail) 
Throughout his premiership Joh Bjelke-Petersen managed to prevent any move for 
a foreign land register. This was in the face of opposition from almost every major 
political group in Queensland, including his own party organisation. (Courtesy Alan 
Moir and Courier-Mail) 
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The premier's attitude to parliament fabove), and the state Liberal party (both 
1983). (Courtesy Alan Moir and Courier-Mail) 
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In waging his "Joh for PM" campaign, the premier badly misjudged the Australian 
electorate's preparedness to follow the Queensland lead. (Courtesy Sean Leahy and 
Courier-Mail) 
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For many years the Queensland ALP, preoccupied by its internal difficulties, was 
not taken seriously as a possible alternative government. (Courtesy Sean Leahy and 
Courier-Mail) 
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Liberal leaders during the Bjelke-Petersen premiership: clockwise from top left. Sir 
Gordon Chalk (1965-76), Sir William Knox (1976-78, 1983-88), Llew Edwards 
(1978-83), Terry White (1983). (Courtesy Queensland Newspapers) Property of University of Queensland Pr ss - do ot copy or distribute
Labor leaders who faced Joh in his 
final years: right, Keith Wright 
(1982-84), below, Nev Warburton 
(1984-88). (Courtesy Queensland 
Newspapers) 
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Labor premier Ned Hanlon introduced the first zonal gerrymander in Queensland in 
1949. In this photo, Hanlon is pictured viewing electoral maps in his Given Terrace, 
Paddington home on his 62nd birthday on I October 1949. (Courtesy John Oxley 
Library) 
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Clockwise from right, the 1985-86 electoral 
redistribution commissioners: John An-
drews (chairman). Sir Thomas Covacevich, 
Col Pearson. (Courtesy Queensland 
Newspapers) 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
The Bjelke-Petersen cabinet (above) and the Ahern cabinet (below) — both premiers 
flanked by ministers in order of seniority. 
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The post-Joh combatants: top, Mike 
Ahern, below left, Wayne Goss, below 
right, Angus Innes. (Courtesy Queensland 
Newspapers) 
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OH! Mr. Ahem 
how could you? 
DURING 20 YEARS 
IN GOVERNMENT.. 
EIGHT YEARS 
IN CABINET.. 
YOU NEVER HEARD, 
SAW OR SAID ANYTHING 
ABOUT CORRUPTION, 
^^^^ AuiNDii<«bi w i w 9-mn loi ir» I I P 1C P H I SI Soul" Bn>H™ 
In 1988 Mike Ahern attempted to dissociate his administration from Bjelke-
Petersen's, a strategy questioned by this ALP advertisement. Ahern had been a 
National party politician for twenty years, eight of them as a member of Bjelke-
Petersen's cabinet. 
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fact, Hodges did regard himself as supportive of the police. He 
just did not see the police as being above the law. 
Alternatively, an individual Pohce minister's interest in pursuing 
a specific allegation against the force, or one or more of its mem-
bers, might be dampened if it were knovm that the premier would 
always back the force in such circumstances. For example, in early 
1983 Police minister Bill Glasson announced that he wanted to 
rid Queensland of prostitution and gambling because they made 
the public suspicious that police received bribes. The pohce union 
sought an apology from the minister for the statement and the 
premier offered Glasson some blunt advice about his choice of 
words. Glasson appeared thereafter to soften his approach on the 
subject. 
In her study Colleen Lewis highlights the special relationship the 
pohce enjoyed with Joh Bjelke-Petersen, and the extent to which 
his habitual defence of the force, regardless of the allegations 
involved, allowed it to sidestep charges of corruption. That same 
relationship also enabled the force to evade or undermine any 
attempts to make its operations more accountable to the public. 
The Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed widespread police misconduct 
involving illegal gambling, prostitution and drugs. There was also 
evidence that individual police officers had falsified evidence and 
perjured themselves in order to secure convictions. Yet, amazing-
ly, the body established to investigate allegations of police 
misconduct, the Police Complaints Tribunal, reported that it had 
received only isolated complaints of corruption over the period of 
its existence from 1982 to 1987, a time when misconduct was 
flourishing. 
The Police Complaints Tribunal supposedly has an "arms length" 
relationship with the police force. Yet its chairman over a number 
of years, Eric Pratt, a District Court judge and former police 
officer, was identified by Sir Terence Lewis at the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry as one of his "special friends with whom he could discuss 
any matter in confidence". Pratt was also a friend of Bill Gunn, 
who became Police minister in 1986. In other words, the tribunal 
was headed by a friend of both the commissioner of the police 
force it was investigating and, from 1986, the minister responsible 
for the police force. Another member of the tribunal since its 
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inception. Senior Sergeant Col Chant, was president of the police 
union; he was also close to people who were the subject of 
investigations. In all, the tribunal did not behave as a body 
endeavouring to secure police accountability, but one whose 
operation was entirely reactive, and defensive of the interests of 
the police force. 
This lack of activity on the part of the Pohce Complaints 
Tribunal indicates a great deal about the position enjoyed by the 
police, the disregard for police accountability which had developed, 
and the community's reaction to the situation. The pohce force, 
courtesy of its connection with the premier, had ensured that the 
measures to strengthen accountability recommended in the 1977 
Lucas Report were ignored. Some years later the Sturgess Report 
into allegations of police involvement in child pornography and 
male prostitution named people who subsequently were mentioned 
at the Fitzgerald Inquiry in connection with illegal casinos and 
female brothels. Yet the police commissioner. Sir Terence Lewis, 
told the Fitzgerald Inquiry that he had never read the Sturgess 
Report. This suggested his priorities lay elsewhere and reflected 
his political complacency, given that his diaries contained extensive 
details about the newspapers, novels and other reports he read 
which were much less relevant to his police work than the Sturgess 
Report. 
Sir Terence Lewis also extended his interests into mainstream 
National party politics. As his diaries revealed. Sir Terence 
involved himself in police work at the most mundane and detailed 
level when it involved individuals close to the government. 
Mention was made in his diaries of a traffic notice issued to Beryl 
Young, Sir Joh's pilot, and of an apparent attempt to cancel a 
drink-driving action against National party trustee Sir Edward 
Lyons. Lewis also involved himself in a remarkable range of 
activities quite outside his sphere of responsibility. These included 
phone calls to Lyons regarding imperial honours; to Sir Joh 
regarding his likely successor as premier, the appointment of the 
next governor, and the 1985-86 electoral redistribution; and to a 
senior minister, Don Lane, to discuss his own Police minister. The 
diaries of Sir Terence Lewis also revealed that between 1976 and 
1987 he saw Sir Joh 134 times and that Sir Joh telephoned him 197 
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times (Courier-Mail, 12 October 1988). The previous commis-
sioner, Ray Whitrod, had earher told the Fitzgerald Inquiry that 
he had personal dealings with the premier on only three occasions 
in six years. 
The Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed the extent of personal and 
professional alienation felt by many honest police because of the 
corruption of the force which had taken place. Yet there was little 
those officers felt they could do, apart from resign. Most of them 
were all too well aware that cabinet controlled all police promo-
tions down to the level of senior sergeant, and that pohce transfers 
were non-appealable. They had seen the victimisation of police 
officers who had spoken out (Ross Dickson, for example), and 
they knew of the seeming reluctance of the Police Complaints 
Tribunal to do other than reinforce the position of the force's 
ruling chque. 
Pohtical penetration of the judiciary 
Pohdcal interference has also extended to Queensland's judiciary, 
although that activity has not been confined to recent years, having 
been evident notably during the premierships of Labor leaders 
WilHam Forgan Smith and Vince Gair. It is, however, the 
sequence of events which culminated in the appointment of Mr 
Justice Dormer Andrews as chief justice which provides the most 
pubhc evidence of pohtical interference in Queensland's judiciary 
during the Bjelke-Petersen premiership. The incident was 
especially interesting because it involved not merely a conflict 
between the executive and judicial arms of government, but also 
conflicts within the coalition; as well, it was a test of the extent of 
influence of Sir Edward Lyons, National party trustee and a 
personal confidant of Joh Bjelke-Petersen. 
At cabinet's meeting on 21 December 1981 the state attorney-
general, Sam Doumany, a Liberal, put forward the name of Mr 
Justice Jim Douglas to replace Sir Charles Wanstall as chief 
justice. According to journalist Evan Whitton, the only person to 
object in cabinet to the recommendation was Joh Bjelke-Petersen, 
who launched a stinging attack upon the judiciary. The matter was 
then deferred to allow time for other names to be considered and 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
86 Working The System 
for battle lines to be drawn up for what was likely to be a difficult 
struggle. 
Sam Doumany had made his recommendation of Mr Justice 
Douglas on the basis of consultations he had had with a wide 
cross-section of the legal community, judges and practitioners 
alike. Traditionally, elevation to the top post had been decided on 
the basis of seniority within the Supreme Court. In addition to 
meeting that requirement, Mr Justice Douglas enjoyed very strong 
personal support for the post from within the profession. Other 
people, however, had other interests. For some months reports 
had circulated that Sir Edwcud Lyons preferred Mr Justice 
Dormer Andrews, seventh in seniority, for the position. Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen was known to hold a general objection to the view 
that the preferred choice of the judiciary should be automatically 
endorsed by the government. Perhaps he harboured a legitimate 
objection to the system of judicial seniority. If he did, he would 
not have been the first Queensland premier to have done so. 
However, journalist Quentin Dempster suggested another explana-
tion in the Brisbane Telegraph at the time. This was that the 
premier was annoyed with the judiciary as a result of being barred 
from officially attending the opening ceremony of the new 
Supreme Court building several months earlier on the grounds that 
he was a litigant before the courts at the time. 
Prior to the January 1982 cabinet meeting at which the chief 
justice appointment was to be resolved, attorney-general Sam 
Doumany gave the impression that he regarded his job as "on the 
line" over the matter. At the meeting National ministers supported 
the premier's strong preference for Mr Justice Andrews, while the 
Liberals continued to support the attorney-general's recommenda-
tion of Mr Justice Douglas. The name of Mr Justice Andrews 
apparently was not even on the list of alternatives the attorney-
general presented to cabinet. After a difficult debate a com-
promise candidate, Mr Justice Walter Campbell, was agreed upon 
and he secured the post. Following an equally messy debate later 
the same day Mr Justice Andrews, on the recommendation of the 
premier, was appointed senior puisne judge. The appointment of 
Andrews occurred only over the strong objections of the attorney-
general and his Liberal ministerial colleagues, all of whom refused 
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to sign the Executive Council minute containing the appointments. 
The governor nevertheless endorsed the minute, thereby confirm-
ing both appointments. Three years later, in 1985, Mr Justice 
Andrews went on to secure the top job following Sir Walter 
Campbell's further elevation to the post of governor. 
A much darker side to the political involvement in the chief 
justice appointment issue emerged more than six years later, 
during the course of the Fitzgerald Inquiry. In a statutory 
declaration to the inquiry on 6 December 1988, former Liberal 
minister Terry White said that, during its deliberations on the 
chief justice issue, state cabinet had been told by Liberal minister 
Don Lane that Mr Justice Douglas had cast a postal vote for 
Labor in the 1972 state election. Mr Justice Douglas was an 
elector in Lane's seat of Merthyr. Former Libertd minister and 
deputy premier. Sir Llew Edwards, and former National party 
minister, Vic Sullivan, also claimed in statutory declarations to the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry that Mr Justice Douglas was overruled for the 
chief justice post after cabinet was told of his postal vote. Another 
witness before the Fitzgerald Inquiry, Sir Edward Lyons, revealed 
his knowledge of the matter. He told the inquiry that Mr Lane 
"had found out that Mr Douglas had been overseas and had cast 
a postal vote and he [Mr Lane] saw those postal votes" (transcript 
reproduced in Courier-Mail, 1 December 1988). A son of Mr 
Justice Douglas, Bob Douglas QC, also submitted a statutory 
declaration regarding his recoUection of the matter. In his 
statement, dated 2 December 1988, Douglas declared that at a 
social occasion in 1973 Don Lane had approached him and said 
"Bob, I am disappointed in your father". According to Douglas 
Lane then said to him that he was aware that Mr Justice Douglas 
had voted for Labor because he had seen his postal vote. For his 
part. Lane staunchly denied these allegations, claiming in a 
statutory declaration that he did not see any postal vote cast by Mr 
Justice Douglas. A Liberal party scrutineer in Merthyr at the 1972 
state election, Ida Margaret Mackay, also tendered to the Fitz-
gerald Inquiry a statutory declaration in which she indicated that, 
to her knowledge. Lane had not touched or looked at any vote that 
was being handled by the Returning Officer. 
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The judiciary in Queensland also may have contributed to its 
own apparent vulnerability to pohtical interference by not distan-
cing itself sufficiently from the pohtical process. Evidence before 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry suggested almost tawdry examples of legal 
identities ingratiating themselves -with the government or its 
poHtical friends in order to secure, it seems, judicial appointments 
or promotions. Such behaviour compromises the judiciary which, 
in order to administer justice in an impartial fashion, has a 
responsibility to ensure that it remains at arm's length from the 
government of the day. And although such practices may not be 
confined to Queensland, the appointment of judges to the boards 
of statutory bodies may be seen as exposing the judiciary to 
untoward influence from the government. Such appointments are 
often prestigious and highly valued; they are also for fixed terms, 
and most allow for reappointment. That necessarily allows for the 
possibility of judges being seen to be beholden to the government 
of the day. 
Institutional "dry rot" in Queensland has meant that institutional 
checks have failed to ensure that the government operates with a 
measure of efficiency and accountability. But it is not only the 
institutional mechanisms built into the political system which have 
failed. So too have the external checks purportedly provided by 
the parties of political opposition, and the state's media. And it is 
the performance of these groups to which attention now turns. 
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Institutional "dry rot" in parliament, the public service, pohce force 
and judiciary has also assisted in neutralising the role of other 
groups to debate and criticise, to offer alternative views and 
policies and, in a more general sense, to provide controls on the 
exercise of pohtical power. In Queensland there has been a 
longstanding disregard for such activities. Moreover, the seemingly 
invulnerable position of the government, generated over the years 
by a loading of the electoral dice, has not encouraged free and 
open debate. Yet the cause of free and open debate also requires 
a healthy party system and a critical media - characteristics which 
have not been especially noticeable in Queensland. 
Both in the style of its operation and in its actions the state 
government over the years has done much to create this situation. 
Yet it is one which has not been brought about by the government 
alone. Under the Westminster system the Opposition has a 
recognised role to question the government, to expose failures of 
policy and administration, and to present the community with an 
alternative to the government of the day. But the Labor party in 
Queensland for many years failed to provide a viable alternative. 
The record of the Liberal party is no better. When in coalition 
with the Nationals, the Liberals were prepared too often to 
prostitute their principles for the accoutrements of office. And, in 
the political vkilderness since 1983, the Liberals have struggled with 
the problem of identifying a role for themselves in Queensland 
pohtics. With one or two notable exceptions the media too has 
failed. It has not provided the community with a detached and 
critical perspective on what was happening inside the governmental 
apparatus. 
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The failure of Labor 
Abuses of power had also occurred during the long period of 
Labor goverment in Queensland but Labor in Opposition since 
1957, at least until the 1980s, did httle to criticise the National 
government on such counts. The state ALP had enjoyed forty 
years of almost unbroken government at the time the party split 
and fell from office in 1957. Over that period Labor had learnt 
well how to exercise power and deploy the fruits of office. The 
one-party system which the Nationals so strenuously sought to 
refine had its roots in Labor's long occupancy of the Treasury 
benches. It can even be argued that the Bjelke-Petersen premier-
ship might have developed differently had Sir Joh not spent his 
first ten years in parhament as an Opposition backbencher. He 
learnt well from his early pohtical experiences. 
Labor in office had sown the seeds of the one-party state. Like 
the Nationals many years later, the ALP in office preached the 
gospel of progress and development and characterised itself as the 
only party capable of securing economic growth and a stable 
political environment. Reform agendas were sometimes set aside 
as the energy of the party was channelled into maintaining the 
regime. Criticism of the government's policies from outside the 
state was repelled by Canberra-bashing pronouncements designed 
to strike parochial chords. Dissent from inside was sometimes 
suppressed brutally, as in the case of the railway strikes of the 
1940s. 
There were other occasions when the actions of Labor in power 
diminished the standing of parliament, the judiciary and the public 
service; there were also instances of corruption and cronyism 
involving friends or relatives of the government. Over that forty 
year period Queensland also failed to make public education a 
high enough priority. And it failed to industrialise its economic 
base to any significant degree and thereby attract a more diver-
sified migrant blend. The society that developed was thus rather 
more closed in its attitudes and more suspicious of outsiders than 
in most other states. And most ironically of all, it was a Labor 
government which introduced Queensland's zonal electoral system, 
a system which, following Labor's split, was used by the party's 
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political opponents to assist in keeping the ALP permanently out 
of office. 
The 1957 split debilitated Queensland Labor. Not only was the 
party disunited but also it soon realised just how difficult it would 
be to regain its seats in the bush. The Country party-led coalition 
moved quickly to remodel the electoral zones in its favour. And, 
in a related move, preferential voting was introduced in 1963 as a 
means of maximising the non-Labor vote, and thereby underlining 
the electoral benefits of coalition government. The Country party 
was also quick to recognise other elements of Labor's legacy 
which, if carefully exploited, could provide a major downpayment 
on the new government's political mortgage; for example, 
maintaining the overwhelming emphasis on economic development, 
stridently defending the state's inhabitants against perceived 
incursions by the federal government, and ensuring that the 
parliament remaiined weak and the public service blinkered. 
During the 1960s the Labor party in Queensland struggled with 
factional crises as well as with the continuing presence of the 
breakaway group, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). Neverthe-
less, by the early 1970s Labor had managed to develop some 
viability as an Opposition, helped significantly by a Country party 
that was unsure of its own future and tentative about the perfor-
mance of its new leader, Joh Bjelke-Petersen. This translated to 
vote gains for the ALP at the 1972 state election when it actually 
outpohed the combined primary vote of the Country and Liberal 
parties, but not to sufficient seats to ahow it to come even close to 
winning office. 
The ALP's position then deteriorated sharply. Apart from its 
factionally induced haemorrhaging, the state Labor party watched 
in dismay as Joh Bjelke-Petersen was transformed in status from 
the view his opponents held of him as a political buffoon to a 
leading national identity in conservative politics. His attacks on 
the Whitlam federal government were relentless. The paranoia he 
cultivated in the state against the "centralist, socialist" policies of 
the Whitlam administration also was boosted by federal Labor's 
inability to handle him. It was one thing for the premier to 
provoke or attack the prime minister, but the Country party - now 
in the process of changing its name and broadening its policies -
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characterised any attack on Joh Bjelke-Petersen or his government 
as an attack on all Queenslanders and their cherished way of hfe. 
With ALP support in Queensland now free-faUmg, the premier 
capitalised on the situation by calling an early state election m 
December 1974. The outcome for Labor was disastrous: its vote 
dropped by 10 per cent to just over 36 per cent, and its seat tally 
to just 11 of the 82 in the Legislative Assembly (down from 33 at 
the 1972 poU). 
Instead of acknowledging the seriousness of the problem, the 
Whitlam government reacted by blaming the party's poor perform-
ance in Queensland on the supposed "difference" of that state from 
the rest of Austredia. It was precisely the "Queensland is different" 
image which Joh Bjelke-Petersen's Nationals were trying to foster 
in order to advance their standing. Unwittingly, Gough Whitlam 
was assisting the National paut/s strategy. State Labor also 
assisted by default, failing to recognise that, in such a parochial 
state, it needed to distance itself from the federal ALP. 
Whereas the Nationals continued to make their party's oper-
ations more professional throughout this period, Labor's pre-
occupation with its internal problems suggested that it was neither 
able nor wiUing to "play the main game". It failed to develop a 
party platform attractive to groups such as women and the urban 
middle class, where its voter support was soft. It also failed to 
attract many good candidates, which was hardly surprising. The 
party on numerous occasions gave the impression that preselection 
contests were not so much about injecting talent into the parl-
iamentary wing with a view to assembling a viable Opposition as 
about bestowing sinecures on those who had given loyal if undistin-
guished service to party or faction. Some Labor parliamentarians 
were honest toilers and others were lazy, but very few of them 
seemed particularly committed to wresting government from their 
opponents. The community's reaction to this image of the ALP in 
Queensland was to lose interest in the state Labor party. The 
National party's support increased among blue-collar voters, 
reflecting the growing disenchantment of ALP supporters even in 
the party's traditional areas of strongest support. 
Labor's failure to manage its own affairs contributed directly to 
the power vacuum in which the Nationals were able to operate. 
Furthermore, the Labor party can be fairly accused of complicity 
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in the development of Queensland's one-party state. It was not 
imtil the 1980s that the state ALP seriously embraced the issue of 
electoral reform. Yet even then it failed to dehver. The party 
neglected to present a proper submission concerning the 
redistribution of state electoral boundaries in 1985. The stated 
reason for declining to be involved was Labor's loathing for the 
zonal arrangement which was in place. Many people, however, 
took the view that the party was opting out of the system. Others 
beheved the stand was intended to dampen factional tensions 
within the parliamentary party. Whichever the mterpretation, 
neither was flattering to Labor. 
The state ALP was also slow to take up the matter of advocating 
parhamentary procedures to ensure a more accountable legislature. 
In any case there was no evidence to suggest that Labor politicians 
behaved any better than those on the government side. In the 
early 1970s, for example, several ministers in the coahtion 
government (including the premier himself) accepted gift parcels 
of shares from Comalco, a multinational mining company. 
However, the ALP's ability to highlight the obvious conflict of 
public duty and private interest was totally compromised: 
Comalco share parcels had also been accepted by ALP officials as 
well as by relatives of certain Labor MLAs. A few years later, on 
another matter, a report by the auditor-general, Jim Peel, revealed 
that some twenty-three former and current MLAs had misused 
their parliamentary air-travel entitlements; six of them were Labor 
members. 
For almost thirty years Labor behaved not as a viable alternative 
government, but as a group content to be the party in permanent 
opposition. It directed most of its attentions inward, and failed to 
take its Opposition role seriously (hence its opponents and the 
public could scarcely be expected to do so). The advantage this 
gave the Nationals was immense and assisted the government to 
operate in a political vacuum. 
The Queensland Liberals: compromised and isolated 
For the twenty-six years to 1983 the Liberal party in Queensland 
shared power as the junior pju"tner in the state's coalition govern-
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ment. It was never an altogether comfortable position, the 
Liberals being forced to accept bridesmaid status in the govern-
ment even though their popular vote, at least prior to 1977, 
outstripped that of the Nationals (who gained the advantage by the 
zonal electoral structure). None the less, the Liberals were 
prepared to endure the situation because of the advantages and 
convenience of being part of the government and their conviction 
that the state's demographic trends would ultimately confer 
coalition seniority on them. They were also convinced that their 
political base was safe. The Liberals saw themselves as the party 
of the business community, the "natural" conservative party for 
metropolitan and urban voters, the party that was a moderatmg 
and reforming influence on the sometimes raw and excessive style 
of their partners. 
On a variety of fronts, however, the Liberals failed to match the 
Nationals. At first they believed that the Country party, despite 
changing its name, would be unable to broaden its pohtical base. 
Yet, as the 1970s progressed, this was precisely what did occur. 
The Nationals even showed signs of eclipsing the Liberals in their 
home territory. The business community was responding positively 
to Joh Bjelke-Petersen's staunchly parochial leadership, as well as 
to the National party organisation's aggressive networking offensive 
by which it enlisted support among senior Queensland business 
identities. 
While happy to be a part of a winning team, increasing numbers 
of Liberals became dejected about the party's long-term prospects 
in Queensland. They shared government, but the Nationals were 
now perceived throughout the electorate as the dominant force 
rather than simply the senior partner in the coalition. The 
Nationals were becoming more arrogant in their behaviour, and 
more dismissive of the fate of their partners. Rumblings within 
Liberal ranks intensified. Some backbenchers, in the name of 
upholding party policy, sought to differentiate themselves publicly 
from their parliamentary party hierarchy on matters of government 
policy. They took a separate stand on the issue of a public 
accounts committee, for example, and supported modifications to 
the zonal electoral system. These actions of the Liberal backbench 
dissidents infuriated the Nationals,who sought to isolate them from 
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the government. The tension within Liberal ranks increased. 
Despite the developing crisis the Liberals clung to the comforting 
view that the electorate still needed them for their sobering 
influence on the Nationals. Yet, as a party, they were incapable 
of coping wdth their dilemma. On the one hand they wanted to 
present themselves as essentially similar to and compatible with 
the Nationals, and thus supportive of the government. On the 
other, they had to differentiate themselves sufficiently from the 
Nationals in style and policy in order to maintain the electorate's 
interest. 
In all, the Liberals paid a high price for continued membership 
of the coalition club: they lost their pohtical identity and suffered 
humihation and intimidation at the hands of their more adroit 
partners. 
The one matter which at cmy time was capable of threatening the 
coahtion's existence was the zonal electoral system. It was 
fundamental to the Liberal party's frustration as a seemingly 
permanent junior partner. The Liberals pushed for electoral 
reform on several occasions, most vigorously in 1971 when the 
Country party sought (ultimately successfully) to remodel the 
electoral zones to include a coastal farming-based Country zone. 
Yet the Liberals in coalition were never prepared to risk all by 
pushing the issue to the limit. 
The extent of the Liberal party's frustration with this situation 
was apparent in the wake of the 1980 state election. After three 
weeks of protracted negotiations with the Nationals, the Liberals 
agreed to re-enter a coalition on essentially unchanged terms. The 
decision was reached only after much discussion within the Liberal 
party's State Executive, which ultimately approved the move by a 
margin of eighteen votes to ten, with one abstention. Significantly, 
the party's state president (Dr John Herron) and two vice-presi-
dents (Dr Leigh Atkinson and Mr Greg Vickery) were among 
those in the minority. Those supporting the move included the 
party's parliamentary leader (Dr Llew Edwards), treasurer (Robert 
Mathers) and immediate past president (Yvonne McComb). John 
Moore, who several years later became state president, abstained. 
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Even more telling for the Liberals in those negotiations was the 
one concession which they did extract from the Nationals. This 
was an agreement which read: 
The National Party is prepared to give the Liberal Party an 
undertaking by letter from the president of the National Party to 
the President of the Liberal Party, that the National Faity will 
not initiate any action on redistribution without consulting the 
Liberal Party with a view to genuinely endeavouring to reach a 
mutually acceptable approach. 
One Liberal told Quentin Dempster at the time that this meant 
"They're going to tell us when they'll screw us" (Telcff-aph, 26 
December 1980). 
The Liberal party persistently sought to portray itself as the 
moderating influence in Queensland's coalition. They could point 
to a few occasions when the Nationals had backtracked, such as 
over the premier's desire to invite controversial cancer therapist 
Milan Brych to practice medicine in Queensland. (Brych was later 
jailed in the United States for medical fraud.) 
For the most part, however, the Liberals acted not so much as 
a brake on the government, but as a moderating image for it in the 
way it was presented to the public. This was of great benefit to 
the Nationals. As Henry Reynolds put it in Australian Society in 
February 1989, "the Liberal Party delivered up the middle class 
vote, and often the middle ground as well, to the National Party". 
The presence of the Liberals allowed many urban middle-class 
voters to vote for the system without actually casting a ballot for 
the Nationals. This electoral benefit to the Nationals has in no 
way diminished since the demise of the coalition. The Nationals 
won both the 1983 and the 1986 elections courtesy of Liberal party 
preferences. In 1986 sixteen seats in the south-east corner of the 
state were delivered to the Nationals on the basis of Liberal 
preferences. 
The Liberals liked being part of the action and so they went 
along with their senior partners. The Liberal parliamentary wing 
was slow, for example, to take seriously the issue of public accoun-
tability, as contained in the party's platform. This was despite 
agitations from the Young Liberal organisation and the activities 
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of a number of backbenchers who pressed for the establishment 
of a parliamentary public accounts committee. Such activity was 
seen by the party's senior parliamentarians, however, as disrupting 
coalition relations rather than improving the process of govern-
ment and thus protecting the public interest. The parliamentary 
Liberals were predominantly interested in remaining part of the 
ruling elite; they had no interest in forfeiting the generous 
trappings of office. As Terry White described the situation in 
1983, for these people the "smeU of ministerial leather was a 
powerful aphrodisiac". 
After 1983 the Liberals did not adjust easily to hfe outside 
coalition. True to form, they preferred to believe that it was 
simply a matter of time before they were recalled. As Liberal 
leader Sir Wilham Knox explained to the party's 1986 state 
convention, Queenslanders were "ready to breathe fresh Liberal 
life and good sense back into the State" (Courier-Mail, 9 June 
1986). The Nationals, on the other hand, had other ideas. To 
them the Liberals were unsure of their priorities and had been a 
disruptive and limiting influence when in coalition. They were no 
longer needed, as the 1986 election confirmed. The Liberal party 
faced a new version of its old dilemma: if it pushed for a conser-
vative identity of its own, it risked incurring the wrath of the 
Nationals and potential electoral annihilation; but if it supported 
the Nationals it would be portrayed by Labor as indistinguishable 
from them. 
The Liberals attempted in the 1986 state campaign to overcome 
their tactical dilemma by promising a return to trust and integrity 
in government. The strategy backfired. The Labor party's 
advertisements scoffed at such rhetoric, pointing out that more 
than a dozen ex-Liberals were running as National party can-
didates in that election and questioning the strength of the Liberal 
party's stand on issues such as electoral reform. The Nationals, if 
anything, were even more contemptuous toward their former 
partners. The premier threatened a second election rather than a 
return to the instability of a coalition. On the other hand Russ 
Hinze, in a not too subtle reference to the years of coalition 
government, said: "Let me tell you that you can't be married for 
26 years, jump out of bed, start wearing white and pretend to the 
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world you're a virgin. Think about it - that's the Liberal history, 
that's the Liberal story" (Courier-Mail, 25 September 1986). 
A docile media 
The abuse of political power in Queensland has not often been 
curbed by the media. There has been a reluctance, especially by 
the press, to criticise the excesses of the government. In practice 
this meant an unwUhngness to challenge the government's 
assumption that what was good for it was automatically good for 
Queensland. The need for the media to adopt a more critical role 
has been vital, given the inabihty of the Opposition or the parlia-
ment in general to ensure any government accountability. 
There have been exceptions to the media's inadequacy. After an 
initial story the new editor of the Courier-Mail backed journaUst 
Phil Dickie in his investigations into gambling and prostitution 
rackets and police corruption. The series of euticles he wrote, 
together with the ABC's Four Comers programme "The Moon-
light State", led to the establishment of the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Yet 
the revelations of corruption and vice in evidence before the 
inquiry raise the question of why the media in Queensland failed 
for so long to probe such issues systematically. 
Over the years a number of isolated attempts had been made by 
individuals or particular programmes to investigate different 
aspects of the state's institutional workings, or to arouse public 
interest in such matters. The government's response, however, was 
to stonewall such inquiries, usually by pretending that no allega-
tions had even been made. The premier, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, 
asked on one occasion to explain his reaction to a Four Comers 
report critical of his government, declined on the basis that he had 
"no respect for Four Comers". 
The ABC has been the only media outlet consistently to have 
been critical of the Queensland government. This is significant, 
because, being a nationally based broadcaster administered from 
Sydney, it was the one media organisation not vulnerable to the 
informal sanctions which it might be feared the state government 
could apply against locally owned or locally administered media 
organisations. The only stick the state government could wield 
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against the ABC was a defamation action. (When pursued, these 
actions were invariably taxpayer-funded.) 
The media must accept its share of the blame for the situation 
in which the government, with apparent impunity, was able to 
dismiss critical opinion. Perhaps the media perceived no need to 
adopt a critical perspective. The state's media institutions were, 
after all, an established part of Queensland society, conservative 
in outlook. They probably also shared the government's view that 
the important public issues were those which related to economic 
growth and development. While they may have regarded the 
government's style at times as raw, they saw its priorities as 
essentially sound and, in any case, preferable to the Opposition. 
For every state election between 1957 and 1986, for example, the 
Courier-Mail endorsed the return of a coalition government. That 
it did so in 1986 is especially noteworthy, suggesting that the 
newspaper subscribed to the Liberal party's own view of its 
moderating role in a coahtion government. It is true that the ALP 
was often regarded by the community as unfit to govern, but in aqy 
case the impression prevailed that the government's position was 
unassailable. 
If the media understood the government - or thought it did - the 
government also understood the media. In particular the Nation-
als, both party organisation and government, recognised that 
despite Queensland's supposedly decentralised character the major 
source of news throughout the state was provided, hterally from 
under the one roof, by the Courier-Mail and Australian Associated 
Press (AAP). Just as importantly, the Nationals understood how 
regional news outlets, whose staff resources were often stretched, 
dealt with incoming news. The government recognised the sig-
nificant advantage of presenting a press release in a form which 
could be used as it was, without editorial input. In addition to 
providing a press secretary for each minister, the government spent 
considerable public resources developing a well-staffed Public 
Relations Bureau inside the Premier's Department. The role of 
this bureau was to propagate the government's message, on film, 
over the airwaves, and in the press. 
While the Nationals as a party learnt how to deal with the media, 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen as a politician learnt how to exploit it. He 
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was assisted m this over a number of years by his press secretary 
Allen Callaghan, a former ABC journahst. Callaghan is attributed 
with developing Bjelke-Petersen's media skihs, and with selling to 
Sir Joh the notion of having a significant public relations infra-
structure for propaganda purposes. CaUaghan also taught Bjelke-
Petersen how to deal with the media on his own terms. The 
premier developed an awareness that, as leader of the government, 
he was able to control the news flow, and that journahsts needed 
him as much as he did them. Referring to them as his chooks, 
he fed them regularly, either at press conferences or individually 
in exclusive interviews. The journalists might not always have liked 
the premier's style, but they invariably appreciated gaining access 
to him. 
The effect of the Nationals' canny understanding of the media 
and the government's large investment in its own media infrastruc-
ture was that news coverage of government activities was invar-
iably extensive and usually tame. 
The state government also re2dised that it was the largest 
employer of journalists in Queensland and that there were only 
limited career opportunities for a Queensland-grown journalist 
who wished to pursue a career within the state. The state 
government offered not only the majority of jobs in the Queens-
land media, but also many of the better-paid ones. For example, 
the 1988 salary package of a ministerial press secretary in Queens-
land is at least equivalent to, and often more than, that received by 
the top reporters at the Courier-Mail. 
The customary point of entry into journalism is as a cadet 
reporter for a provincial or metropolitan newspaper, or a radio or 
television outlet. Career advancement may be slow, however, and 
so "fast-track" access to much higher salaried posts inside the 
government is often very attractive. Most people who have been 
ministerial press secretaries in recent years have come to their jobs 
from lower-paid positions elsewhere in the state. Many were 
appointed simply on the basis of a ministerial nod, without public 
advertisement of the position. And even when formal selection 
processes have been used, a preferred candidate has often been 
approached in advance, thereby undermining the purpose of such 
processes. In other words, while it might have been expected that 
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the generous salaries available to press secretaries may have 
attracted interstate candidates, the usual intention was to attract 
a known local or, at the very least, a person from elsewhere with 
a locally known reputation. And with the state government being 
such a large employer of journahsts and the structure of the 
Queensland media so centralised, there has been (and remains) a 
risk that the members of the media might view themselves as part 
of the system, and not so much as observers of it. 
The government has marshalled all the resources at its disposal 
to blunt criticism. It has threatened to sue its critics in order to 
silence or subdue them. For example, public money was used to 
pursue defamation actions against senior Labor figures Neville 
Warburton and Tom Burns who, in the mid 1980s, accused the 
state government of corruption. Verbal intimidation was also 
practised on those "chooks" who were regarded as excessively 
aggressive in questioning the premier or ministers. Sometimes, 
too, Bjelke-Petersen's behaviour at press conferences suggested 
that he was less than convinced of the value of such occasions if 
ever the focus changed from lecture to inquisition. One of the 
more celebrated examples occurred at a media briefing in June 
1977 when Joh Bjelke-Petersen told a reporter to "go jump in the 
lake". Irritated by the persistent line of questioning over an 
alleged bashing at the Fortitude Valley police station the premier 
expostulated "I'm not here to be interrogated, fella. You can go 
jump in the lake. For goodness sake accept what I say. I'm not 
here to be cross-examined. You're just looking for a story. I've 
always treated you fellows pretty fairly - don't push your luck" 
(Courier-Mail, 7 June 1977). 
In 1988 the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) was told 
that, several years beforehand. National party stalwart Sir Edward 
Lyons offered government media work to Tripod Television Pty 
Ltd. Sir Edward allegedly tried to dissuade the principals of 
Tripod (Des Power and John Barton) from running a story on 
Channel 9's Today Tonight about Su- Joh Bjelke-Petersen's alleged 
low-interest loan-raising activities in Japan. Power was the 
executive producer of Today Tonight, emd Barton the presenter. 
Lyons told the ABT there was no basis to the story. Power and 
Barton alleged that Lyons, in his effort to dissuade them from 
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proceeding with it, indicated they might receive substantial govern-
ment work in the future. Lyons denied before the ABT that he 
had ever made such a suggestion. The loan-raising story itself, 
which was broadcast by Today Tonight m February 1983, was later 
the subject of an out-of-court $400,000 payment by the Bond 
Corporation (not long after it acquired QTQ 9) to Bjelke-Peter-
sen. 
Other aspects of that $400,000 payment were revealed m 1988 
and 1989. In particular, the ABT ruled on 7 April 1989 that the 
payment itself was improper, as were Bond's attempts to conceal 
the amount, by offering a spht payment of $50,000 in cash and 
$350,000 in property or a non-repayable loan. The Tribunal also 
ruled that Bond and one of his senior executives, David Aspinall, 
had misled a previous Tribunal hearing. This Jtfose from com-
ments Bond made in an interview with Jana Wendt on Channel 9's 
A Current Affair on 21 January 1988 when he stated: "Certainly 
the premier [Bjelke-Petersen] made it under no doubt that if we 
were going to continue to do business successfully in Queensland, 
then he expected that matter to be resolved." Bond had attempted 
to explain the remarks, which contradicted statements he had 
made to a previous ABT hearing, as "a confusion of expression". 
The Tribunal did not find that explanation credible. 
The $400,0(X) settlement may also haunt the Bond Corporafion 
on another ground. History will probably show that Bond was 
wrong in accepting to have Sir Edward Lyons as deputy chahman 
of QTQ 9. At the time of his appointment Lyons was also 
chairman of the TAB. Significantly, Today Tonight and the 
Courier-Mail broke the story about Lyons's misuse of TAB funds 
for his own personal betting. The synergy of the hasty settlement 
of the defamation action by Bond and the axeing of Today Tonight 
must arouse scepticism regarding QTQ 9's stated reasons for 
dropping that programme. 
For the most part, however, the Queensland media has been 
disinclined to confront the National party or the government. In 
that sense the media has complied with the demands of the 
regime. Some in the media went further than mere compliance, 
becoming almost adulatory in their treatment of their premier. 
This extended even to the point of sympathetically canvassing the 
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possibility of a Bjelke-Petersen dynasty, with one commercial 
television channel prepared to outlay a sum for exclusive rights to 
cover the wedding of Sir Joh's son. 
Media proprietors might seek to defend their behaviour over the 
years by pointing to what the Fitzgerald Inquiry has revealed to be 
the reahty of doing big business successfully in Queensland, in par-
ticular, the necessity of enjoying the confidence of the government. 
But that is a poor defence, notwithstemding that there is always a 
tension when commercial objectives conflict with public interest 
requirements. 
Criticism is a legitimate and essential ingredient in a healthy 
liberal democracy. For a long time in Queensland, however, the 
pohtical environment has not made room for criticcd debate and 
the party (parties) of political Opposition jmd the media have 
failed the public in their responsibility to provide such a critical 
perspective. As a result there has been no serious attempt to 
articulate a "public interest" independent of that conveniently 
formulated by the government. In fact, significant elements of the 
media may even have come to believe that government interest did 
equate with pubhc interest. 
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Cabinet dominates the political process in Queensland, as it does 
elsewhere in Australia. Together with the pubhc service, it forms 
the executive arm of government. Cabinet determines both the 
flow and nature of the legislation coming before parliament as well 
as the economic and social regulation that the state government 
will impose. It is jJso the body effectively responsible for making 
the thousands of appointments each year to Queensland govern-
ment and semi-government bodies. In a strict sense, under the 
system of responsible government it is the Executive Council - the 
body comprising the state's governor, the premier and other 
ministers -which is formally responsible for such decisions. In 
practice. Executive Council's role is mainly one of legitunization. 
In one sense there is nothing unusual about the intense executive 
dominance of politics that occurs in Queensland. After ah, it is a 
well-chronicled feature of governments based on the Westminster 
model. The phenomenon is attributable to the growth of modern 
political parties and their insistence upon party discipline, the 
increasing complexity and expanding range of government activity 
and, consequently, the reliance of governments and their ministers 
on pubhc service advisers. In Queensland, however, executive 
dominance has been reinforced by the long-term absence of real 
political, constitutional and electoral restraints on the exercise of 
power. 
Given the Queensland cabinet's remarkable degree of authority, 
surprisingly little is known about how it operates. Public attention 
often focuses on the decisions it makes, or on the premier, or the 
reported influence or idiosyncrasies of particular ministers, but -
probably because of the conventions of secrecy and solidarity 
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associated with cabinet's decisions - rather less is known about its 
internal culture. The mystery surrounding the Queensland 
cabmet's operations is heightened by the fact that there is no 
cabinet handbook for the northern state and, hence, no standard-
ised procedures governing cabinet's operations. However, the 
release of a Legislation Manual by the Premier's Department just 
after the 1986 state election has brought some improvement to 
cabinet's legislative deliberations. 
The Queensland cabinet normaUy convenes weekly, on Monday 
mornings, although until recent years its meetings were held on 
Tuesdays whenever state parliament was not in session. The 
premier chairs the meeting which, in addition to the eighteen 
ministers, is also routinely attended by the cabinet secretary, an 
official drawn from the Premier's Department. Significantly, 
ministers are flanked around the cabinet table in order of senior-
ity, a longstanding convention which tends both to concentrate 
discussion toward one end of the room and continually to remind 
junior ministers of their station in proceedings. This seating 
arrangement may also present some practical difficulties. In early 
1987, for example, one junior minister with hearing problems 
returned from cabinet and announced to his assembled senior 
departmental officers that he had no idea of the outcome of a 
cabinet submission he had introduced because he could not hear 
the discussion going on at the other end of the table. He then 
suggested that someone should telephone the cabinet secretary to 
find out what had happened. 
Most meetings of cabinet take place in the state government's 
Executive Building in Brisbane. Periodically, however, cabinet 
convenes in a location outside the metropolis. In all, some fifty 
cities and towns - including some of Queensland's smallest and 
most remote - have hosted more than seventy country cabinet 
meetings since the Country-Liberal coalition assumed office in the 
late 1950s. During Sir Joh's term of office these country meetings 
came to be dubbed "Joh Shows" or "Muppet Shows" because of 
the premier's habit of parading his ministers and his assessment 
of then individual standings before the local party faithful. (A 
procedural aspect of the country cabinet meeting is that one 
minister is rostered by the premier not to attend. That person 
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remains in Brisbane as "cover", thus ensuring the continuity of 
government in the event of a calamity claiming the lives of the 
rest of cabinet.) 
Country cabinet meetings have tended to be held as and when 
necessary in terms of the prevailing political climate. In most 
years there are between two and four meetings outside Brisbane. 
In the critical state election year of 1986, on the other hand, there 
were five, edl conducted in electorally sensitive locations: Babinda, 
Gladstone, Atherton, Nambour, and Mackay. Indeed, the pohtical 
benefits to be reaped from country meetings should not be 
underestimated in a large, decentralised, parochial state such as 
Queensland. The occasions allow cabinet to be seen as sensitive 
to the prevailing mood of its own grassroots. This was an obvious 
consideration in the decision to hold one of the first country 
meetings after Sir Joh's resignation in the south-western town of 
Goondiwindi, in the party's heartland. A likely benefit for the 
local community when cabinet comes to town is the injection of 
new or upgraded capital works into the town or region. This can 
be very helpful if, as with cabinet's February 1985 meeting in 
Rockhampton and its June 1988 meeting at the Gold Coast, a state 
by-election is in the offing. It was also not fortuitous that during 
the years of coalition government the location of country cabinet 
meetings tended to favour the Nationals over the Liberals. 
Preparing for cabinet 
Ministers who wish to lodge submissions for the following week's 
cabinet meeting are required to do so, with the cabinet secretary, 
by 5 pm on the Thursday beforehand, although papers received on 
the Friday morning are sometimes also accepted. Because there 
is no cabinet handbook there are no standard guidelines for the 
framing of all categories of cabinet submissions. 
As mentioned earlier, however, submissions with legislative 
implications are now covered by the Legislation Manual produced 
by the Premier's Department. Before November 1986, when the 
manual came into use, guidelines for cabinet submissions with 
legislative implications were periodically circulated by the cabinet 
secretary. 
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A large volume of business is usually processed in a single 
meeting and the time available to deal with any single item is 
extremely hmited. Most ministers or, usually, their departments, 
therefore frame their submissions in an easily digestible form. 
The great majority are brief - only one or two pages in length. 
Even a matter of the most complex or contentious nature, and one 
which therefore may require lengthy supporting documentation, is 
usually accompanied by a brief executive summary. 
The provision of executive summaries arose, curiously, in 
response to the practice of several cabinet ministers who, during 
the final two years of the Bjelke-Petersen premiership, periodically 
deluged the cabinet with voluminous, sometimes unintelligibly 
detailed submissions. These ministers, whose strategy was well 
understood by their public service advisers, believed their chances 
of securing cabinet approval for their documents were, in fact, 
assisted by overwhelming the cabinet meeting in this manner. The 
assumption was that other, more junior ministers would be so 
bombarded by the paperwork as not to bother to examine it in 
detail, leaving the "running" in cabinet to the minister concerned 
and the premier. As a means of manipulating cabinet, it is 
significant that these ministers felt so confident of their own 
positions, the premier's views and cabinet's likely reaction to their 
proposals. 
The cabinet secretary numbers each cabinet submission accord-
ing to its numerical order of submission. Each submission is also 
allocated a security classification on a scale of A to D, where A 
covers those which are "Secret", B "Restricted", and C "Confiden-
tial"; D is for papers which are to be more widely available. Each 
copy of each submission is also numbered, a practice designed to 
protect security. The first and second copies are assigned to the 
governor and premier, respectively, and other copy numbers are 
allocated to ministers in order of their seniority and, up until the 
mid 1980s, to a small number of senior public servants. Once the 
numbering is completed the process of distributing the papers for 
the cabinet meeting commences. A locked cabinet bag containing 
the papers is delivered to each minister usually around mid-
afternoon on the Friday. 
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The cabinet bag, nowadays a large brown briefcase (made to 
order in Queensland, it is understood, by inmates of the state's 
prisons), mcludes the formal collective minutes of cabinet's 
previous meeting, the agenda for the next, and aU cabinet submis-
sions other than those which have been rated classification A by 
their sponsoring ministers. The latter, in many cases, are only 
tabled at the cabinet meeting itself. Significantly, the collective 
minutes of the previous cabinet meeting exclude reference to the 
decisions reached at that meeting. They merely contain details in 
each case of the submission number, the name of the sponsoring 
minister, and a cross- reference, using a sepcuate numbering 
sequence, to the record of cabinet decisions. A list of the 
decisions of each meeting is circulated separately by the cabinet 
secretary to ah ministers within a day or so of the meeting. 
Until July 1984 each minister was reasonably free to consult his 
or her public service advisers about the contents of various 
submissions. Senior departmental officials were thus reasonably 
well acquainted with developments occurring throughout the 
government. However, as a result of concern about possible 
security lapses involving cabinet papers, a remarkable edict was 
invoked in July 1984 to the effect that cabinet submissions would 
no longer be made available to public service departmental heads, 
while ministers were expressly directed not to divulge the contents 
of the bag to their officials. The only exceptions to this ruling 
were the respective permanent heads of the central agencies (all 
under the premier's umbrella): the coordinator-general of the 
Premier's Department, the under treasurer, and the chairman of 
the Public Service Board. Those individuals themselves were 
issued with extremely tight guidelines concerning their access to, 
and circulation of, the information. 
The July 1984 directive was neither good for the processes of 
cabinet decision-making nor practical. In the first place, details 
of the instruction itself, as well as the cabinet discussion of the 
issue, were leaked. At a more serious level, the directive appeared 
designed to inhibit the opportunities of ministers to offer informed 
comments in cabinet on proposals which might affect their 
portfolios. This is despite the fact that our system of responsible 
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government is one which, in modern terms, requires ministers to 
rely on the expertise of public officials. 
Preventing individual ministers from consulting with their 
officials on matters brought to cabinet by other ministers is 
impractical, if only because it works against both ministerial and 
pubhc service self-interest. Not surprisingly, the 1984 directive was 
viewed as potentially reducing cabinet's deliberative capacity, 
concentrating authority in the hands of the then premier and his 
deputy, and institutionalising a system of near-monopolistic 
rehance for advice on the premier's own central agency permanent 
heads. The pronouncement was widely interpreted as a lack of 
confidence by the premier in his ministers; a lack of trust in the 
public service; and a naked attempt by the Premier's Department 
to exclude other agencies from deliberations on important matters. 
The new system for distributing cabinet documents did not work 
and, although never formally abandoned, it had ceased to operate 
long before Bjelke-Petersen's resignation. Although the Ahern 
government has had its own irritations with leaked cabinet 
documents, ministers have not been required to restrict in any 
particular way access to their cabinet bags. These arrangements 
vary considerably from minister to minister. Some ministers only 
share the cabinet bag with their press secretary; one minister even 
explained that this was so that the press secretary could vet the 
bag for any press or publicity opportunities for the minister! Most 
ministers, however, tend to distribute the cabinet bag, according to 
their own advisory requirements, to their public service chief 
executives and either their press secretary or private secretary. 
Some ministers may not even care to see what is in the cabinet 
bag until their own departmental briefing sessions on the morning 
of cabinet. 
A cabinet meeting is preceded by the premier's personal briefing 
session, in which the premier is briefed on the agenda for the 
meeting and alerted to any potentially difficult issues. In Sir Joh's 
day this session was attended by the permanent head of the 
Premier's Department as well as by the premier's personal pilot 
and close confidante Beryl Young, who was also chief of the state 
government's air wing. Three other senior public servants - the 
chairmjm of the Public Service Board, the coordinator-general and 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
110 Working The System 
the under treasurer - attended as required, as did the premier's 
press secretary. Except for Beryl Young, the composition of the 
group was unremarkable. But her attendance and status at such 
gatherings was indicative of her standing as one of the premier's 
informal "kitchen cabinet", which also included Sir Edward ("top 
level Ted") Lyons. Nor was Young's attendance at these sessions 
the only conspicuous example of her influential role: on at least 
one occasion she was among members of the Queensland entour-
age attending the annued Premiers' Conference in Canberra. 
Mike Ahern has used the pre-cabinet briefings in a different way. 
On the morning of cabinet, and before the briefing session itself, 
he and party president Sir Robert Sparkes customarily discuss by 
telephone important matters coming before cabinet that day. This 
is extremely significant, indicating a formal hnk between the 
parliamentary and organisational wings of the party in the handling 
of the government's business. 
Between that discussion with the party state president and the 
pre-cabinet briefing, Ahern chairs what is termed inside the 
Premier's Department as a meeting of his personal staff. In fact, 
that is not quite accurate. True, the session is usually attended by 
three public servants: Peter Hall (the premier's senior press 
secretary), Gary Diggles (senior private secretary) and Fin 
McKechnie (director of corporate public relations). In addition, 
and more often than not, two other people attend: Ken Crooke, 
the National party's state director, and Bob Baudino, a public 
relations expert who was hired by the state government as a 
consultant on a part-tme basis in 1988. Although never publicly 
identified as such, Baudino's role - in terms of his previous 
experience as a strategist with the federal Liberal party - is widely 
regarded as a political one. And while it is understood that this 
meeting does not discuss the contents of the cabinet bag, it may 
deal with certain cabinet items as weU as other strategic issues or 
political problems facing the premier in the week ahead. More-
ovfT, Ken Crooke's attendance at these meetings provides further 
evidence of the blurring of roles between party and government. 
The pre-cabinet briefing then takes place, usually lasting for just 
under an hour, and attended by the premier, his deputy Bill Gunn, 
Finance minister Brian Austin, Peter Hall, and two other public 
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servants - the director-general of the Premier's Department Erik 
Finger, and under treasurer John Hah. The session is mainly 
devoted to the day's cabinet submissions which are read out in 
numerical order and discussed only if there is a point of special 
interest or concern. A helpful device used in this session, and later 
in the full cabinet meeting, is the billet doux. Literally translated 
as a love letter, a billet doux in the cabinet context is a short note 
attached either by the Premier's Department or by Treasury to any 
submission which may carry significant financial imphcations, or 
imphcations for government pohcy. It facilitates the treatment of 
submissions and allows the premier, his senior ministers and their 
central agencies (Premier's Department and Treasury) to keep 
some check on matters being presented to cabinet by outlying 
departments. 
The proceedings of cabinet 
The cabinet secretary has an important role in organising the 
business of the cabinet meeting and recording its deliberations. 
It is now known that two types of records are kept: the cabinet 
secretary's detailed handwritten notes of each meeting, and the 
collective minutes the cabinet secretary draws up after the meeting 
for circulation to ministers. Until very recently it was not known, 
even by many cabinet ministers, that the first kind of notes were 
retained. But apparently they have been, at least for a number of 
years. For example, the cabinet secretary's detailed notes of cab-
met's 10 December 1984 meeting were tendered as exhibit No. 
1773 at the Fitzgerald Inquiry on 14 November 1988. As fate 
would have it, that meeting was chaired not by Joh Bjelke-Petersen 
but by the deputy premier. Bill Gunn, and the discussion reported-
ly was more freewheeling than normal. The notes of the meeting 
are revealing, particularly in relation to the strong influence of Sir 
Robert Sparkes on proceedings, and the dominant role of senior 
ministers in the deliberations. In fact, about half the members of 
cabinet appeared to make no real contribution to the discussion. 
Bill Gurm opened the discussion of that 1984 meeting by 
indicating, somewhat ironically given later events, that "Sparkes 
wants Inquiry into Police - going to be cu-ticles in press this week". 
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But Sir Robert's influence was not confined to matters of high 
policy: BiU Gunn later reportedly told cabinet that Sparkes was 
"uptight re Hurrey", presumably a reference to a "child sex" scandal 
which was to lead to the criminal conviction of well-known radio 
personality Bill Hurrey. The tone of these notes also reveals a 
distinct earthiness in the contributions of some ministers, par-
ticularly when social and moral issues were being discussed. By 
coincidence, the cabinet secretary's detailed notes of the same 
meeting reveal that cabinet was briefed by the attorney-general, 
Neville Harper, on the problem of illegal casinos in Brisbane. 
This was in direct contradiction to the government's strident pubhc 
denials at the time of the existence of such establishments. 
The second type of record of cabinet's discussions, the collective 
minutes of proceedings, are drawn up by the cabinet secretary 
following each meeting. They include details of attendance, a 
sanitised version of any debates, 2md details of the outcome of 
cabinet's consideration of each submission discussed at the 
meeting. These collective minutes are then circulated to ministers 
along with the paperwork for the next meeting of cabinet, where 
they are confirmed. 
Cabinet's business at the meeting is divided into three major 
segments: the circulation of Executive Council minutes (ECMs) 
for the Executive Council meeting on the following Thursday; the 
consideration of individual cabinet submissions and, where 
necessary, the reconsideration of deferred submissions; and oral 
matters. The Bjelke-Petersen cabinet dealt with the ECMs first, 
then moved to oral matters and finally individual cabinet submis-
sions. Mike Ahern reshuffled the order of proceedings, his cabinet 
dealing first with cabinet submissions held over from the previous 
meeting, then new submissions and then the ECMs. Oral matters 
are dealt with lastly by Ahern, and usually in conjunction with 
formalities, such as the handling of invitations. 
Although timetabled differently, the treatment of ECMs in the 
Ahern cabinet is similar to that which prevailed during Sir Joh's 
premiership. In order of seniority each minister is given a turn 
to lead in the presentation of ECMs. Other ministers then present 
their ECMs - once again, however, always in seniority order. 
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Most ECMs are brief, with pertaining information usually 
contained in an ECM folder as an accompanying schedule. For 
example, an ECM relating to a public service appointment will be 
accompanied by a schedule detailing other applications received 
for the position, as well as a resume of the proposed appointee. 
The contents of many ECMs are cleared beforehand, either by the 
premier or other relevant ministers and, since 1988, by the relevant 
cabinet committee. While many ECMs are endorsed almost 
automatically, ministers over the years have tended to focus on 
those ECMs containing recommendations for public service or 
statutory authorities' appointments. In recent years there have 
been a great many of these, given that all public service promo-
tions and appointments at Grade 1-15 and above (any position 
over about $48,000 in 1989 annual salary terms), and all similar 
police recommendations above the rank of senior sergeant, require 
cabinet and Executive Council endorsement. Nor has it been 
uncommon for cabinet to overturn police or departmental recom-
mendations for appointment. For his part, Ahern has allowed 
certain of the less contentious appointments to be determined at 
ministerial level and go directly to Executive Council without being 
first considered by the full cabinet. 
Cabinet may deal with as many as 120 ECMs in one meeting. 
Considering that all ministers must initial every minute, the 
deliberations are somewhat jumbled and unsatisfactory. This is 
because a minister's presentation of any ECM coincides with 
everybody else frantically initialling the already approved ECMs 
circulating around the cabinet table. The paperwork is so 
considerable that each minister is provided with a side-table on 
which to place his or her cabinet bag. 
Over the years, and particularly during the latter stages of 
Bjelke-Petersen's premiership, it has been during this segment of 
the cabinet meeting that petty rivalries among ministers have most 
often been displayed: this is probably because of the opportunity 
ministers have to query and upstage their colleagues in front of the 
premier. In other words, much of the debate relates to personality 
more than to policy. For example, it was during cabinet discussion 
of an ECM - a proposal for, of all things, local government 
subdivisional changes - that one of the more celebrated ministerial 
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clashes in recent years occurred. It took place on 12 August 1985. 
The combatants were two of cabinet's more senior and able 
ministers - Russ Hinze and Don Lane. Interestingly though, their 
clash related not so much to the substance of the proposal under 
discussion as to Hinze's aside that Lane, as an ex-Liberal, should 
have better understood a particuliu" aspect of the matter. Lane 
took the greatest offence at this reminder of his Liberal past, 
which was also not the first time his memory had been jogged in 
the cabinet room by Hinze. In what were described by others who 
were present as the "most colourful terms". Lane warned Hinze 
never to do it again, at which point the premier interceded to 
restore order. 
Announcements arising from cabinet's endorsement of ECMs 
are made only after the papers have been signed by the governor 
at the Executive Council meeting on the following Thursday. Until 
the late 1980s a minister in exceptional circumstances might have 
been given clearance by cabinet to take an individual ECM straight 
to the governor following the cabinet meeting; this procedure was 
known as the "flying minute". As governor. Sir Walter Campbell 
has discontinued this practice. Under new arrangements ministers 
may request a special meeting of the Executive Council to approve 
an urgent matter. If the governor agrees to the request any such 
meeting requires the attendance of at least two ministers. 
Sir Walter's action to amend these procedures was probably 
inspired by those occasions in the past when matters contained in 
ECMs had been made public before the Executive Council's 
meeting, meaning the governor was presented with an invariably 
unappreciated fait accompli. Indeed, there had been occasions 
when the governor of the day had been so displeased with such 
lapses that he had reportedly refused to sign ECMs containing 
appointments which had been announced in advance; the most 
dramatic was the proposed appointment of former cabinet minister 
Tom Newbery as Queensland's agent-general in London. In June 
1986 Sir Walter Campbell, not many months after moving to 
Government House, sought to bring such practices to an end. 
Through the premier he requested from cabinet, and was given, an 
undertaking that henceforth he would be provided with more 
details about the appointments to statutory bodies and authorities 
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that required Executive Council's approval. On other occasions Sir 
Walter has called ministers to Government House to have them 
explain ECMs, in the process also making clear to the cabinet 
collectively that the office of governor should not be regarded 
merely as a rubber stamp. In his final days as premier even Sir 
Joh must have absorbed that message. Sir Walter choosing to 
interpret the National parliamentary party's leadership crisis as 
political and therefore capable of resolution by parliamentary 
means, rather than constitutional and therefore requiring the 
governor's intervention. 
Whereas the discussion of ECMs affords the best opportunity 
mside the cabinet room for individual ministers to ventilate their 
personal rivalries, the time devoted to oral matters allows the 
premier to exert his personal control over the cabinet as a group. 
Once again in order of their seniority, ministers are invited to 
bring forward matters of specific or general interest. The 
discussion tends to be free-ranging and sometimes disjointed, but 
there is no doubt that it is the most significant element of the 
cabinet meeting in terms both of hard politics and the internal 
powerplays of the cabinet. It was in these discussions that Sir Joh 
was at his best. As the most senior minister he led off, often 
meandering over a large number of issues, or demanding explana-
tions of different ministers; during this time he employed all of his 
considerable skills to bring errant ministers into line and to 
maintain his close and firm control over the cabinet as a whole. 
It was during a cabinet discussion of oral matters in December 
1985, for example, that the premier severely lectured Education 
minister Lin Powell for allegedly violating cabinet solidarity; the 
allegation was that Powell publicly supported tourist operators 
who opposed new legislation regulating public access to Fraser 
Island. Poweh reportedly described certain aspects of the 
legislation as "just plain dumb" (Courier-Mail, 18 December 1985). 
Yet Sir Joh was not nearly so bullying with senior ministers as he 
was on this occasion with Powell. Although the premier periodi-
cally threatened Russ Hinze over his skirmishes with Sir Edward 
Lyons, he did so usually in media interviews rather than in the 
cabinet room. On more than one occasion the "please explain" 
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issued to Hinze by the premier in a news conference or press 
interview came to nothing in the subsequent cabinet meeting. 
It did not take Mike Ahern long as premier to reahse the 
importance of the oral matters segment of the cabinet meeting. 
Most notably, he used it to cement his government's support for 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry, in particular, by swiftly acceding to any 
requests from the inquiry for an extension of its terms of ref-
erence. Like his predecessors, Ahern has used this time to air 
political problems facing the state government, such as the federal 
referendum campaign in the latter half of 1988 and, occasionally, 
to criticise the performance of individual ministers. Early in his 
premiership, for instance, he issued a stiff reprimand to Bob 
Katter Jnr for allegedly failing to arrive on time and in time to 
deliver the eulogy at the north Queensland funeral of a former 
cabinet minister. Katter had been designated as the state govern-
ment's senior representative at the ceremony. 
Unlike the order of discussion of both ECMs and oral matters, 
individual cabinet submissions are considered in the order in which 
they were submitted. While the discussion of any submission has 
always been largely a dialogue between the relevant minister and 
the premier (who has in front of him the billet doux containing the 
comments of his own department and that of Treasury), this 
feature has been underlined in recent years. Sir Joh Bjelke-
Petersen preferred cabinet meetings to be finished by 1 pm 
whereas Sir Frank Nicklin's cabinet often remained in session all 
day. Mike Ahern also prefers the cabinet meeting to be finished 
by lunchtime, though with his administration a good deal of the 
detailed work is left to separate meetings of the various cabinet 
committees. Cabinet therefore has very hmited time in which to 
transact its business; ministers have neither a great deal of time 
to examine the submissions of others, nor do they tend to do so 
unless departmental rivalries are involved. In any case, the real 
pressure on ministers in terms of their individual cabinet submis-
sions is applied not in cabinet, but in the parliamentary party room 
and, since Ahern's accession, in the cabinet committees. 
Proposals for new or amended legislation, or other items which 
are legislatively related, make up the bulk of such cabinet submis-
sions. The process for dealing with them nowadays comprises two 
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stages. A minister initially requests cabinet permission to develop 
a particular legislative initiative; if approved, the minister then 
prepares draft legislation together with supporting documentation 
for cabinet discussion. 
Above all, it must be understood that the mode of cabinet 
discussions is essentially reactive, that deliberations are limited, 
and that discussions are dominated by the premier and senior 
ministers. The way cabinet uses its time sometimes reveals 
interesting pohcy priorities. For example, cabinet has been known 
to spend fifteen or twenty minutes discussing the kangaroo cull or 
the dingo protection fence, yet only twenty or thirty seconds on a 
major town plan. 
Ministerial responsibility "Queensland style" 
Although state cabinet is the body which makes government policy 
and drafts the government's legislative programme, its decisions 
are more the product of check-points and influences operating 
outside the cabinet room than a reflection of rigorous deliberation 
within it. This is not a situation peculiar to Queensland, although 
the almost complete absence of institutional restraints on the 
exercise of government power in the state has produced its own 
peculiarities. 
The style of ministerial accountability which applies in 
Queensland has evolved over the long period in which the 
Nafionals have been the party in power. The pressures on 
individual ministers and the collective cabinet have not been those 
applied externally by the parliament or caused by concern of 
electoral defeat, but by mechanisms and influences within the party 
and government. Ministers do not take long to appreciate the 
position: they know that to succeed they must be able to cultivate 
backbench support and earn the confidence of their parliamentary 
leader, the party organisation and, preferably, the industry and 
professional groups relevant to their portfolios. 
Quite apart from the National party organisation's own policy 
development committees (examined in chapter 6), there are two 
sets of committee mechanisms which exist to assist and advise the 
parliamentary party in government. The first of these is the min-
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isterial committee system which has been developed for each 
portfolio, while the second is the cabinet committee structure 
developed by Mike Ahern as premier. 
The ministerial (or government party) committee structure was 
developed during the 1970s. These committees provide political 
advice and assistemce to individual ministers both in the party 
room and the parliament, and to the government collectively in the 
parliament. A separate committee exists for each of the eighteen 
ministries. Their importance varies according to the portfolio, the 
personal style of the minister, and the interests and commitment 
of committee members. This variability of importance was 
particularly pronounced in the days of coahtion government when 
the political priorities of the Nationzds and the Liberals often 
diverged - a factor which tended to be reflected in the composition 
of the committees. For example. National party MLAs tended to 
dominate the memberships of those ministerial committees dealing 
with public works and housing, mines and energy, primary indus-
try, and lands, forestry and water resources; Liberals predominated 
in such portfolios as justice and education. 
The membership of these ministerial committees is formally 
orchestrated by the cabinet secretary. Individual backbench MLAs 
may nominate themselves, or selective approaches may be made 
by individual ministers to backbenchers of then choice. Member-
ship of the committees is then finalised at cabinet. The number 
of members per committee averages about eight (excluding the 
minister), and most backbenchers are allocated to about four 
different committees. 
The way in which the ministerial committees operate depends, 
above all, on the attitude of the premier, and also, of individual 
ministers. Joh Bjelke-Petersen was comfortable with them. He 
preferred to have a generalised knowledge of issues, leaving the 
details for ministers to defend. Ministers who are more able or 
experienced, or who cope easily with detail, might use their 
committees sparingly. During Mike Ahern's first year as premier, 
for example, he convened his ministerial committee on only one 
occasion, while Brian Austin - when he was Health minister - only 
convened his committee to discuss legislation which was already in 
draft form. New ministers, on the other hand, sometimes use theh 
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committees as political crutches, relying heavily on the party's 
backbenchers for policy ideas and thus requiring weekly meetings 
during parhamentary sessions in order to assist with the drafting 
of legislation or policy statements. Some ministers even establish 
sub-committees of their ministerial committees to work specifically 
on legislation. 
Vince Lester has used his ministerial committee meetings to 
discuss sensitive issues. Even as a relatively senior and experienced 
minister, he convened his committee weekly whenever parliament 
was in session. The minister's chief pubhc service officials and 
political advisers also were often invited to attend. Backbenchers 
warmed to this approach; they felt they were being involved in the 
government's decision-making, whether the issue was a major 
crisis, such as the 1988 Queen Street construction site accident in 
Brisbane, or one of local interest, such as the issue of a permit 
for a suburban flea market. This style of operation for the 
committee suited Lester's temperament, and also allowed him to 
cultivate the party-room support he might need some time in the 
future, for example, if the parliamentary leadership or deputy 
leadership became vacant. 
Not ah ministers have recognised the benefits of using their 
ministerial committees effectively. Lin Powell, when Education 
minister, developed an Education ministerial committee the 
composition of which was regarded by many within the National 
party backbench as incestuous. After the 1983 state election, for 
example, its members were almost entirely new members of 
parliament who were also ex-schoolteachers. The committee's 
advice may have been technically proficient, but it was politically 
less experienced. 
The ways ministers cultivate backbench support also vary. For 
some, the example they set of talent or sheer hard work is enough. 
Others attempt to curry favour by hinting at future opportunities 
for elevation to the ministry. Before the Fitzgerald Inquiry, too, 
generous amounts of government-paid travel and ministerial 
hospitality, all courtesy of the public purse, were always available. 
There is also another blunt means of attracting backbench support, 
one available and long-used by ministers whose portfolios cover 
pubhc works or other means of capital injection. Euphemistically 
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referred to by backbenchers as "political" activity, this is the 
practice traditionally regarded as one of the spoils of office - of 
"pumping largesse" into "deserving areas". When asked to clarify 
the term "pohtical" in this context, one backbencher responded: 
"You know what political is. Pohtical is when you have to spend 
a miUion dollars in a marginal seat to save it." 
It is not surprising that some effort is put into forming these 
committees. They are important for ministers and backbenchers 
alike. Ministers, in addition to cultivating support, may need 
people to back them in order to sustain their position in the party 
room or on the floor of the House. In a more general sense, the 
committee members can be used by a minister as barometers of 
the mood of the party room or the general pubhc regarding either 
the minister's own performance or particular issues of the day. 
Most importantly, the ministerial committees help to keep 
backbenchers busy and, thus, their energies directed to the good 
of the party. 
There are also significant advantages for committee members, 
apart from the self-indulgent benefits of travel and hospitality 
already mentioned. Backbenchers often use their ministerial 
committee involvement to tailor their professional political ambi-
tions or to do something special in an emerging field of political 
interest. There is the chance that a member wih be noticed in the 
party room or the parliament or National party headquarters as a 
proficient operator and thus attract attention when cabinet 
vacancies occur. Speaking privileges in parliament are accorded 
committee members when relevant legislation is being considered. 
These opportunities for committee members to display their 
talents should not be underestimated in a parliamentary party 
where the prospects of ministerial elevation are so good, at least 
by comparison with other states. In Queensland more than one-
third of National parhamentarians in 1988 were ministers, and only 
five of all the National MLAs who at that time had sat in parha-
ment longer than the previous five years had not been elevated to 
the ministry at some time or other. 
Another significant aspect of the committees relates to their use 
of public service resources. Although the extent of public service 
involvement m ministerial committees varies from portfolio to 
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portfolio, and over time, it is not uncommon for both senior pubhc 
servants as well as political staffers to attend and participate 
actively in these meetings as advisers. Involvement by public 
officials in such meetings is not peculiar to Queensland; but 
evidence over the years suggests that in some portfolios the 
demands placed on officials imply for them obligations of part-
isanship and personal ministerial protection. 
The ministerial committees have thus come to play a significant 
supportive role in the execution of government business. It is none 
the less in the National pculiamentary party room itself where, 
much more so than even in cabinet, real pressure is applied to 
cabinet ministers to account for their actions. Again, however, the 
ministerial committees perform a role: a minister who has briefed 
his or her committee on a controversial measure, and has the 
backbenchers committed to it, is infinitely better equipped to 
defend that position in the party room than a minister who has 
not taken that precaution. 
The real significance of the National party parliamentary room 
is that, for some years now, it has come to be regarded as the de 
facto parliament, in the sense that this is where the real debate has 
occurred, where problems are aired and amendments to draft 
legislation made. This situation was confirmed on more than one 
occasion publicly by former minister Russ Hinze in his declaration 
that "the government is in the party room". Joh Bjelke-Petersen 
himself must have believed it to be the case, because it was he who 
was the first in Queensland to insist on collective ministerial 
responsibihty being applied in the joint parties room (the name for 
the party room in the days of coalition). 
While a practice not confined to Queensland, Bjelke-Petersen's 
insistence on cabinet solidarity in the joint parties room was, to 
him, a practical response to a practical problem. In this case the 
"problem" was that his position was not always sustained by the 
joint parties. The matter came to a climax in 1978 over the issue 
of the sandmining of coloured sands at Cooloola, a little over one 
hundred kilometres north of Brisbane. Both the premier and state 
cabinet publicly supported the mining proposal, but there was 
widespread pubhc disenchantment over the matter. At the time, 
Bjelke-Petersen promised to let the joint parties meeting finally 
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decide the issue. It did so, rejecting the position of the premier 
and the cabinet. This was the last time the premier left such a 
decision to the joint parties. Interestingly too, the Cooloola issue 
was the one and only issue during the Bjelke-Petersen premiership 
when a secret ballot was held by the joint parties. (This was one 
of many matters recorded in the detailed handwritten minutes of 
joint parties meetings which were kept over many years, a fact not 
known even by all who were involved.) 
In particular, Joh Bjelke-Petersen quickly came to understand 
that his insistence upon collective ministerial responsibility in the 
joint parties room could both frustrate the Liberals and reduce 
their impact in the coalition. Because cabinet meetings normally 
preceded joint parties gatherings, Liberal ministers could choose 
either to support the cabinet line, which on a number of pohcy 
matters was contrary to Liberal policy, or risk their positions as 
ministers in the coalition arrangement. Indeed, any minister who 
failed to uphold the cabinet line in joint parties assuredly risked 
instant dismissal. 
Tensions within the party room eased following the end of the 
coalition, but the advantages of continuing to enforce cabinet 
solidarity in that forum remain. A matter resolved by a tight 
margin in the cabinet (albeit that formal votes are rare there) has 
an excellent chance of gaining party room support provided that 
cabinet members toe the line. 
The pressures upon ministers to be accountable for their 
activities, if only to their cabinet and party room colleagues, have 
intensified since Mike Ahern secured the premiership. It is not 
surprising that the new premier moved to streamline the cabinet 
process: he himself had sampled eight years as a minister of the 
Bjelke-Petersen cabinet and must have long realised cabinet's 
inadequacies as either a deliberative or decision-making body. To 
address the problem of work overload Ahern introduced a cabinet 
committee system. It comprises two senior policy committees -
one dealing with economic policy and the other with the budget -
and three ministerial planning committees (MFCs) - dealing, 
respectively, with resources, infrastructure and social issues. Each 
MFC reports to cabinet via the relevant senior policy committee. 
The cabinet committee network is also supported by an economic 
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advisory committee drawn from the private sector and chaired by 
a senior Queensland business identity. 
Ahhough it is still too early to assess the likely enduring impact 
of the cabinet committee system, there have been several im-
mediate consequences. First, the committees have forced mini-
sters, especially the newer and more junior ones, to come to grips 
with the details of their portfolios. Hitherto ministers had been 
able to elude this burden either because of the lack of time in full 
cabinet meetings to probe such details, or because of their reliance 
upon departmental officials or political advisers at ministerial 
committees. Under the new arrangements ministers have been 
forced to work harder on their paper-work. In Sir Joh's day 
cabinet deliberations of individual ministers' submissions often 
amounted to little more than a dialogue between minister and 
premier. Some of this business has now been removed from the 
full cabinet meeting, and is handled by one or other of the two 
senior policy committees. These committees have identical 
membership - Mike Ahern (premier and treasurer, in the chair), 
Brian Austin (Finance), Bill Gunn (deputy premier. Works and 
Housing), Vince Lester (Employment, Training and Industrial 
Affairs) and Neville Harper (Primary Industries). 
Early signals suggest that the two senior committees are 
operating with some measure of success. They have overcome the 
initial resistance of the Treasury Department to their establish-
ment and they allow for a more strategic approach to decision-
making. They are, none the less, proving somewhat cumbersome 
in their operations. Decisions emerge very slowly, and some 
proposals have moved back and forth between the committees 
without being resolved. This should not be surprising, given that 
Ahern's personal style is deliberative - unlike that of his predeces-
sor. His cabinet is mostly comprised of people who, as holdovers 
from the Bjelke-Petersen years, were unaccustomed to the new 
style of operation. Some people have made the adjustment, but 
others have not. For example, ministers uncomfortable with this 
more inquiring modus operandi may seek protective armour for 
themselves. At a single meeting of cabinet's Budget Committee 
held on 3 October 1988, three different ministers called before that 
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committee brought with them public servants to provide assistance; 
one minister even brought in six. 
This difficulty of adjustment is also very apparent in examining 
the ministerial planning committees. One of these, the Infrastruc-
ture Committee chaired by Bill Gunn, simply has not functioned. 
It is uncertain whether it even met during its first year, although 
its area of responsibility was "shadowed" by a pubhc service inter-
departmental committee. Another MPC, that dejiling with social 
issues, has been hamstrung by the repeated failure of certain of its 
members to attend the regularly convened meetings. Other 
factors, including ministerial and leadership rivalries, could explain 
the situation of either committee, but the point remains that 
neither has operated effectively. 
The dominance of the premier in cabinet 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen learnt well from his early political experiences. 
He was almost removed in the early stages of his premiership, but 
then went on to build for himself a formidable reputation. His 
position within his party remained invulnerable until his political 
judgment totally deserted him in 1987. 
Although no successor could initially expect to match his 
authority, the position of premier does wield considerable power 
in both the cabinet and the party room. The premier chairs the 
cabinet and controls all cabinet processes and mechanisms, 
including the paperflow. This means, among other things, that the 
premier can put forward any item at all, even without warning. 
The National party premier in Queensland, like other conservative 
leaders elsewhere in Australia, also has the authority to appoint all 
members of the ministry, although in practice National party 
headquarters is likely to be closely involved in this procedure (as 
explained in chapter 6). 
This authority carries with it a number of advantages for the 
premier. Appointees to cabinet presumably feel some indebt-
edness toward the parliamentary leader, while the large size of the 
Queensland cabinet (relative to the whole National parliamentary 
party) enables the premier to hold out reasonable promotion 
prospects to other backbenchers. That, in turn, inspires loyalty 
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within the parhamentary wing, while allowing the premier to 
maintain considerable pressure on ministers to perform and to 
conform. The pressure is applied by the processes of cabinet, as 
well as of its own committees, the party room, and the ministerial 
committees. Sometimes it is even applied publicly. New ministers, 
in particular, feel the burden. Bjelke-Petersen often reminded his 
new cabinet recruits that they were "on trial". The premier's 
authority is also underlined by the strong emphasis upon seniority 
which occurs in relation to almost every aspect of cabinet. 
The strength of the premier's position also may be indicated by 
the manner in which decisions are reached and disputes resolved 
in cabinet. For the most part "active" decisions are not required; 
individual cabinet submissions or ECMs usually lead to only one 
course of action and, provided that this outcome has been cleared 
by the appropriate committee beforehand or checked with the 
premier if there is a doubt about it, most decisions slide through 
without great difficulty. Sometimes issues are contentious, yet the 
view of the premier, once stated, nearly always leads to a degree 
of resolution. At worst, the premier may defer a decision if he is 
concerned about the level of support for his position. For 
example. Sir Joh deferred the matter of a replacement for Sir 
Charles Wanstall as chief justice after a clash with his Liberal 
attorney-general. At a subsequent meeting the premier won the 
day, albeit that on this occasion all the Liberal cabinet members 
dechned to sign the ECM containing the recommendation. 
It has been only in rare circumstances that a formal vote of 
cabinet has been required. In the last fifteen years of the Bjelke-
Petersen premiership there were no more than a handful of such 
occasions. These included the 13-1 vote of the cabinet in 1974 to 
join the Commonwealth government's Medibank programme (the 
premier's was the one opposing voice) and the almost equally 
overwhelming vote of state cabinet several years later against 
permitting cancer therapist Milan Brych to conduct a clinic in 
Queensland. Again Bjelke-Petersen was in the minority, while his 
position on the matter was subsequently discredited following 
Brych's conviction in California for fraud. On two other occasions, 
however, Sir Joh was able to secure his own preference through a 
formal vote. The first was in relation to the proposed location of 
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a power station at Tarong (a site adjacent to the premier's own 
electorate), although the professional advice to cabinet, which was 
leaked to the press, strongly favoured an alternative site at 
Milmerran. The second matter pertained to the appointment of 
Sir Edward Lyons as chairman of the TAB. In each case, 
however, the formal vote was taken only after the differing 
opinions within the ministry had been thoroughly jiired in the 
public arena. By contrast, there were two or three issues on which 
the Ahern ministry voted in its first year in office. None of these 
matters was publicly aired either beforehand or afterward, al-
though it is understood that one of them related to the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry, and probably involved Sir Terence Lewis. 
Occasions when the premier's view has not prevailed in cabinet 
have not been common, and have been even less so since the 
demise of the coalition. Yet one fascinating incident did occur, 
albeit accidentally, at the cabinet meeting on 20 November 1984. 
Cabinet had before it a category A (secret) submission (No. 
40214) recommending an enhanced role for the Pubhc Service 
Board in the management of staff and financial resources within 
the public service. The premier was not at cabinet that day, 
although the acting premier (Bill Gunn) had been briefed by the 
Public Service Board on the submission's contents. Gunn was 
prepared to let the matter proceed, despite the fact that the 
submission (presumably because of its security classification) had 
not been included in the cabinet bag, and thus was seen for the 
first time by ministers only when tabled at the cabinet meeting. In 
any event, cabinet approved the submission. Within a day or so, 
however, the premier returned, and received from his own 
department and from Treasury an opposing view to that which 
cabinet had reached on the matter. He thereupon instructed the 
decision to be changed so that its effect was reversed and, at the 
meeting the following week, reported his action. It is understood 
that not one cabinet minister responded - much less objected - to 
the premier's action. 
This was not the only issue on which Sir Joh forced his cabinet 
to somersault. About a year before the coalition collapsed a joint 
submission was made by ministers Bill Glasson (Lands), Bill 
Hewitt (Administrative Services) and Sam Doumany (Justice) to 
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establish a foreign land register. Despite the fact that the Liberal 
party already supported such a measure, and the National party 
organisation was moving in the same direction, the matter was 
dropped in cabmet on account of the premier's strong opposition. 
A httle later, while Joh Bjelke-Petersen was abroad, the same 
proposal reappeared on the cabinet agenda, although it was not 
clear which minister was responsible for this action. Some 
ministers were confused by the situation, while others presumed 
that the premier had softened his stance on the matter and was 
prepared for it to be proceeded with while he was away. Cabinet 
endorsed the submission. When informed of this action, however. 
Sir Joh was furious and, at the next cabinet meeting, the decision 
was reversed. 
Attention so far has focused on the structure and processes of 
cabinet, on the dominant position of the premier, and on the 
parliamentary party environment within which the premier and the 
cabinet operate. One crucial factor remains to be discussed on 
this subject - the role and influence of the National party orgam-
isation £md its long-time president. Sir Robert Sparkes. 
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Although state cabinet may be the body responsible for the 
decisions of government, very little of consequence occurs there or 
elsewhere inside the Queensland government without the know-
ledge of the National party apparatus. Indeed, the snug relation-
ship between the parhamentary and organisational wings over the 
years has been crucial to the broadening of the party's electoral 
base. The Nationals were seen as a tightly run outfit, single-
mindedly intent on advancing Queensland's economic develop-
ment. They were also committed to protecting Queensland from 
the political incursions of successive federal governments and its 
inhabitants from the threat to moral standards posed by the 
supposedly permissive policies of other governments. 
A degree of natural tension did exist, however, between the 
parliamentary party and the organisational wing on matters of 
principle. For example, there has been intermittent tension over 
perceived attempts by the party organisation to intervene on policy 
issues, thereby laying the party open to the same charge levelled 
for many years against the ALP, namely, that non-elected party 
officials exerted undue control over elected members of the 
parliamentary party. A dispute arising from this matter of 
principle occurred fairly early in Robert Sparkes's state presidency 
when, in 1973, an MLA (Don Neal) told the parliamentary party 
that he had been threatened with disendorsement if he did not 
abide by the decision of the state conference on a matter of land 
policy. Another example of such tension, and one which surfaced 
regularly during the 1980s, was the uneasiness which surrounded 
the intractability of the Bjelke-Petersen cabinet (in particular, the 
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premier himself) in refusing to endorse the wish of successive 
party state conferences to introduce a foreign land register. 
Tension within the party was usually contained to manageable 
levels, although Sir Joh did bridle periodically at reports suggesting 
the overbearing influence of party headquarters, in particular, the 
extent of authority of party president Sir Robert Sparkes. 
Significantly, when a total breakdown did occur between Bjelke-
Petersen and the party organisation in 1987, it was the party 
organisation under Sir Robert which prevailed. 
Sir Robert Sparkes 
Sir Robert Sparkes became the president of the Queensland 
National (then Country) party in 1970. The son of former state 
parliamentarian and prosperous grazier and graingrower Sir James 
Sparkes, Sir Robert has combined his duties at the state party level 
with obligations in local government: since 1967 he has been 
chairman of the Wambo Shire Council on the Western Darling 
Downs. 
According to a senior member of the National party Alan 
Metcalfe in his book In Vieir Own Right, Sparkes had known Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen from the early days when Bjelke-Petersen was an 
aerial-seeding contractor. However, it was not until 1970 that their 
alliance was formed when Sparkes intervened to contain party 
instability after a move in the party room against Bjelke-Petersen's 
leadership. In a bid to forestall the disunity Sparkes threatened 
with disendorsement any MLA who acted disloyally. 
The authority which Sparkes wields in the National party is 
extraordinary. In part this is a tribute to his considerable tactical 
skill and the vast knowledge he possesses not only of his own party 
but also of almost every facet of Queensland politics. This 
knowledge enabled him, together with executive director Mike 
Evans and premier Bjelke-Petersen, to mastermind a political 
strategy to extend his party's electoral base; the success of that 
strategy led the Nationals ultimately to secure office in their own 
right. 
As the party's stocks improved, Sparkes's political authority 
extended to the point where, even in the public mind, it rivalled 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
JJO Working The System 
that of Bjelke-Petersen. Within the party Sir Robert's position 
became impregnable; he has held the party presidency longer than 
any of his predecessors (the next longest-serving presidents were 
John Leahy from 1936 to 1944 and Alan Campbell 1944 to 1951), 
and not once in his first fifteen years as party state president did 
anyone even contest the post against him. 
For the most part Sparkes preferred to keep out of the pubhc 
gaze but his influence, observable or otherwise, has been pervasive. 
His name is frequently invoked by ministers in the cabinet room, 
particularly when they are seeking to persuade colleagues on a 
matter. His view of the state of the party or his assessment of 
problems is also conveyed regularly to cabinet. One instance, 
already mentioned, was when the acting premier opened a cabinet 
meeting by reporting that Sparkes wanted an inquiry into the 
police as there were going to be articles in the press about it that 
week. Sir Robert is fully conversant with important matters 
under consideration in the cabinet room. Although there is no 
evidence to suggest that he has ever received the cabinet bag, 
ministers often consult him for advice or seek his support for 
proposals. And while he may not receive the cabinet paperwork 
as such, a number of ministers believe that Sir Robert's knowledge 
of cabinet discussions has been assisted over the years by the 
regular "pipelines" provided by certain ministers anxious to 
ingratiate themselves with him. 
Sparkes's detailed knowledge of what is occurring in both cabinet 
and the parliamentary party room has been assisted over recent 
years by the strategically placed presence in the Premier's 
Department of Wendy Armstrong, a research officer who was 
formerly employed at National party headquarters. After joining 
the departmental staff, she maintained a close working relationship 
with Sir Robert while also coming to be regarded as one of the 
members of Sir Joh's personal "kitchen cabinet". Armstrong, who 
remained with the Premier's Department following Bjelke-
Petersen's demise, is employed as a contract public servant, but 
her role in the department is widely regarded as directly political. 
For example, according to Alan Metcalfe she was a member of the 
National party committee which laid down the final blueprint for 
their 1983 state election campaign strategy. Armstrong also vets 
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the draft policy statements emanating from the party's pohcy 
committees before these are forwarded to the party's State 
Management Committee. Nor is her work confined to the state 
sphere; she sometimes provides the federal National party with 
pohcy assistance. 
Armstrong enjoys access to the contents of the cabinet bag and 
is the person to whom both government ministers and back-
benchers turn for advice and assistance, especially when they are 
in trouble. She is not a card-carrying member of the National 
party, but she is of considerable strategic importance to Sir Robert 
Sparkes personally, and in the broader relations between the 
parhamentcuy and organisational wings of the party. This is 
underlined by the fact that Ms Armstrong is one of the very few 
outsiders who frequently attends as an observer the quarterly 
meetings of the Queensland National party's influential Central 
Council (see accompanying diagram for details of the state party's 
organisational structure). 
Su Robert's access to cabinet has also been formalised since 
Mike Ahern's elevation to the premiership; as mentioned earlier, 
Sparkes and Ahern routinely hold a telephone conversation on the 
morning of cabinet to discuss matters on its agenda. The call is 
scheduled even before the premier's own briefing session with his 
senior public service advisers. 
Another facility which has enabled the parliamentary and 
organisational wings to remain close, and in particular which has 
allowed Sparkes to keep a watching brief over the government's 
performance, is the quarterly joint meeting of the parliamentary 
wing and the State Management Committee. This joint session, 
which is chaired by Sir Robert, provides a means for the govern-
ment to report to the party organisation on a variety of issues. In 
fact, the premier delivers a "Government Report" to the party 
organisation at these meetings. 
A number of examples over the years illustrate the extent of Sir 
Robert's impact on cabinet and the government. Apart from the 
assistance he lent Joh Bjelke-Petersen in his early years as 
premier, and which was referred to earlier, Sparkes intervened in 
1978 to convince parliamentary members that the general public, 
m the wake of the Peel Report's disclosure of rorts involving 
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MLAs' air travel entitlements, supported tighter controls over 
parliamentary travel. On other occasions he has intervened when 
cabinet has appeared to depart from or move beyond party policy 
on a matter. Most often, however, his intrusion has been in the 
mterests of "damage control". It is believed that it was Sir Robert 
who convinced cabinet to acknowledge National party backbench 
and community feelings on the abortion issue by allowing a free 
vote on legislation coming before the Queensland parliament. 
And it was Sir Robert who, in the face of Sir Joh's open hostility, 
engineered a resolution of the 1986 Lindeman Island crisis which 
occurred when state cabinet revoked 390 hectares of national park 
on Lindeman Island in order to allow the land to be reverted to 
freehold. The government's intention was then to sell the land to 
East-West Airlines, headed in Queensland by the premier's 
confidant Sir Edward Lyons. Whereas Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen 
refused to reconsider the matter, the intervention of Sir Robert led 
to a tactical retreat by East-West. 
Although it is the responsibility of the premier as parliamentary 
leader to determine the composition of the ministry. Sir Robert 
Sparkes is invariably consulted and his advice almost always 
heeded. The premier will judge ministerial contenders in terms of 
loyalty and, to a lesser extent, performance in the party room and 
in the parliament. Sir Robert's input, on the other hand, addresses 
broader pohtical considerations, which might include the geograph-
ical representation or age structure of the cabinet. The import-
ance of these considerations has been underlined since the 
Nationals assumed government in their own right. In 1978 
journalist Hugh Lunn constructed a profile of the ten National 
party members of the coalition cabinet. Nine were farmers or 
graziers and all ten were men, with an average age of sixty-one 
years. All had left school before the end of Year 12, all came 
from small towns, and not one of them included reading, theatre, 
music, history, writing or antiques among their hobbies (Weekend 
Australian, 2 December 1978). By 1988 the cabinet profile was 
somewhat broader, with about half of the eighteen ministers listed 
as farmers or graziers, in some cases not exclusively so. By this 
stage other occupational groups were represented in cabinet; one 
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of the eighteen ministers was a woman and she and one other 
minister were Brisbane-based. 
In large part it was Sir Robert Sparkes who forced this broader 
composition. By the late 1970s he was aware that cabinet had 
come to be regarded as unrepresentative of many of the groups 
the National party needed to attract in order to realise its political 
ambitions. At the same time the Nationals had to ensure that 
their traditional support base in the coastal farmlands and in the 
rural areas west of the Great Divide was not made uneasy. Sir 
Robert Sparkes played a crucial role in carefully balancing these 
considerations. It was he, for example, who in 1980 convinced Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen to elevate Mike Ahern to the ministry and to 
allocate him an industry-related portfoho. He also insisted that 
cabinet's "northern" representation required bolstering, which led 
to the elevation several years later of Bob Katter Jnr. It wjis also 
Sparkes who in 1986 helped to engineer the preselection of Brian 
Austin for the newly created seat of Nicklin, on the Sunshine 
Coast. This was not easily achieved. Austin, whose marginal 
northside Brisbane seat of Wavell had been abolished in the 
redistribution of that year, was not a local and, as an ex-Liberal, 
did not enjoy automatic support within the relevant National party 
branches. On the other hand Sparkes recognised that Austin had 
to be protected: not only was he one of the government's more 
experienced and able ministers, but also his (and Don Lane's) 
switch of allegiance in the wake of the 1983 election had delivered 
government to the Nationals in their own right. 
Articulating the vision of dominance 
Although Joh Bjelke-Petersen may have thought otherwise, the 
Country party's successful transformation into the National party 
was effected not by the efforts of the parliamentary team alone, 
but as a result of a strategy forged by the tight teamwork of the 
parliamentary and organisational leadership of the party. The 
change involved not just a new label for the party but a calculated 
broadening of its policy interests and, to accommodate them, a 
modernising of the party's administrative operations. 
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Sparkes was the architect who gave effect to the Nationals' 
dream of political dominance in Queensland. His vision embraced 
notions not only of maintaining dominance of the state's coalition, 
but also of the National party ultimately governing in its own right, 
and entrenching itself as the party permanently in power, the party 
which was the "natural choice" for Queenslanders. But to achieve 
this position the Nationals first had to eclipse the state Liberals, 
and the only way to do that was to establish a metropolitan branch 
base and a much closer relationship with the Brisbane business 
community. 
Sparkes's plan was extraordinarily ambitious, indeed quite 
audacious given the problems the Country party faced in the early 
1970s. A new name for the party had to be found, a sound 
professional footing for the party organisation secured, and new 
pohcies attractive to a broader constituency devised. Collectively 
these measures would facilitate the growth of a wider political 
organisation at the grassroots level. 
Implementing this strategy was not easy and efforts were not 
immediately rewarded, despite the very strong organisational 
teamwork of Sir Robert and Mike Evans, the former school 
teacher and relative of Sir Robert who became party executive 
director in the same year Sparkes became president. In particular, 
the Nationals still had an image problem in the metropolitan area. 
Somehow this had to be overcome. 
Widespread disaffection with the policies of successive federal 
governments provided an opportunity for the Queensland Nation-
als to create a bridgehead of support amongst urban and metro-
politan voters in general, and the business community in particular. 
The fact that the Nationals were in coalition with the state Liberals 
was a limiting factor, although the Nationals had much to thank 
their partners for in terms of how to deal with business. For 
example. Sir Gordon Chalk, the Liberal state leader and deputy 
premier for eleven years under Sir Frank Nicklin, Jack Pizzey and 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen, spent many hours introducing Bjelke-Petersen 
to Brisbane's business leaders. These contacts were doubtless 
invaluable for the new premier, but Sir Gordon also was showing 
the National party how to network the business community. By 
the time Chalk retired in 1976 the Nationals had learnt their own 
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way around and had started to develop their ovm contacts; they no 
longer needed as much assistance from their coahtion partners. 
Sparkes and Evans were spending a great deal of time doing then 
own networking, visiting the boardrooms in Brisbane's commercial 
heart, and entertaining corporate identities at the party's Spring 
Hill headquarters, known to all as The Bunker. 
The Nationals still lacked an urban base, but in the wake of 
Chalk's departure Sparkes and Evans recognised the opportunity 
available to the party to reinforce the advantages accruing from its 
senior status in the coalition. To do so new pohcies still had to be 
developed. Up until the early 1970s the policy structure in the 
party was very hmited. Several pohcy committees covered 
traditional areas of interest, but they were not notably active. The 
need for new policies to widen the party's electoral base nec-
essitated the formation of new policy committees. Some of these 
paralleled ministerial portfohos (for example, education and 
health); others involved a greater degree of portfoho subdivision 
or policy targeting (for example, small business). Certain others 
appeared to have no relationship at all with state-level respon-
sibilities but reflected a close identification with federal issues of 
major public interest (for example, defence, sports, and com-
munications). One or two of the original policy committees 
remained intact, most notably the Lands Committee, chaired 
continuously since 1966 by Sir Robert Sparkes himself. In all, by 
1988 twenty-seven different party policy committees had been 
developed, as well as several others of a specific purpose or 
temporary nature (see Appendix G for details). 
The development of the policy committee structure allowed the 
National party to recognise policy opportunities across the 
spectrum of state government activities. The Nationals could 
shadow the performance of Liberal ministers and, occasionally, 
pre-empt or embarrass the Liberal party by announcing policy 
initiatives in a portfolio where the Liberals were supposedly in 
charge (for example. Industrial Relations). These actions not only 
rattled the Liberal party's confidence but also demonstrated to 
both the general public and the business community that the 
National party was the party of ideas in the coalition. Further-
more, such activities were intended to show that, as senior party 
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in the coahtion, the Nationals were prepared to inject pohcy 
mitiatives whenever and wherever required, if necessary overriding 
Liberal party opposition and pubhc service advice to Liberal 
mmisters. For example, the National party strongly advocated the 
abohtion of death duties, despite strong pubhc opposition from 
treasurer Sir Gordon Chalk and other Liberals. 
The National party pohcy committees have played a critical role 
in the party's networking of the professional and business com-
munities. Gaining access to the boardrooms of major companies 
was the first task, but the estabhshment of party pohcy committees 
allowed for a more direct contribution by business to policy 
development. Some ministers reahsed the potential of such 
involvement. A typical example was Mike Ahern who, as minister 
for Industry, Small Business and Technology from 1983 to 1986, 
used his party's Industry Commerce and Economics Committee to 
build up contacts in industry for himself and his party. 
These committees are often briefed, too, by senior public 
servants. While the practice itself may not be dissimilar to that in 
some other places, it should be viewed in Queensland in the 
context of the blurring which has taken place between the roles of 
party and government. At a very practiced level, senior public 
servants have recognised that one of the major roles of the party 
pohcy committees is to provide the government with an alternative 
source of advice to the public service. As a result the committees, 
or those of them which are active and interested, tend to be 
viewed with caution by public servants. This is especially the case 
when committee chairpersons have access to the key players: in 
this context, the premier, the party president, and senior members 
of the State Management Committee such as Sir Charles Holm, 
Sir Wilham Ahen, and Bruce Campbell. 
Apart from the position of chairperson, the membership of 
policy committees is confidential. Most committee members are 
Nationals, although the party's by-laws do provide for non-party 
committee membership where individuals possess specialist 
knowledge. There are some current examples. The Arts and 
Heritage Committee includes two non-party members - Norman 
LleweUyn, the executive director of Brisbane Warana Festival Ltd, 
and Peter Dent, Manager of the Queensland Arts Council. 
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All policy committee chairpersons, however, must be party 
members. Most are members of State Management Committee, 
are prominent in branch affairs, or are state or federal parl-
iamentarians. In 1988 one member of the Management Commit-
tee, Eric Powne, was chairing two different policy committees, 
while a senior pubhc servant in the State Government Computer 
Centre, Graham Smith, was chairing the party's Science and 
Technology Committee. 
The development of the policy committee structure was crucial 
to the broadening of the Nationals' political legitimacy in Queens-
land. Through these committees, the party's task at first was to 
demonstrate to urban conservative voters that it offered superior 
policies and better leadership than the Liberals. This particular 
combination of qualities was necessary to "seed" the developing 
branch structure in the metropolitan area. This was handled by a 
very small group of party supporters including Glen Shiel, Marjorie 
Shiel, Bill Siller, Bev Siller, Jim Gillan, Ted Howard, Dermot 
Lynch, and David Russell. At first a slow process, it gained 
momentum as the bickering among state Liberals intensified as 
they cast about in search of the future role for their party north of 
the Tweed. 
Breaking through 
The establishment of the Bjelke-Petersen Foundation in 1979 
facilitated a change in the Brisbane business community's percep-
tions of the National party. While the establishment of the 
Foundation attracted a deal of public distrust over the possible 
motives involved, the National party argued that a modern political 
party could only be successful if it was able to secure its financial 
viability. The objective of the Foundation was to raise $2.5 million 
which was to be invested in commercial buildings in selected 
centres throughout the state. The income thus generated was to 
be used partly to meet the costs of election campaigns and partly 
"to promote the merits of the Free Enterprise philosophy and 
generally enhance the effectiveness of the Party Organisation in its 
struggle to preserve the Free Enterprise system" (Financial 
Review, 25 May 1979). 
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The interest of the business community in the Foundation was 
captured by the Nationals' successfully enlisting the names of a 
number of prominent Brisbane business identities. In the past 
Brisbane business persons generally dealt with the state govern-
ment via the deputy premier who, under the coalition arrangement, 
was always a Liberal. Now, through the Bjelke-Petersen Found-
ation, the Nationals had attracted the likes of Sir Ernest Savage 
and Sir Roderick Proctor. Savage was chairman of the Bank of 
Queensland and a long-time partner in the accounting firm 
Coopers and Lybrand. Proctor, on the other hand, was well 
known not only as a senior partner in another accounting firm, 
Hungerfords, but also as a prominent company director. 
The association of such names with the National party's cause 
sent signals to Brisbane's commercial world. Rumours also 
circulated that a major Queensland multinational corporation had 
made a generous donation to the Nationals which allowed the 
party's Spring Hill headquarters to be refurbished. The message 
of all this was clear: the Nationals were on the move. 
But other messages were also conveyed, as was graphically 
captured in an exchange between National party executive director 
Mike Evans and interviewer Peter Ross in a Four Comers 
programme on ABC TV on 25 September 1982. Evans was also 
secretary of the Bjelke-Petersen Foundation. 
Interviewer. As the Queensland boom hotted up over the last 
few years, developers and businessmen of all kinds found 
themselves being enthusiastically canvassed by the Foundation's 
organizers. To many businessmen, the message seemed to be no 
contribution, no contracts. Now I'm just taking out one section 
of the letter you sent out - "It's in the protection of your 
commercial future as well as your basic democratic lifestyle for 
you to donate to the Bjelke-Petersen Foundation." 
Mike Evans: Well I don't think there's anything wrong with that. 
What that is saying, [is that] your commercial future is in fact 
supporting (for) the Party to support the private enterprise way 
of life. Therefore commercial future equals [the] private 
enterprise way of life. 
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Interviewer. A very essential investment. 
Mike Evans: Investment for the private enterprise way of life. 
Interviewer. In the protection of your commercial future. 
Mike Evans: WeU look, I think I've explained that private 
enterprise equals what you're talking about. 
From the outset the benefits of donating to the Foundation were 
tangible. According to Margaret Cribb in the Current Affairs 
Bulletin in October 1981, donors were offered a variety of 
incentives ranging from the naming of a building in their honour 
to a private dinner with the premier; alternatively, they could 
place advertisements in the party's journal. National Outlook, 
which - because of the tax deductibilities then available to 
businesses for advertising costs - would be effectively free. 
The significant level of donations to the Bjelke-Petersen 
Foundation also provided the party with a financial boost in its bid 
to secure a metropolitan presence. At the 1980 state election, for 
example, the Nationals were prepared to spend $80,000 on the seat 
of Toowong alone. It was an expensive gamble, and the seat was 
not won, but the party's strategy was principally to establish a 
meaningful presence in the area. To do so they selected a high-
profile candidate (realtor Peter Forrest), spent a great deal of 
money, and got the party known locally. In an immediate sense 
the bid failed, but the investment paid off at the election three 
years later when, in the wake of the coalition's self-destruction, 
television personality Earle Bailey won the seat for the party. 
Entrenching "the club" 
The Bjelke-Petersen Foundation may have been set up with a 
fund-raising objective, but in reality it also helped to generate a 
new wisdom in Queensland. This was that the National party was 
not only the way to go for business, but also the only way to go for 
anyone with "a positive approach", to use Sir Joh's term. 
Senior figures in the National party or others closely associated 
with it frequently had honours bestowed on them by Buckingham 
Palace. For example, six of the seven 1982 directors of the Bjelke-
Petersen Foundation - more precisely, its trustee company NPA 
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Nominees Pty Ltd - have received knighthoods on the recommen-
dation of the Queensland government. These were Sir Robert 
Sparkes (state president). Sir Charles Holm (senior vice-pres-
ident). Sir William Allen (party state treasurer), Sir Edward Lyons 
(party trustee). Sir Roderick Proctor (party trustee), and Sir 
Ernest Savage. And while overlapping significantly with the 
previous group, it is noteworthy that by the time Bjelke-Petersen 
rethed twelve members of the Natioucd party's powerful State 
Management Committee had received imperial honours on the 
recommendation of the state government. These included - in 
addition to Sparkes, Holm, Allen, and Sir Joh himself - Sir Sydney 
Roberts, Sir Frank Moore, and Sir Douglas Logan. Three others 
were recipients of OBEs and two others MBEs. 
Business identities regarded as supporters of the National party, 
or personal supporters of Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, commonly 
received high honours or were offered appointments on the boards 
of various government bodies. Of course, many of these people 
were distinguished in their fields and were thus obvious candidates. 
Yet despite the talents of the individuals concerned, the message 
was being conveyed to the business community that a close 
association with the National party could be very rewarding. Sir 
Roderick Proctor, a party trustee and successful business man, was 
appointed chairman of the SGIO Building Society. Sir Edward 
Lyons, a merchant banker and party trustee who had developed a 
close personal friendship with Sir Joh, was appointed chairman of 
the Totalisator Agency Board (TAB) in 1981. Sir Ernest Savage 
was appointed to chair two public sector-related inquiries. 
Advertising expert Sir Frank Moore, a member of the National 
party State Management Committee, was also appointed chairman 
of the Queensland Tourist and Travel Corporation. And another 
advertising identity, Fred Maybury, who was also a member of the 
Management Committee as weU as a key National party activist in 
the business community, received appointment first as the state 
government's advertising officer and later as Queensland Pavilion 
Commissioner during World Expo. 
Honours were even made available to southerners who came to 
Queensland and publicly empathised with the "positive approach" 
of the Bjelke-Petersen government. A Sydney insurance business 
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man, Justin Hickey, who was virtually unknown in Queensland at 
the time, amazed the Queensland establishment by being awarded 
a knighthood in the Queensland government's honours list of 1979. 
Sir Justin's account of the events surrounding his award is 
revealing; he had this to say in an interview with Peter Ross on 
ABC TV's Four Comers on 25 September 1982. 
Justin Hickey: Mr Bjelke-Petersen came to me and said, I'm 
trying to raise $200,000 on which the Federal Government will 
subsidise four to one, to raise a million dollars to build a senior 
citizens hospice, if I can use that term, and naturally as a 
politician he wanted to build it in his electorate. I said, right, 
how much can you raise? And he said, I feel we can raise 
$100,000. I said write my name down for another hundred. 
Interviewer. Just like that? 
Justin Hickey: Just like that. 
Interviewer. You could understand the perceptions that you 
bought your knighthood, to put it crudely? 
Justin Hickey: That has been well aired, indeed yes. 
Interviewer. Which came first, the cheque and the knighthood 
or . . . 
Justin Hickey: The cheque and the knighthood. 
Interviewer Or the $100,000? 
Justin Hickey : Oh no I paid the $100,000 before I ever received 
the knighthood. 
The state government was even charged by its opponents with 
discriminating among National party electorates in terms of the 
extent of pork-barrelling of imperial honours. In August 1985 the 
deputy Opposition leader, Tom Burns, told state parliament that 
over the preceding five years seventeen people in Sir Joh's own 
electorate, Barambah, had been recognised for outstanding 
community service, and only one in Burdekin, another National 
party electorate with a similar population. 
Not only were public positions made available to National party 
sympathisers but also appointments were sometimes made without 
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any regard for the clash of interest they might seem to create for 
the incumbent. The appointment of Keith Wilhams as chairman 
of the Gold Coast Waterways Authority was a case in point, 
although not even the objection of the then local National party 
state member (Doug Jennings) prompted a reconsideration of the 
decision. Williams at the time was also owner of Sea World, a 
large aquatic tourist attraction at the Gold Coast. It is situated on 
the Broadwater, a channel of water which comes under the 
jurisdiction of the Gold Coast Waterways Authority. 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen simply did not recognise such conflicts of 
interest or, if he did, he ignored them. The only consideration for 
him was "to get the job done". To that end, he was of the view 
that all that was needed was a commitment to the project. Yet the 
practice of appointing friends of the government to important 
public positions cast some doubt on who was doing what and for 
whom. The National party continually preached the gospel of free 
enterprise, but the state government ensured that major develop-
ment mterests were not open to free market forces. They were 
supervised in a very personal way by National party supporters. 
While the state government in Queensland has historically taken 
a lead in the development of the economy and the provision of 
infrastructure, it was becoming uncertain whether significant 
private enterprise could even operate unless it was approved of by 
the National party apparatus. 
For those developers with "sound" connections, however, life in 
Corporate Queensland was very sweet. Indeed, the state govern-
ment was even prepared to enact special-purpose legislation to 
enable particular projects to proceed. In the case of Sanctuary 
Cove at Hope Island, just north of the Gold Coast, the government 
passed legislation overriding local council planning requirements 
to allow the developer to develop low-lying land. That developer 
was, coincidentally, prominent Bjelke-Petersen supporter Mike 
Gore. In another case special legislation was passed to allow a 
developer, Girvan Brothers Pty Ltd, to override local government 
requirements in developing the Toowong Village shopping centre. 
Special legislation was also enacted to allow the development of 
the Iwasaki International Tourist Centre at Yeppoon in central 
Queensland. In that case an agreement was established whereby 
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the developer was provided with crown land and leasehold 
concessions in return for a substantial investment in an inter-
national resort. Although the Japanese developer appeared 
subsequently to have breached the agreement, Joh Bjelke-Petersen 
tolerated these breaches. This was despite growing doubts about 
the project even from inside the National party. 
The National party in government has sought to create the 
impression that it supports free enterprise. In reality, however, it 
has sought principally to cater to those who support it. It sees 
itself exclusively as a party in power. It has cultivated an environ-
ment in which the distinction between party and government has 
been lost, and the distinction between public and private interest 
is either not recognised or not accepted as a relevant considera-
tion. 
For those who aligned themselves with the Nationals, the 
government-business relationship has worked splendidly. Certain 
developers over the years have been given control of prime city or 
beachfront land without going to tender. Others have benefited 
from "fast track" approvals which were justified on the basis of 
overcoming unnecessary bureaucratic delays. In reality, such 
approvals were nothing more than attempts to overcome by-laws 
which had been designed to protect the public's interest. In the 
process, windfall profits were sometimes conferred at the expense 
of the community as a whole. 
In other instances the government has unhesitatingly intervened 
in the tendering process to assist a favoured group. For example, 
the Port of Brisbane Authority in 1979 recommended that the 
contract for stevedoring operations at the new container terminal 
in Brisbane should be awarded to Associated Container Transport-
ation (Australia) Ltd. It made this decision on the basis of 
favourable advice received from the United Graziers Association, 
the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce, the Customs Agents 
Association, and Hungerfords, an independent accounting firm. 
Cabinet subsequently advised the Port Authority that it should 
favourably consider an alternative proposal by Brisbane Wharves 
and Wooldumping Pty Ltd (BWWD), a subsidiary of the P&Q 
shipping line. The chief executive of BWWD was Mr Brian 
Baillie, who at the time was also Queensland head of P&Q. 
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Cabinet ultimately overturned the recommendation of the Port 
Authority and awarded the stevedoring agreement to the consor-
tium of BWWD and ANL. This decision was apparently based on 
a report to State Management Committee by Sir Sydney Roberts, 
a rural industry businessman who was also the Nationals' im-
mediate past state president. It should also be added that BWWD 
aheady controUed the existing container terminal situated on the 
Hamilton reach of the Brisbane River. In other words, the 
decision on the new terminal meant that BWWD effectively 
monopohsed control of container terminal facilities at the Brisbane 
port. The squabble prompted one member of the Port Authority, 
the ALP Brisbane Lord Mayor Frank Sleeman, to resign his 
Authority position in protest. Even Sir Charles Barton, at the time 
the Authority's chairman and himself a distinguished public 
servant, obhquely criticised the state government. Sir Charles, who 
suggested that "Cabinet may have had more information than the 
Authority" (although the evidence was to the contrary), also noted 
that other matters of a political nature might have been involved 
in the decision (Weekend Australian, 7-8 April 1979; Telegraph, 
24 April 1979). 
Evidence to the Fitzgerald Inquiry suggested that much less 
subtle oiling of the party machine was also going on. Counsel 
assisting the inquiry, Doug Drummond QC, revealed that two 
construction companies won $86 million worth of Queensland 
government contracts after donating to the National party 
(Courier-Mail, 6 December 1988). An international construction 
company, Citra Constructions Ltd, donated $250,000 to the 
Nationals in February 1983 and, sbc months later, was awarded a 
$2.5 miUion contract to build the Bundaberg Maternity Hospital. 
Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen responded to Mr Drummond by denying 
that he knew of the donation at the time the contract was awarded. 
Nevertheless Citra was awarded the tender against the advice of 
both the Bundaberg Hospital Board and the Health Department 
as well as the recommendation of the Health minister. Initially the 
tender had been awarded to Evans Harch at a fixed price of $2,497 
milhon, and indeed this was announced in a press release from the 
Health minister on 7 October 1983. The matter was then deferred 
in cabinet for several weeks. On 24 October the premier informed 
cabmet that Citra had won the contract. The eventual bill was 
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some $69,000 more than the fixed-price contract offered by Evans 
Harch. 
Citra also was granted government contracts totalling $59 milhon 
as part of the Queensland mainline electrification scheme. Mr 
Drummond also told the inquiry that another company, Electric 
Power Transmissions, donated $90,000 to the National party within 
days of being awarded a $25 milhon rail electrification contract 
(Courier-Mail, 6 December 1988). 
But the government did not merely look after those in the 
business community who supported it. It was also very generous 
to its own kind. The families and friends of certain ministers, or 
certain individuals close to the government, were treated generous-
ly. Also, some retired or defeated National party parliamentarians 
were found attractive jobs. Former National party deputy leader 
Ron Camm was appointed chairman of the Queensland Sugar 
Board, former MLA for Wynnum Bih Lamond made chairman of 
the Queensland Small Business Association, former MLA for 
Mourilyan Vicki Kippin a departmental haison officer for north 
Queensland, and former minister Max Hodges appointed chairman 
of the Port of Brisbane Authority. 
In 1986 the Queensland Police minister. Bill Gunn, permitted the 
police commissioner. Sir Terence Lewis and Lady Lewis to reside 
for some months in the ministerial suite on the top floor of PoUce 
headquarters while their new home was being built in the inner 
Brisbane suburb of Paddington. Both Lewis and Gunn defended 
the arrangement on the grounds that a serving police officer was 
entitled to a rent allowance of $7 per fortnight, and that, while 
using the ministerial suite, Lewis was not claiming that allowance. 
Yet the availability of that accommodation, at what was a pepper-
corn rental, was a privilege not available to other police officers. 
The arrangement also raised the separate question of whether it 
was even appropriate for the minister and the police commissioner 
to come to such an agreement between themselves. 
The electorates of ministers, or those of their families, also 
sometimes received remarkably generous levels of support from 
the public purse. In August 1982, for example, a Bjelke-Petersen 
family company purchased two large properties in the vicinity of 
Duaringa, a township of some 350 people in central Queensland. 
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Over the next several years some $10 million in state government 
funds was earmarked for improvments in the district; most of 
it was intended to be pumped into projects which, coincidentally, 
benefited the Bjelke-Petersen family properties. This included $4 
million for a weir at Tartrus on the upper reaches of the Macken-
zie River, the beneficiaries of which would include the Bjelke-
Petersen properties, and a further $3 million for a bridge over the 
river. This project, however, only reached the design stage before 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen's retirement. Some $1.5 million was allocated 
for roadworks on the Apis Creek Road leading past the Ten Mile 
property owned by the Bjelke-Petersen family; $377,000 of that 
amount was approved the very day after the Main Roads Depart-
ment assumed responsibility for these roadworks from the local 
shire council. A new police station and cell block were built in 
Duaringa in 1984 at a cost of $472,353. Also, a new school 
building (to accommodate eight students) was built near Ten Mile 
at a cost of $131,738. Upgrading of the local Duaringa racetrack 
was also undertaken, even though only three or four race meetings 
had been held there over the previous three years (Courier-Mail, 
18 February 1989). 
Apart from the actual size of the largesse which was targeted for 
Duaringa, documents tendered to the Fitzgerald Inquiry regarding 
these matters suggested an involvement by the premier's own 
office. Normally such decisions are made at departmental level. 
According to journalist Phil Dickie, the documents also revealed 
that an officer of a foreign bank "had to go along" with a request 
for a loan to a Bjelke-Petersen family company and that a shortfall 
in the loan was made up with money which a Japanese company 
paid in options it never exercised. The Fitzgerald Inquiry saw a 
telex from a bank officer called in by Sir Joh, which read, in part: 
For a proper assessment of this request the information 
available at this time is rather limited, but we think that we 
have to go along as this would open further avenues in 
Queensland. I am told we will always be approached first for 
Queensland Government and semi-government finance 
requirements. If this application does not find your consent we 
believe that it would affect negatively our business in this State. 
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At the Inquiry Sir Joh angrily denied he had ever suggested 
anything of the sort. (Courier-Mail, 18 February 1989). 
Neither ministers nor party officials have attempted to disguise 
apparent conflicts between public duty and private interest. In 
1986 certain dairy quotas, known as entitlements, were diverted 
from the Darling Downs into the south-east corner of the state 
where several prominent National party identities have connections 
with the dairy industry. Among those who stood to gain from the 
diversions were the family of senior government minister Russ 
Hinze, whose family supphed milk to the South Coast Dairy Co-
Op Association Ltd, and Sir Charles Holm, senior vice-president 
of the Queensland National party and also a dairy farm owner m 
the south-east. Another identity involved in the same controversy 
was Sam Doumany, a former Liberal minister and subsequently a 
member of the National party. Doumany was the state govern-
ment-appointed chairman of the Queenslemd Milk Board. 
Some ministers mixed their public and personal business 
interests very carelessly. Former Local Government and Racing 
minister Russ Hinze attracted persistent criticism during his career 
for aheged conflicts of interest. To the Fitzgerald Inquiry he also 
revealed just how fortunate he and his wife Fay had been in their 
business dealings. For example, he said that construction magnate 
Sir Leslie Thiess had not asked for the repayment of loans 
totalling $550,000 which he had made to Fay Hinze over an eight-
year period. Hinze also told the inquiry that he and Fay were 
paying rent of just $1 per month for a Gold Coast penthouse 
owned by Sir Leslie. In separate evidence to the inquiry, however, 
it was heard that Sir Leslie had gained state government contracts 
over the period when the loans were being made, that is, when 
Hinze was minister for Local Government. Those contracts 
included one for Townsville's Breakwater Casino and a large coal 
contract. 
But the system did not merely reward party loyalists and business 
supporters. Senior public servants were similarly favoured. They 
received high honours, appointments to plum government or semi-
government boards and post-retirement positions of influence 
inside and outside government, often in companies with sound 
business or personal connections either to the National party or to 
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Sh Joh. And while such appointments on the one hand may be 
seen as appropriate recognition of outstanding ability, they also 
reflect the extent to which corporations have viewed the ben-
eficiaries as assisting them to "do business" in Queensland. The 
controversy surrounding the $400,000 out-of-court defamation 
payment made by Alan Bond to Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen has not 
dampened the importance of this "doing business successfully" 
argument. In a television interview with Jana Wendt on Channel 
9 in early 1988 , referred to earlier. Bond suggested that he saw 
such a payment as necessary in order for him to deal successfully 
in Queensland. In later evidence before the Australian Broad-
casting Tribunal he suggested that he had not meant what he 
appeared to have said. The counsel assisting the ABT, however, 
suggested that Bond had been placed in a position of commercial 
blackmail by the then premier of Queensland (Courier-Mail, 7 
February 1989). 
The system which the Nationals have entrenched in Queensland 
encourages compliance with "the rules of the game". The "rules" 
do not permit criticism. Those who do not play the game, or who 
do not support the Nationals, or who criticise the standing 
arrangements, risk being ostracised. On a number of occasions Sir 
Joh effectively threatened electors in certain marginal seats by 
remarking that, if they did not return a National party member, 
they could expect to get nothing further from the government. 
One of the first of these incidents occurred in November 1977 
when the premier threatened that state government funds for the 
Lake Juhus Dam in the Mount Isa electorate would not necessarily 
continue if the sitting National MLA, Angelo Bertoni, lost the seat. 
As Bjelke-Petersen phrased it, "While I've got a worker for my 
party in Mt Isa, we will always play our part. Any other candidate 
will have no access to me at all" (Australian, 4 November 1977). 
Those who dared to criticise the government, or Sir Joh, were 
often attacked quite viciously. At the same political meeting where 
Bjelke-Petersen threatened the Lake Julius Dam funding the 
premier was asked by a woman in the crowd why he branded all 
anti-uranium campaigners as communists or left-wing radicals. He 
responded, "If you squawk like a crow, look like a crow and fly like 
a crow you'll be shot with the crows." It was an unfortunate 
attack. The lady questioner was a former Miss Australia. 
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Evidence before the Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed the extent to 
which the government was prepared to go in order to stifle 
criticism. Bjelke-Petersen confirmed what many had suspected 
about the government's handhng of street marches, namely, that 
the police force had been given power over street march permits 
for "political reasons". The inquiry also heard evidence that the 
government was prepared to use the pohce force to destroy its 
opponents, both Labor and Liberal. 
Up until 1986 the Nationals tended to ignore any criticisms 
alleging cronyism or other corrupt practices within the government 
or party appzuatus. However, this was somewhat harder to do 
after allegations levelled by one of the party's own trustees. Sir 
Roderick Proctor, that the government was guilty of cronyism and 
had made a charade of public tendering. 
Instead of acknowledging the problem, the party severed its ties 
with Sir Roderick. And when the Labor and Liberal parliamen-
tarians predictably took up his allegations, members of the 
government chose to defend themselves not on the floor of 
parliament but by issuing more than forty writs against those who 
had impugned the government's honesty. On the grounds of 
protecting the government's good name, the writs were taken out 
by all ministers. They were funded not by them, however, but by 
the public purse. Ironically, the government decided in the wake 
of the Fitzgerald Inquiry revelations not to proceed with many of 
the actions. 
For some people in Queensland, the system of doing business 
has apparently worked so well that government supporters were 
even prepared to donate, anonymously, tens of thousands of 
dollars in cash, dropping the amounts off at the premier's office. 
At the Fitzgerald Inquiry on 5 December 1988 Sir Joh told how 
people who didn't even leave their names had left $110,000 in 
donations in his office. He said that he had not involved himself 
wdth the source of the donations and his staff "probably didn't want 
to know either". Sir Joh went on to say that he and his staff did 
not issue receipts or keep notes on who made donations. And 
when asked by Commissioner Fitzgerald if it was unusual for large 
cash sums to be handed over as donations. Sir Joh replied, "No, 
not at all, sur." Mr Fitzgerald then asked what conversation had 
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been held with a Hong Kong business man before he had handed 
over a cash donation of $100,000 to Sir Joh's secretary. According 
to the former premier the man had indicated that he had wanted 
"to help the party, we are interested in the way you operate" 
(Courier-Mail, 6 December 1988). 
Propagating the regime and imposing its values 
By the 1980s the Nationals in Queensland had cultivated an 
environment whereby to attack the premier, the National party or 
the government was to risk being labelled un-Queensland, or anti-
Queensland. The government operated in a power vacuum 
without institutional impediment, while its propagation of the 
"Queensland first" dogma was continuously reinforced by the 
separate existence of strongly mobihsed party and government 
media machines and, in particular, by publicly funded political 
advertisements under the auspices of the state government. 
There has been no limit, in fact, to the government's prepared-
ness to use taxpayer-funded pohtical advertising to propagate the 
message that what was good for itself was automatically good for 
Queensland. Sometimes the government has managed to entice 
industry into this process of legitimation. For example, in 1985 
state cabinet decided to hold one of its normal Brisbane meetings 
not in the Executive Building but in the refurbished National Bank 
Building on the corner of Queen and Creek streets in the Brisbane 
central business district. The decision, while seemingly innocuous, 
was loaded with significance. The government was struggling in 
the opinion poUs and, with the next state election in prospect, was 
especially anxious to underline its commitment to, and reputation 
in, the business community. The Nationals were equally concerned 
to project a more moderate position on conservation issues in a 
bid to maintain their support base among metropolitan ex-Liberals. 
The rationale for holding a cabinet meeting in the historic venue 
was as a gesture in recognition of the building's centenary. The 
government may also have justified its decision on the basis that 
occasional cabinet meetings had been held there during the 1880s. 
But the real motivation for holding cabinet's 11 June 1985 meeting 
in the same building was political rather than historical, evidenced 
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by the costly commemorative booklet which the Premier's 
Department pubhshed for the occasion. The booklet not only 
depicted a close association between Sir Joh's government and a 
major banking organisation, thereby reminding people of the 
commitment to business, but it also contained extensive colour 
photography of a number of other buildings which the government 
had claimed to have preserved. There was also a personal 
message from the premier which contained suggestions that his 
government was strongly committed to heritage and conservation. 
The government has been interested, too, to propagate its own 
value systems and, if necessary, to impose behavioural and 
intellectual conformity on its citizens, notably through the state 
education system. Joh Bjelke-Petersen summarised his position in 
the following terms: 
Educators will get the message that we only allow wholesome, 
decent, practical material in schools. . . And we want the 
department, whoever is there, to get a clear understanding this 
is what the government intends to happen. (Courier-Mail, 20 
July 1982). 
During the coalition period the government directly involved 
itself in curriculum issues, banning several sets of curriculum 
materials used widely in other states. These included MACQS 
(Man: A Course of Study) and SEMP (Social Education Materials 
Project). This approach was further underlined after the Nationals 
assumed government in their own right, at least up until Bjelke-
Petersen's departure from the premiership. 
In March 1985 the Education minister, Lin Powell, warned 
teachers not to use a Human Rights Commission teaching kit 
dealing with issues including the law, citizenship and discrim-
ination. He described the kit as "nefarious rubbish". A book on 
the High Court was also banned because, in the words of the 
public service director-general of Education at the time, George 
Berkeley, it showed "a bias toward the Federal Government's 
centralist views of the court" (Age, 6 March 1986). Powell also 
announced that a Peace Studies kit would not be used in state 
schools because it was "communist-inspired". Meanwhile, the state 
government in 1984 instructed state school teachers that evolution 
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was to be taught only as a theory and that alternative (Old 
Testament) models about creation were to be provided. The 
Education minister then proceeded to organise "creation science 
seminars" from which University of Queensland scientists were 
excluded; they had wanted to attend the seminars to put the case 
for evolutionary creation. 
The government's evident position throughout all of these 
skirmishes was that it was prepared to take direct control of 
education policy in order to ensure that the "interests of the 
people" were protected. In reality, it was underlining its deter-
mination to propagate the moral and spiritual dimensions of 
Queensland's one-party state. 
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Change . . . 
The constitution of the Queensland National Party proclaims a 
commitment to "a society based on behef in God and loyalty to the 
Queen", to "democracy, hberty and individual enterprise", and to 
the "restriction of the power and size of government and taxation 
to the levels which least intrude into the hves of the people". As 
the foregoing chapters indicate, however, this rhetoric has been 
little more than a convenient facade to camouflage the nature of 
the governing machine and to rationalise its behaviour. 
The National party has enjoyed great success in Queensland. In 
1972 it was a narrowly based group threatened with electoral 
extinction. By the end of 1983 it had doubled its support and 
secured government in its own right. With the assistance of loaded 
electoral dice it achieved pre-eminence by superior political 
strategy and organisation and by an unrelenting and ruthless 
determination to entrench itself as the permanent party in 
government. But while the Nationals in power portrayed them-
selves as the party of free enterprise, economic development and 
moral righteousness, the Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed that during 
their stewardship politics in Queensland was rife with corruption. 
It is inappropriate to rest the blame entirely on the Nationals. 
Labor had enjoyed forty years of almost unbroken office in the 
state prior to 1957, and it was during this lengthy period that 
Queensland's one-party system, since refined, first emerged. 
Ironically, too, it was a Labor government in Queensland which, 
in the name of "balanced representation", introduced an electoral 
system which was later remodelled by its political opponents in 
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order to keep Labor out of office and to minimise the influence 
of the state Liberals. 
For the Nationals the zonal electoral system provided the 
building blocks of their regime and a buffer against political 
defeat. This advantage allowed the National party to propagate 
unchallenged its message of unfettered economic development for 
Queensland and underline its commitment to the moral protection 
of the state's inhabitants. 
The message behind all this was simple: the only path to 
prosperity for Queensland was with the Nationals. Criticism of 
any kind, or alternative views of the state's future, were dismissed 
with contempt as being un-Queensland, anti-Queensland and, 
therefore, illegitimate. 
Emphasis was continually placed on strong leadership, progress, 
and "getting things done" for Queensland. There was a disregard 
for the fate of institutions, such as the parliament, whose role it 
was to provide a check on the government's behaviour. Such 
checks were viewed as impediments, so their influence had to be 
neutrahsed. The Opposition was viewed similarly: by virtue of its 
position it was seen as having nothing positive to offer. In any 
case, the ALP Opposition seemed a good deal more interested in 
its own internal wranglings than in wresting government from its 
opponents. It was seldom viewed as a viable alternative. The 
National party was free to operate in what was largely a power 
vacuum. Provided it could keep its political opponents neutralised 
and its critics muzzled or discredited, it believed it could stay in 
office forever. 
The Nationals' perception of their invulnerability bred arrogance 
among those who wielded the power. Some came apparently to 
believe that they could do almost anything they wished, provided 
of course that the party organisation approved. Encouraged by 
the conviction that what was good for the Nationals was good for 
Queensland (and perhaps good for them personally), many within 
or close to the National party came to equate the roles of party 
and government. Government was for the benefit of the Nation-
als, while the public purse was something to be dispersed prin-
cipally amongst the party's supporters. There was no such thing 
as differentiating public duty from private interest. 
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The Nationals were able to dismiss criticism of the way the 
government did its business by pointing to the state's economic 
achievements, and to the major development projects the state 
continued to attract. The government employed the same 
dismissive strategy in dealing with more serious allegations of 
corruption, usually flatly refusing to acknowledge any possibility of 
such activity. For years this strategy worked well, but the 1986 
allegations of cronyism in the state government by National party 
trustee Sn Roderick Proctor made this "deny all" approach far less 
credible. 
The Fitzgerald Inquiry, which began in mid 1987, has revealed 
that over many years links had developed in Queensland between 
criminal and political networks. Crime and corruption became 
widespread and organised across a range of activities including 
bribery, prostitution, the operation of sex parlours and brothels, 
tax evasion, illegal gambling, SP betting, the rorting of ministerial 
expenses, protection rackets, money laundering and, probably, drug 
running. 
It also appears that corruption in Queensland had become 
increasingly more organised. Those holding influential public or 
official positions were gradually incriminated into corruption 
hierarchies. Crime and corruption came to be sanctioned or 
excused by key participants in the political and administrative 
order. Most importantly, by the mid 1980s not only had politicians 
become involved in crime and corruption, but evidence suggests 
that these forms of activity had become essential to the running of 
the machinery of government in Queensland. Corruption was vital 
to the operation of politics and policy-making in the state. 
Exposing the system: the impact of the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
The Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and 
Associated Police Misconduct, led by Tony Fitzgerald QC, was 
established by the state government in May 1987. The decision to 
establish the inquiry was taken by acting premier Bill Gunn while 
the premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, was overseas. Gunn's 
action probably had as much to do with jockeying for the leader-
ship in the National party (resulting from the anticipated departure 
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from state politics of Sir Joh) as it did with the pursuit of corrup-
tion. Gunn was one of the contenders for the premiership, and 
Bjelke-Petersen's own choice for his successor. But Gunn had an 
image problem with the public, who saw him as little more than a 
Joh clone. If nothing else, his decision to establish the inquiry 
gave him the opportunity to distinguish himself from the premier, 
and thus demonstrate his leadership qualities to parliamentary col-
leagues and the public alike. 
The Fitzgerald Inquiry was established as a hmited probe into 
alleged police misconduct. By the time it had completed taking 
pubhc evidence, however, it had become an investigation into 
Queensland's entire institutional fabric. The evidence had revealed 
how the processes of government in Queensland had deteriorated 
over a very long period of time. 
The hues of investigation pursued by the inquiry severely 
embarrassed the Nationals, yet the incoming premier, Mike Ahern, 
and Bill Gunn, who retained the deputy premiership, continued 
unequivocjdly to support it. They sought to represent the Ahern 
ministry as a totally new government watching events unfold with 
the concern only of an interested bystander. It was a difficult 
position to sustain: Ahern himself had been in parliament for 
twenty years, and a minister in the Bjelke-Petersen government for 
eight, and most of his cabinet had been members of Bjelke-
Petersen's ministry. 
While it is unlikely that Ahern can credibly portray his ministry 
as totally removed from the corruption his government is com-
mitted to purging, there is also little evidence in Australia to 
suggest that the exposure of corruption inevitably leads to electoral 
destruction. What is potentially electorally harmful, however, is if 
the revelations of corruption hinder the capacity of the government 
to govern. 
There are signs to suggest that this may be happening with the 
Queensland Nationals. The sustained impetus of the Fitzgerald 
investigation has touched a series of troublesome pressure points 
mside the National party. This is hardly surprising. Persons or 
groups inside the party, or close to it, who had been part of the 
previous decision-making processes were threatened by any 
attempt to expose the way in which the government had previously 
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conducted its business. Pressure from these quarters has made it 
difficult for the Nationals to adjust to political life after Bjelke-
Petersen and to maintain a united front concerning the way 
forward. Ahern and Gunn have addressed the corruption issue, 
but unless they can contain the resulting internal fallout there is a 
possibility that the party could implode. 
The investigatory tentacles of the Fitzgerald Inquiry have latched 
on to certain areas where corruption has flourished, but the time 
and resources of the inquiry are limited. And although the inquiry 
may be able to target a few individuals, or a range of practices, the 
implementation of reforms - however thorough and useful the 
recommendations - depends on the goodwiU of politicians, the 
active support of the public service, judiciary and police, and the 
watchfulness of the media. 
No panaceas 
Despite Mike Ahern's promise to implement Fitzgerald's recom-
mendations lock, stock and barrel, some of his political colleagues 
may cavil at reforms that affect their own interests. Public 
servants, too, may resist reforms that affect their entrenched 
privileges. 
It is likely that, in the wake of the Fitzgerald Report, a range of 
structural remedies will be raised in the community, one of which 
will probably be the reintroduction of an upper house of parha-
ment. The absence of an upper house in the Queensland parlia-
ment has been seen as one reason for the state's less-accountable 
political system. However, an analysis of the performance of 
upper houses elsewhere, or even of Queensland's own Legislative 
Council prior to its abolition in 1922, does not suggest this as a 
panacea. 
It can be argued that the absence of an upper house in Queens-
land may have contributed to a political environment which 
spurned compromise. This was because there were no apparent 
limitations on the power of the party with a majority on the floor 
of the Legislative Assembly. But the defunct Queensland Legisla-
tive Council could hardly be idealised as a democratic safeguard, 
upholder of accountability, or defender of the people. On the 
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contrary, historian Barry Nethercote argues in fact that it was 
conceived as, and always acted as a "brake on democracy", and as 
a "protector of vested interests". Being a house of life appointees, 
as it was in Queensland, it was responsible to no one; its revisory 
functions were poorly performed and it acted mostly in the self-
interest of the groups its members represented. 
None of the Legislative Councils which have survived elsewhere 
in Australia has evolved in the direction in which advocates of a 
restored upper chamber in Queensland hope for. Some of the 
more severe electoral malapportionments in Austrahan history 
have occurred in state upper houses. Not one Legislative Council 
of the five that remain was even elected by adult suffrage until 
1950, the last one being New South Wales, La 1979. 
State upper houses have not prevented government corruption 
and cronyism or pohtical scandals. Despite their role as chambers 
where the administration of government can be scrutinised, 
Legislative Councils did not prevent the land scandals in Victoria 
during the latter years of Rupert Hamer's premiership, or the 
collapse in Western Australia of Rothwells Bank, or prison 
administration corruption in New South Wales which led to the 
ministerial demise of Rex Jackson. Nor has the interest of 
Legislative Councils in such matters necessarily inspired interest or 
confidence within the community. The Western Australian 
Legislative Council's investigation of a public works project in 1988 
drew no public submissions, even though it invited them. 
The practical difficulty of reintroducing a Legislative Council in 
Queensland is immense. The single house (unicameral) 
arrangement is one of four matters entrenched within the Queens-
land Constitution, so that a proposal to reintroduce the Legislative 
Council would be required to be placed before the people of 
Queensland in a referendum. Queenslanders would be most 
unlikely to actually vote in favour of the proposition, especially if 
a net increase in the number of politicians was involved. 
In any case, pubhc debate on the effects of having no upper 
house deflects criticism from the shortcomings in existing mech-
anisms or institutions. Politicians may therefore be only too 
willing to initiate public debate about a non-existent institution 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
160 Working The System 
and propose it as a simple and single solution to all that is wrong. 
The idea has httle to offer. 
The establishment by the Ahern government of a Public 
Accounts Committee in Queensland is a welcome initiative in 
strengthening the parliament's ability to secure a measure of 
accountability from the government. Once again, however, this 
machinery measure should not be regarded as enough. It will be 
effective only to the extent allowed by its legislation, the wish of its 
members and staffers, and the requirements of the media or other 
critics. Freedom of information legislation is another avenue 
which the media could use to maintain scrutiny, especially 
regarding government tendering practices. But if there is no real 
commitment to the principles of this legislation, it could be used 
defensively by the government. The same apphes if there is a 
move to widen the ombudsman's powers to include the police. In 
New South Wales the ombudsman is empowered to investigate the 
police, but that alone does not prevent corruption. 
In any case, initiatives such as these should not be considered for 
implementation singly. Introduced piecemeal, they may achieve 
little but, if implemented together, they could make a difference 
by ensuring some meaningful level of public accountability. 
Is change possible? 
When Mike Ahern assumed the premiership he committed himself 
to a vision of excellence, to public accountability, and to ending 
cronyism, patronage and corruption within the state government. 
In those terms he deserves credit for his strong support of the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry, despite the haemorrhaging its investigations 
have caused within the National party. The new premier has also 
presided over the establishment of other mechanisms which should 
ensure greater public accountability on the part of the state 
government. These include parliamentary public accounts and 
public works committees, a pecuniary interest register for all 
parliamentarians, a code of conduct for public servants, and a 
foreign land register. 
There are other signs, however, which suggest that since Ahern's 
accession not very much of substance has changed inside the 
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National party, the state government apparatus, or even the 
parliament. A number of examples follow. 
• National party identities are still being appointed to plum 
government jobs. National party treasurer Sir William Allen 
was appointed chairman of Suncorp; he subsequently resigned 
as party treasurer, but he has now been appointed a party 
trustee. Senior party identity and "Joh for PM" strategist Fred 
Maybury was appointed a member of the Board of the Queen-
sland Tourist and Travel Corporation as well as the executive 
chairman of the state government's Events Corporation. 
Another state body, the Queensland Industry Development 
Corporation is now chaired by Mr CJ. Brennan, who is also the 
vice-president of the Darling Downs zone of the Queensland 
National party. Other prominent Nationals have been appointed 
to the QIDC Board since Mike Ahern took over as premier. 
• The Ahern administration is just as prepared as the Bjelke-
Petersen government was to use taxpayer funds to support 
blatantly political causes. It did so in the 1988 federal referen-
dum campaign on the pretext of protecting the interests of 
Queensland. In 1989 the government admitted that it had used 
taxpayer funds to pay the legal costs of a small business which 
was involved in a voluntary employment agreement hearing. 
• The evidence remains as strong as ever that the National party 
organisation both monitors and directly involves itself in the 
decision-making processes of the government. Some of the 
evidence for this was provided in chapter 5. 
• Notwithstanding the events of 1987 and 1988, elements within 
the Queensland police force still behave as though they were 
above or beyond the law. Not only does one contingent of 
officers badly misbehave during a police football carnival in 
Toowoomba, but also it is revealed that other police resist 
cooperating in a government-appointed investigation of the 
matter. 
• The Ahern government - despite its commitment to account-
abihty - has made it illegal to publish information which is under 
consideration by the new Pubhc Accounts Committee. 
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• Ministers are still taking family members and substantial 
entourages of public service staff and party colleagues on trips 
which are of questionable value to the administration of gover-
ment affairs. 
Changing the system in Queensland will not be achieved just by 
the shock value of Mr Fitzgerald's report, or by simply pushing an 
individual out of the premiership or a government out of office. 
The root problem is an attitudinal one, £md it requires an attit-
udinal solution. 
Those who have wielded power in Queensland over many years 
have worked the system to its limit. They have felt secure m domg 
so because they were electorally safe, and because they believed 
that the electorate's only concern was that the government protect 
the people by delivering the economic goods. 
The Nationals' attitude was dismissive of critics and utterly 
resistant to change; it was also one in which the incimibent regime 
came to regard itself not as providing stewardship of the govern-
ment, but rather, complete ownership of it. Public and private 
interests were not distinguished, and the legitimate role of the 
political Opposition to provide criticism and an alternative 
viewpoint was neither acknowledged nor understood; meanwhile, 
those who criticised the one-party line could expect to be muzzled 
and neutralised. 
The Fitzgerald Inquiry has provided hard evidence to support 
these claims. It also has established in the community's mind a 
clear link between hip-pocket interests and the seething corruption 
which has flourished in Queensland. 
While it is encouraging that all three major political parties in 
Queensland now acknowledge the corruption issue as a major 
problem, there will be institutional resistance to the implemen-
tation of reforms. Perhaps the new generation of pohticians in 
Queensland will be prepared to tackle that resistance and continue 
the process of enlivening the community's interest in the way it is 
governed. This will not be easily achieved because the prevailing 
cynicism about politicians tends to encourage within the com-
munity a feeling of helplessness and wonder about whether it all 
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matters. But if the community is able to be convinced that such 
matters are important, it may well be possible to draw a link 
between the general public's economic self-interest and the 
corruption of politicians and governments. And if the community 
does draw that hnk, and does understand that cronyism and 
corruption do have a cost - a cost against society as well as a direct 
economic cost against the people - then perhaps the community 
will expect better from their elected representatives and their 
pubhc officials. Perhaps, too, the community will be less prepared 
to tolerate the behaviour of those who hke to regard the public 
purse as a private and bottomless feeding trough. 
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APPENDIX A 
ADVICE ESTABLISHING THE VALIDY OF THE STATE MANAGEMENT 
COMMriTEE TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE PARLL\MENTARY 
PARTY 
Minister for Justice and Attorney-General 
POSTAL OPO. Bra 1601, Bratani. CHi. « )L OfTlCE: Suit Liw BuilcSnt Dr, Ann k Cxortt StitOi. Brutone 
THiPHONE: m CKl TELEX (JJUST <II78. W 0I6S. FACSIMILE. 2280641 
26th November, 1987. 
HEHORANDUH : 
We have been asked to advise as to the 
legitimacy of a meeting of the State Parliamentary 
National Party convened by the Management Committee 
yesterday and to be held at 10 o'clock this morning. In 
examining this question, it is necessary to refer to a 
number of the Clauses of the National Party of 
Australia - Queensland Constitution. 
Clause 20 catalogues the Units of the Party. 
Amongst these are Central Council, the Management 
Committee and the State Parliamentary Party. 
Provisions with respect to the State 
Parliamentary Party are made in Clauses 103 to 106. 
Clause 103 states:-
"The State Parliamentary Party shall 
consist of members of the Party elected to 
the State Parliament as candidates endorsed 
by the Party and such other members of the 
Party who are elected to the State 
Parliament as the Party shall determine." 
Clause 104 states:-
"The State Parliamentary Party shall 
appoint a Leader, Deputy Leader, and such 
other Officers as it may decide, and shall 
govern its affairs according to its own 
rules. " 
Clauses 105 and 106 deal with the role of the 
State Parliamentary Party with regard to the 
implementation of the Party platform and policy decisions 
of Central Council and State Conference and do not impact 
on the question upon which our advice Is sought. 
It will be noted that Clause IQl) states that the 
State Parliamentary party "shall govern its affairs 
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according to Its own rules". No formal rules for the 
conduct of meetings of the State Parliamentary Party have 
been made to date. The point in contention Is that, at 
Its last meeting prior to the adjournment of Parliament, 
the State Parliamentary Party entrusted to the Honourable 
the Premier the responsibility of calling the next 
meeting. 
Despite requests from a number of members that 
an early meeting be convened, he declined to do so and a 
number of National Party Members of Parliament (believed 
to be 3I) requested the Management Committee to convene a 
meeting. 
The Management Committee met yesterday (the 25th 
November, 1987) and almost unanimously fixed a meeting 
for this morning. 
The Management Committee, the membership of 
which Is set out In Clause 91 and which is widely 
representative of the Executive and the Units of the 
Party, has a number of powers conferred on it by the 
Constitution. In particular, Clause 93 states:-
"The Management Committee shall, subject to 
the provisions hereof, have power to manage all 
the affairs of the Party. It shall not have 
power to alter the provisions hereof or the 
platform and policy of the Party. In 
particular, and subject as aforesaid:-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) it shall exercise full control over all 
member,^ and Units of the Party, receive 
financial statements and reports from Party 
Units and hear and determine disputes; 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) it may exercise the powers vested in 
Central Council when It deems necessary and 
any such actions shall be submitted to the 
next meeting of Central Council for 
ratification and up to that date any action 
so taken shall be valid whether or not 
Central Council ratifies the actions. 
It will be noted that Clause 93(c) permits the 
Management Committee to exercise full control over all 
members and Units of the Party. Clause 93(f) enables It 
to "exercise the powers vested in Central Council when it 
deems necessary"-
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The membership of Central Council is recited In 
Clause 79. Clause 80 Is in the following terms:-
"Central Council shall In all matters 
subject to specific directions herein 
contained and to decisions of Annual or 
Special State Conferences exercise full 
control over the affairs of the Party and 
subject as aforesaid Its decisions on all 
matters shall be final and binding on all 
members and Party Units." 
It will be noted that one of the powers of 
Central Council is to "exercise full control over the 
affairs of the Party". 
Clause 82 is in the following terms:-
"Notwlthstanding anything to the contrary 
contained herein, should the foregoing 
powers conferred on Central Council be 
insufficient to deal with any exigency that 
may arise, authority is vested in it to 
take such action as it considers to be 
appropriate in the interests of the Party, 
provided that no such action shall 
contravene the spirit hereof. Every such 
action of Central Council shall be recorded 
In its minutes, and be reported to the next 
following State Conference." 
It Is our opinion that, taking the 
abovementloned Clauses of the Constitution in 
combination, it cannot be asserted that the meeting of 
the State Parliamentary Party convened by the Management 
Committee is incompetent to decide the question of 
Leadership of the Parliamentary Party. In other words, 
it is our opinion that the meeting has been validly 
convened. 
m^ 
Minister for Justice 
and Attorney-General 
Solicitor General. 
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CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE PARLLAMENTARY PARTY TO THE 
QUEENSLAND GOVERNOR SIGNALLING THE ABILITY OF MIKE 
AHERN TO FORM A GOVERNMENT 
26th November, 1987. 
His Excellency Sir Walter Campbell Q.C. 
Governor of Queensland 
Government House 
Fernberg Road 
BARDON Q. 4065 
Hay it please Your Excellency, 
At a duly convened meeting of members of the State Parliamentary 
National Party held in Brisbane today, it was resolved that all 
elective positions be declared vacant and new elections held for 
those positions. 
As a result of the election held consequent upon that 
resolution, I was elected Parliamentary Leader of the National 
Party, and therefore I enjoy the support of the majority of the 
ruling Party of the Parliament as will be noted by the attached 
signatures. 
As Leader of the ruling Parliamentary Party, I am able to form a 
government and assure supply to the Crown. No other Member of 
the Parliament is in a position to give such an absolute 
assurance. 
I accordingly request that Your Excellency issue to me a 
Commission to form a government and withdraw any Commission 
existing at the time of receipt of this letter. 
I forward also Opinions of the Crown Law Officers and of Messrs. 
G.L. Davies Q.C. and C D . Gilbert relating to the matters which 
Vour Excellency is now called upon to determine, which may be of 
assistance to Your Excellency. 
Yours faithfully, 
/<yt^^'j(^C(/^'<^-^y^..^^ 
Parliamentary Leader of the National Party 
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SCHEOai£ 
We, the undersigned members of the State Parliamentary National 
Party, hereby acknowledge that we have read the contents of the 
attached correspondence and our agreement with its contents. 
NAME 
AHERN M.J. 
ALISON G. 
AUSTIN B.D. 
BERGHOFER C.J. 
BJELKE-PETERSEN, 
S i r J o h 
BOOTH D.J. 
BORBIDGE R.E. 
BURREKET T.A. 
CHAPMAN Y.A. 
CLAUSON P.J. 
COOPER T.R. 
ELLIOTT J.A. 
FITZGERALD A.A. 
FRASER H.D.J. 
GATELY L.F. 
GIBBS I.J. 
GILMORE T.J.G. 
GLASSON W.H. 
GUNN W.A.M. 
HARPER N.J. 
HENDERSON I.T. 
HINTON D.G. 
HINZE, R.J. 
HOBBS H.W.T. 
/•IriRveV L.-f. 
ELECTORATE 
Landsborough 
Maryborough 
Nicklin 
Toowoomba South 
Barambah 
Warwick 
Surfers Paradise 
Townsville 
Pine Rivers 
Redlands 
Roma 
Cunningham 
Lockyer 
Springwood 
Currumbin 
Albert 
Tablelands 
Gregory 
Somerset 
Auburn 
Mount Gravatt 
Broadsound 
South Coast 
Warrego 
orie£r>/6L.or^% 
SIGNATURE 
ytH^^^J^Cc^^-'t^^ 
/ ^ > C c - WJa^-xJi^ 
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HYND T . S . 
KATTER R . C . 
LANE D . F . 
LESTER V . P . 
UNGARD K.R . 
LITTLEPROUD E . G . 
McCAULEY D . E . 
HcKECHNIE P . R . 
HcPHIE A . C . 
HENZEL M.R. 
MUNTZ G.H. 
NEAL D.McC. 
NELSON B.A. 
NEWTON L . E . 
POWELL L.W. 
RANDELL J . H . 
ROW E.G. 
SHERRIN C.A. 
SIMPSON G . L . 
SLACK D . J . 
STEPHAN L.W. 
STONEMAN M.D. 
TENNI M . J . 
VEIVERS M. 
- 2 -
Nerang 
F l i n d e r s 
Mer thy r 
Peak Downs 
F a s s i f e r n 
Condamlne 
C a l l i d e 
Carnarvon 
Toowoomba North 
Mulgrave 
Whitsunday 
Balonne 
Aspley 
G la s shouse 
I s i s 
Mi ran i 
Hinch inbrook 
Mans f i e ld 
Cooroora 
B u r n e t t 
Gympie 
Burdek in 
Bar ron R i v e r 
S o u t h p o r t 
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PROPORTION OF VOTERS AND PROPORTION OF SEATS 
PER ZONE: 1977 AND 1985-86 REDISTRIBUTIONS 
Zone 1977 Redistribution' 1985-86 Redistribution* 
% of votes % of scats % of votes % of seats 
South Eastern Zone 
Brisbane 
Non-Brisbane 
Provincial Cities 
Western & Far Northern 
Gjuntry 
63.6 
36.3 
27.3 
17.1 
5.0 
14.3 
57.3 
32.9 
24.4 
15.9 
8.5 
18.3 
64.6 57.3 
Not specified 
Not specified 
16.0 14.6 
4.5 9.0 
14.8 19.1 
as at November 1977 state election 
The December 1984 figures were those employed by the Electoral Districts 
ODmmission in calculating the 1985-86 boundaries 
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QUEENSLAND REDISTRIBUTION COMMISSIONERS 
(1949 - 1986^ 
Name 
1949 The Hon. Mr. Justice 
Joseph Sheehy 
(chairman) 
Douglas Fraser 
Bernard Maguire 
1958 Douglas Fraser 
(chairman) 
John Harvey 
Percy Wright 
1971 Sir Douglas Fraser 
(chairman) 
Henry Radford 
Archibald Archer 
19f} Sir Douglas Fraser 
(chairman) 
Keith Redman 
Sir Archibald Archer 
ISiS John Andrews 
(chairman) 
Sir Thomas Covacevich 
Col Pearson 
Occupation/Background 
Judge of the Supreme Court of Qld 
Senior public service inspector; career 
public servant since 1919 
Principal Electoral Officer 
Public Service commissioner; 
previous redistribution commissioner 
(1949) 
Surveyor-General (since 1929) 
Barrister 
Retired Public Servant commissioner, 
previous redistribution commissioner 
(1949 and 1958) 
Principal Electoral Officer 
Retired grazier, company director 
Retired Public Service commissioner, 
previous redistribution commissioner 
(1949, 1958 and 1971) 
Principal Electoral Officer 
Retired grazier; company director, 
previous redistribution commissioner 
(1971) 
Agent-General in London; previously 
Chairman of the Public Service Board; 
and Gold Coast City Administrator 
Solicitor 
Under Secretary, Department of Justice 
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APPENDIX E 
QUEENSLAND STATE ELECnONS 1950^3 
TOTAL STATEWIDE PRIMARY VOTES 
AND SEATS WON BY EACH POLITICAL PARTY 
Total Country/ Liberal ALP Others 
No. of National 
seats 
% of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of 
vote seats vote seats vote seats vote scats 
1950 
1953 
1956 
1957 
1960 
1963 
1966 
1969 
1972 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
75 
75 
75 
75 
78 
78 
78 
78 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
89 
19.3 
18.8 
19.3 
19.9 
19J 
20.3 
18.9 
21.0 
19.9 
27.9 
26.9 
27.9 
38.9 
39.6 
20 
15 
16 
24 
26 
26 
27 
26 
26 
39 
35 
35 
43* 
49 
29.9 
21.3 
25.1 
22.2 
24.0 
23.8 
25.6 
23.7 
22.2 
31.1 
25.4 
26.9 
15.0 
16.5 
11 
8 
8 
18 
20 
20 
20 
19 
21 
30 
24 
22 
6* 
10 
46.9 
53.2 
51.2 
28.9 
39.9 
43.8 
43.8 
45.0 
46.7 
36.0 
42.8 
41.5 
44.0 
41.4 
42 
50 
49 
20 
25 
26 
26 
31 
33 
11 
23 
25 
32 
30 
3.9 
53 
3.4 
27.9 
16.6 
12.1 
11.4 
10.3 
11.0 
5.0 
4.8 
3.7 
0.9 
2.5 
2 
2 
2 
13 
7 
6 
5 
2 
2 
2 
, 
-
1 
-
includes Don Lane and Brian Austin in the National party 1983 total, even 
though their seats were actually secured by them as Liberals; they each 
changed to the National party within days of that election. 
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AUSTRALIAN LOWER HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT 
SITTING DAYS, 1967 - 1988 
Year Qld NSW Vic SA WA Tas C'wealth 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
69 
66 
55* 
70 
77 
55* 
76 
62* 
71 
59 
38* 
58 
70 
36* 
61 
54 
29* 
50 
49 
28* 
49 
46 
* Election year 
64 
55* 
63 
61 
57* 
55 
55* 
63 
58 
56* 
60 
49* 
60 
58* 
54 
53 
48 
45* 
46 
48 
58 
41* 
43* 
51 
50 
48* 
47 
55 
50* 
50 
57 
52* 
50 
58 
53* 
61 
65 
51* 
58 
44 
45* 
50 
50 
44* 
68 
59* 
83 
58* 
77 
71 
55* 
70 
58* 
60 
50* 
63 
37* 
59 
55 
56* 
62 
60 
57* 
49 
53 
52 
50 
59* 
66 
45 
47* 
72 
76 
50* 
57 
65 
41* 
68 
64 
47* 
69 
59 
50* 
61 
60 
43* 
59 
48 
59 
72 
44* 
69 
72 
53* 
61 
58 
48 
50* 
59 
54 
52* 
75 
60 
41* 
55 
47 
48 
48* 
66 
55 
62 
67 
51* 
73 
74 
60* 
81 
62* 
69* 
79 
68* 
75 
68 
51* 
62 
53 
49* 
52* 
66 
79 
74* 
65 
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ROLE OF PRINCIPAL ORGANISATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN 
THE NATIONAL PARTY OF AUSTRALIA (QLD) 
State Conference 
The annual State Conference of the National Party of Australia (Queensland) is 
responsible for determining the general policy of the party. Between 700 and 
8(X) voting delegates are eligible to attend (depending on the numbers of 
branches), including delegates from the Women's section of the party as well as 
from the Young Nationals. Each party branch is entitled to send one (1) voting 
delegate to State Conference. All Queensland-based parliamentary members 
(at both state and federal levels) have full voting rights. 
Central Council 
Central Council, which comprises some 150 delegates, meets at least four (4) 
times per year. Apart from administrative functions, Central Council is 
responsible for receiving and debating policy resolutions of lesser significance; 
it also has the final responsibility in the selection of candidates. The chairman 
of each State Electorate Council or Federal Divisional Council is automatically 
a delegate to the Central Council. The Women's Section and the Young 
Nationals have representation in their own right. All members of the 
parliamentary party, at either federal or state level, are members of Central 
Council. 
State Management Committee 
The State Management Committee, which meets monthly, manages the day-to-
day affairs of the party. It comprises the party's state president, two senior 
vice-presidents, fourteen zone vice-presidents, a number of members who are 
elected by the Slate Conference as its representatives on State Management 
Committee, and the leader of the state parliamentary party; one representative 
from each of the state and federal parliamentary parties is also appointed. 
State Electorate Councils 
Each State Electorate Council consists of delegates elected from each branch 
(including Women and Young Nationals as well as the senior branches) in the 
relevant State electorate. Each such Electorate Council is responsible for 
campaigning and electorate administration. General policy resolutions are 
ratified at each Electorate Council and then forwarded to cither Central 
Council or State Conference. 
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Party Policy Committees 
As at early 1989 there were twenty-seven (27) Party Policy Committees and a 
further four (4) Special Purpose Sub-Committees. The Party Policy 
Committees were as follows: Aboriginal and Island Affairs (chaired by Lady 
Pearl Logan); Ageing (Dr Dermot Lynch); Communications (Eric Powne); 
Conservation and Environment (Geoff Colless); Arts and Heritage (Mike 
Evans); Defence (Bob Katter Snr.); Education (Craig Sherrin until his 
appointment as a state government Minister. Chairmanship subsequently 
vacant); Employment, Training and Vocational Education (Huan Fraser); 
Fishing (Senator Ron Boswell); Health (Dr Dermot Lynch); Housing, Industry 
and Urban Land (Ernie Kingston); Immigration (Mendy Campbell); Industrial 
Relations (Hugh Bowers); Industry, Commerce and Economics (Keith 
Stenhouse); Justice (Bernard Ponting); Lands (Sir Robert Spwrkes); Local 
Government (Eric Powne); Minerals and Energy (Tony White); Primary 
Industries (Alan Shannon); Science and Technology (Graham Smith); Small 
Business 0an Thomas); Social Welfare (David Grace); Sport (Mick Veivers); 
Tourism (Paul Neville); Transport (Leo Gately); Water Resources (Roy 
Stainkey); and Works (Alan Butler). The four Special Purpose Sub-
committees were as follows: Horticultural (chaired by Len Stephan); Meat 
(John Bell); Drug (Mendy Campbell); and Youth Affairs (Russell Schroter). 
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